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THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH
Local governments around the world are almost invariably short of money. As a con-
sequence, most local governments are unable to provide adequately the local services 
that are needed by local citizens—services that are crucial for poverty reduction and 
economic development. This situation arises for many reasons: the mismatch between the 
functions assigned to local governments and the revenue sources assigned to them (the 
problem of vertical imbalance); the widely diﬀering levels of ﬁnancial resources between 
local governments (the problem of horizontal imbalance); inadequate or unpredictable 
transfers from central or state governments; weak revenue collection performance by 
local government; and poor expenditure management by local government. In most 
countries, it is a combination of all of these. But among these, the inadequacy of local 
revenue instruments is often a key issue, whether in developed, developing, or transitional 
countries. This problem is exacerbated in many developing and transitional countries 
because the local economy, on which local governments depend for their local revenues, 
is largely “informal” and therefore hard to tax.
This research project, under the LGI Fellowship scheme, was designed to identify 
whether and how local governments in developing and transitional countries can gen-
erate resources eﬀectively, eﬃciently, and equitably from their local economies when 
those economies are to a large extent informal. Studies were conducted during 2008–09 
by local researchers in six countries: Georgia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and 
Sierra Leone.
MOBILIZING LOCAL REVENUES
The extent to which local governments can ﬁnance their expenditures out of local taxa-
tion varies enormously both among and within countries—see Tables 1 and 2.1 In some 
OECD countries, local governments may be able to generate a large proportion of their 
budgets from local taxes and other local revenue sources.2 In developing and transitional 
countries, the proportion may be much lower, whether because of inadequate local tax 
instruments or the relative importance of tax sharing (particularly in transition countries). 
The variations within countries may also be enormous, with capital cities potentially 
being self-suﬃcient, given the appropriate local tax instruments, while remote rural 
areas have little or no local revenue possibilities. Nor should ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency 
necessarily be regarded as a satisfactory situation, since it may simply mean that local 
services are provided inadequately or not at all.3
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Table 1.
Local Revenue Sources: Selected European Countries
 2007 (provisional data) UK Germany France Italy Spain
EUR billions,
except for the UK in GBP billions LG SG+LG LG LG LG
Local Taxes Income and profits 179.4 22.4 32.2
Payroll 6.8
Property 23.6 20.7 68.5 12.2 31.4
Goods and services 93.5 17.7 66.5 53.3
Subtotal: Local taxes 23.6 293.6 93.0 101.1 116.9
Social security contributions 3.4 17.8 0.5 1.2 0.8
Other local revenue 23.8 59.5 53.3 26.8 15.7
Subtotal: Local Own Revenue (LOR) 50.8 370.9 146.8 129.1 133.4
Grants/transfers 124.0 109.9 58.1 103.3 85.2
Total Local Government Revenue 174.8 480.8 204.9 232.4 218.6
Total General Government Revenue* 584.3 1,064.7 940.4 716.2 431.1
Local Taxes as Percent of Total Local 
Government Revenue
13.5% 61.1% 45.4% 43.5% 53.5%
LOR as Percent of Total Local 
Government Revenue
29.1% 77.1% 71.6% 55.6% 61.0%
LOR as Percent of Total General 
Government Revenue
8.7% 34.8% 15.6% 18.0% 30.9%
Notes: * Total for all levels of government net of transfers.
  LG: Local Government. 
  LOR: Local Government Own Revenue.
  SG: State or Province Government.
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics 2008.
Much depends on the local tax instruments available. Property tax remains the 
most common form of local tax around the world. There are good reasons for this, not 
least the ease by which the revenue can be assigned to the right jurisdiction, and the 
widely accepted connection between the services provided by local government and the 
value of the property being taxed. But property tax has serious weaknesses, not least 
the visibility of payment (unlike income tax which can be collected at source, or VAT 
which is disguised in the ﬁnal price of a purchase). This visibility makes the tax highly-
sensitive politically, which in turn makes for a reluctance to raise the tax rate, revalue 
property, and update tax registers. Without such actions, revenues from property tax 
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are eroded by inﬂation and fail to keep up with population and economic growth. In 
addition, in many transition countries, there is still not yet a fully developed property 
market on which to base valuations, so that property taxes are often levied on the even 
more inelastic base of property size. Moreover, in some cases, as in Georgia, the scale 
of exemptions is such as to render the tax almost insigniﬁcant. Meanwhile, in many 
developing countries, property tax is often still conﬁned to the urban core (and in some 
cases just to the old colonial core), thereby not capturing the vast peri-urban growth, 
never mind the property (not all of which is rudimentary) in rural areas.
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Some countries allow local governments to tax a variety of other objects, such a 
motor vehicles, tourism and entertainment, electricity consumption, land development, 
and so on. These all have some very positive characteristics as local revenue sources, 
not least that they are relatively easy to administer. Yet central governments are often 
reluctant to surrender such revenue sources to local government.
Then there is a range of taxes on the local economy that can be found in diﬀerent 
countries: taxes on sales or turnover or proﬁts, whether levied on the local economy as 
a whole, or on certain sections of it. Such taxes present signiﬁcant problems, in terms of 
overlap with national taxes, how to assign the revenues to the right local governments, 
and how to assess businesses’ ability to pay eﬀectively and fairly.
However, what is apparent is that, in many developing and transitional countries, 
local governments have a variety of revenue instruments that impinge on the local 
economy even though they may not technically be taxes. Levies such as charges for 
markets (a major revenue source for local governments in many African countries), 
business licenses, permits for street trading, etc., are not technically taxes but are rather 
charges for a service provided, or a fee for a permit or license to carry out an activity. 
However, inasmuch as the revenue generated greatly exceeds the cost of the service or 
beneﬁt provided, or of the regulatory function involved, these revenue sources are ef-
fectively taxes on the users of the services. Thus, the conventional distinction between 
taxes and nontax revenues is unhelpful for our purposes. What we are concerned with 
here is the range of local revenue instruments, whether tax or nontax, that impinge on, 
and generate revenue from, the local economy.
There may also be a variety of other nontax instruments that impact the local 
economy: charges for water supply, sanitation and waste disposal, fees for building 
permits, tolls levied on local roads, etc. In most cases, such levies at best merely recover 
the costs of the services or regulatory functions being provided. But to the extent that 
any of these generate revenues from the local economy, or place burdens on the local 
economy that exceed the value of the service being provided or the regulatory function 
involved, such revenue sources are relevant to our study. 
LOCAL TAXATION AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
Thus, what we are concerned with here is the range of local revenue instruments, both 
tax and nontax, that do, or could, generate net revenues from the local economy in 
some way or other. The particular challenge addressed in this research is how to gener-
ate such resources in situations where large parts of the local economies are eﬀectively 
informal. The phenomenon of the informal sector is well known and widely documented 
in developing countries, particularly in urban areas. But it has also been an increasing 
feature of the transitional countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
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Union, as state enterprises have collapsed and newly-privatized enterprises have shed 
surplus labor. Indeed, it can be argued that an extensive informal sector existed under 
communism, but that it was largely hidden and therefore unrecognized. The situation 
has become a great deal more severe as a result of the structural adjustments that have 
taken place in these economies in the last two decades.
It is not the intention in this volume to try to deﬁne precisely the informal sector, or 
to spend time discussing the nature of that sector: there is already a huge and growing 
literature on the subject (for example: Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur, and Ostrom 2006; 
Pratap and Qunintin 2006; Yuki 2007). But it is necessary to clarify what we mean by 
the informal sector for the purposes of this research. Essentially we are talking about 
activities that are in some way or other not fully compliant with state regulations and 
so operate at the margins of the economy. They may range, at one end of the spectrum, 
from street vendors hawking their wares in locations where oﬃcially they are prohib-
ited, to quite large businesses that do not have the necessary permits to operate, do 
not conﬁrm to various regulations, and/or are evading taxation. It may even include 
certain activities of formal sector businesses that are set up in ways to avoid regulatory 
or tax requirements. It may include criminal, or at least illegal, activities. All of these 
things make taxing such activities more—even more—diﬃcult. But it does not mean 
that it is impossible to generate revenues from such activities: with a suitable range of 
instruments, and with political will and administrative capacity, there is the potential 
to generate signiﬁcant revenues from informal sector activities.4
Nor is it the case that the informal sector is always poor, in such that any attempt 
to generate revenues from it is burdening the poor. As the Indonesian case shows, many 
street traders can earn incomes comparable to those in the formal sector. Indeed, some 
parts of the informal sector may actually generate substantial incomes for those involved, 
albeit often through the exploitation of unprotected workers. The evasion of regulation 
and taxation can give such enterprises substantial advantages over formal sector busi-
nesses. It is therefore equitable that revenue instruments should be applied and enforced 
on such enterprises. However, some parts of the informal sector are undoubtedly poor 
—street vendors and shoeshine boys, for example. It is not the intention of this research 
to identify ways in which heavier tax burdens can be imposed on such people. Indeed, 
one of the conclusions from the research is that low-income informal sector activities 
are often burdened by various levies that are unoﬃcial or illegal, the revenues of which 
are unaccounted for. 
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EVALUATING LOCAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION
The aim of this research was to examine the ways in which local governments in develop-
ing and transitional countries do, or could, generate revenues from their local economies 
when those local economies tend to be informal. However, it is not enough just to look 
at how much revenue is collected. There are a number of considerations for evaluating 
the performance of local revenues.
First, there is the absolute amount that is generated from a particular revenue 
source, including the share of the local budget and the amount per capita. Regrettably, 
many of the local revenue sources identiﬁed in the case studies generated microscopic 
amounts of money.
Second, there are the trends in revenue collection over time, and particularly whether 
revenues grow in real terms (adjusting for inﬂation), in per capita terms (adjusting for 
population growth), and in relation to economic growth (comparison with GDP). All 
too often, local revenues capture a declining share of GDP.
Third, there is the eﬀectiveness of revenue collection: that is, to what extent does 
the local government manage to collect the full potential of that particular revenue. 
This can be highly problematic to assess in the absence of some basis for calculating the 
potential of the revenue source. Nevertheless, it is often possible to identify where there 
is a serious shortfall: large arrears in relation to property tax; property tax rolls that are 
seriously out of date; the absence of any register of businesses for a business license fee, 
or the failure to update that register; weaknesses in the revenue administration process, 
meaning that monies paid do not reach the local government’s accounts; the existence 
of unoﬃcial or illegal levies; and so on. Even the most rudimentary assessment of rev-
enue collection in some of the case studies suggests that their eﬀectiveness is very low.
Fourth, eﬃciency: that is, the cost of collecting revenues as a proportion of the 
amounts collected. In principle, revenue collection costs are not diﬃcult to estimate, 
yet the analysis of eﬃciency is rarely made. In practice, for our case studies, the reluc-
tance of local governments to divulge information on collection costs made it diﬃcult 
to make anything other than a crude estimate of eﬃciency. Nevertheless, it is clear 
from the cases that collection costs can be very high, in some cases using up most of 
the revenue collected. This is a very poor use of resources, creating a completely useless 
burden on taxpayers.5
The ﬁfth consideration is equity—how the tax burden is distributed between taxpay-
ers. This is often diﬃcult to determine, especially where taxes and charges on businesses 
can be passed on to consumers. Nevertheless, it seems clear that levies on small-scale 
businesses selling mainly to low-income groups are likely to be regressive. Where the 
problem is non-payment or evasion by larger businesses and higher-income groups—an 
all too common situation in developing counties—the impact is also highly inequitable 
and probably regressive. A further problem is that local taxation is often horizontally 
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inequitable, taxing certain groups or sectors that can easily be captured while leaving 
other groups or sectors untaxed.
Finally, the issue of neutrality. Taxes and other levies on particular sectors and activi-
ties inﬂuence decisions of consumers and producers. In most cases, such non-neutrality 
is undesirable, harming economic growth.6 Much reform of national taxation has been 
designed to reduce non-neutrality, for example, through the introduction of VAT and 
the removal of exemptions and other distortionary arrangements. It is inappropriate 
for local governments to then introduce local taxes and levies that undermine such 
reforms. Yet in practice, many local taxes do just that, discouraging business enterprise 
and creating arbitrary, unintended incentives and disincentives for particular activities.
IMPROVING LOCAL REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
Mobilizing local revenues is as much about the administration of those revenues as it is 
about the design of the tax instruments. This involves a number of elements:
  regular review of tax, charge, and fee rates; adjusting them in line with inﬂation;
  identifying all those liable to pay, and maintaining up-to-date tax registers;
  correctly assessing the amount of tax liability: this is a particular challenge in 
relation to local taxes on business, with a sharp trade-oﬀ between fairness on 
the one hand, and the ease of implementation on the other. Only with more 
sophisticated assessment systems is it possible to make the tax suﬃciently gradu-
ated to enable a signiﬁcant amount of revenue to be collected (since ﬂat rates or 
only moderately graduated tariﬀ structures have to be set at the level which the 
poorest can aﬀord to pay); yet more sophisticated measurements of the ability 
to pay are likely to cost more to administer, lead to errors and inequities, and 
provide opportunities for collusion and fraud;
  collecting the correct amounts in a timely manner, yet without incurring 
substantial collection costs;
  taking eﬀective enforcement action against non-payers: this can be expensive 
and time-consuming, especially when court processes are involved;
  accounting for all receipts in a manner that permits cross-checking and reporting; 
all too often manual systems are wide open to losses and fraud;7 
  routine and regular cross-checks of assessments against payments, with regular 
monitoring reports on collection performance, including arrears;
  reviewing systems and processes to ensure that scope for evasion, collusion and 
fraud are minimized, and that staﬀ resources are being used most cost-eﬀectively;
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  taking action to prevent collection of unoﬃcial levies, bribes, and rent-seeking 
by those, such as the police, who are responsible for managing and regulating 
economic and other activities.
The case studies revealed severe weaknesses in relation to all of the above issues, but 
also examples of where reforms had been made.
THE CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY
The study required local researchers to hold the various elements of the study in tension: 
how revenues can be generated for the local governments from the local economy, much 
of which is informal. In other words, this was not just a study of local taxation, nor 
just of the informal sector. Inevitably, some case studies focused more on local revenue 
generation (e.g., Georgia), while others focused more on the impact on the informal 
sector (e.g., Indonesia). But between the case studies, some valuable material was gath-
ered about both current practices of local governments (including some interesting 
innovations), and the possible reforms that could lead to better resource mobilization 
from the local economy.
The six case studies were (in alphabetical order of country):
  Georgia (Teimuraz Khomeriki): three municipalities including the capital city, 
Tblisi—to be published at a later date;
  India (Aurobindo Ogra and Debolina Kunda): two municipalities in the state 
of Uttarakhand plus the city of Bangalore in Karnataka;
  Indonesia (Edi Suharto): street trading in two cities, Jakarta and Bandung;
  Pakistan (Said Paracha and Mosharraf Zaidi): four municipalities in two districts;
  Sierra Leone (Adams Tommy): four cities including the capital, Freetown, one 
district and one chiefdom;
  Ukraine (Kateryna Pilkevich): three municipalities of diﬀering sizes.
Each case study involved:
  reviewing literature and documentation (studies, reports, legislation, etc.) 
relevant to the issue in the case country;
  collecting and analyzing national level data (and, where relevant, state/provincial 
level data) on local government revenues;
  analyzing data on local revenues for the selected municipalities (both budgeted 
and actual revenues, and including trends over ﬁve years);
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  making visits to each of the municipalities concerned;
  holding interviews and focus group discussions with oﬃcials of central (and 
state/province) government and the local governments concerned, with local 
business organizations and associations, and with individual business people 
and taxpayers;
  identifying examples of good practice and reform initiatives already undertaken.
In many cases, getting access to local government data proved to be a challenge, as 
did getting local government oﬃcials to respond to the issues.
Based on the ﬁeld research, each researcher developed a number of options for 
policy reform and developing an advocacy action plan. These are being pursued with 
the national and local governments concerned.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
The cases studies demonstrated a number of common themes. First, the huge scale of 
the informal sector, particularly in countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sierra 
Leone, but also in the post-Soviet countries of Georgia and Ukraine. This presents great 
challenges to the tax authorities at both the national and local levels. Yet it is often the 
regulatory arrangements adopted by governments, national and local, and the antiquated 
and inappropriate legal arrangements, that force businesses to operate informally. 
Second, the inadequacy of local tax instruments. Apart from property tax, which itself 
is highly problematic, most case study municipalities have little by way of eﬀective local 
tax instruments. In Sierra Leone, local governments still rely on a highly inequitable ﬂat-
rate poll tax. In Pakistan, provincial governments have arbitrarily withheld local taxing 
powers from local governments. In Georgia, recent changes have eliminated all but three 
local taxes, while large-scale exemptions mean that little revenue can be generated from 
these. In Ukraine, an innovation was the introduction of a simpliﬁed system of taxation 
on small businesses, but that still needs considerable reform to make it eﬀective. In both 
Ukraine and Georgia, virtually all tax is collected by the national tax administration, even 
though the revenue may be shared with local governments; thus, local governments have 
neither the scope nor the incentive to improve local revenue collection. 
One consequence of the very limited range of local taxes is the exploitation of nontax 
instruments, such as business licenses, market charges, building permits, and road tolls 
(and in Georgia and Ukraine, privatization receipts), to generate revenues. These often 
have quite negative eﬀects on both equity and incentives (neutrality). Another result is 
that, even in the capital cities, local governments remain heavily dependant on central 
transfers, and hence have little incentive to improve their local revenue systems.
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Third, the revenue instruments that do exist are often very poorly administered, 
with much of the revenue potential remaining uncollected. The case studies showed 
the scale of evasion, collusion, and fraud to be alarmingly high. This also has serious 
implications for the equity and neutrality of the tax system, particular where larger and 
more proﬁtable businesses (whether formal or informal) remain untaxed. Moreover, 
collection costs often absorb a large proportion of the revenue collected (as much as 90 
percent in one municipality in Pakistan), creating a huge deadweight for the economy. 
Nevertheless, the studies found some modest attempts at reform of local tax administra-
tion, notably in India and Sierra Leone. 
Fourth, and this is perhaps the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding, the local, informal economy 
is being “taxed,” but those taxes are often not generating resources for local governments 
to improve local service provision. Money that is collected often ends up in the pockets 
of the revenue collectors, while those with the power to regulate and control economic 
activities are able to extract “rents” from the informal sector. Not only do such levies 
create burdens for informal sector businesses, and particularly for the poor, but they also 
create uncertainty that inhibits the development of such businesses. This was particularly 
apparent in the cases of Pakistan and Indonesia but applies in other cases as well. No-
where did there seem to be any serious attempt to curb such unoﬃcial or illegal levies. 
In Pakistan in particular, there are multiple political interests in maintaining corrupt 
revenue collection arrangements.
Finally, based on the evidence from interviews and focus group discussions, there 
is a certain willingness on the part of the business community to pay local taxes in 
return for services being provided. But at the same time, they want tax liabilities to be 
clearly deﬁned, small and overlapping levies (particularly unoﬃcial ones) eliminated, 
and greater assurance that the revenue collected would not be pocketed. This is even 
more so relevant to informal sector businesses, which claim that they would be more 
than willing to pay properly deﬁned local taxes in exchange for the right to conduct 
business without harassment.
These serious problems notwithstanding, there are examples of where modest reforms 
have been achieved. The most notable example was Bangalore, which has made signiﬁcant 
improvements in the collection of property tax using self-assessment, as well as reforming 
the trade licensing system. Also in India, in the municipalities of Uttarakhand, there have 
been some innovations in local revenue sources, including an advertising tax and an entry 
tax on tourists. In Sierra Leone, improvements have been made to the assessment and col-
lection of property tax and business licenses, at least in Freetown and Bo. These reforms 
have generated signiﬁcantly increased revenues, albeit from a very low base. 
Elsewhere, reform has been more illusive. In Indonesia, local governments have 
sought to exploit their new levels of autonomy by inventing numerous local revenue 
instruments that are inequitable, adversely aﬀect businesses, and create rent-seeking 
opportunities. But the Indonesian case study shows the potential beneﬁts of providing 
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greater security for the informal sector—in other words, greater formalization—and of 
using associations of street traders as a mechanism for collecting revenues. In Pakistan, 
the whole reform process is so highly politicized (not least in relation to the future of 
any form of decentralized government) that it is hard to envisage any serious reform of 
local revenues taking place in the foreseeable future.
In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the centralized nature of tax collection leaves 
little room for local initiatives at reform. However, both those case studies present 
proposals for reform of tax instruments that would oﬀer substantial beneﬁts to local 
government. In the case of Ukraine, the proposals include the introduction of a property 
tax and reforms to the recently introduced uniﬁed small business tax, as well as reﬁning 
the tax instruments assigned to local government and the reassigning of some centrally 
collected taxes. In the case of Georgia, the proposals include the introduction of a local 
sales tax and/or a local income tax, as well as the removal of the many exemptions to 
property tax. In both cases, the reform would also need to make the municipal level 
more clearly responsible for the local taxes, even if the actual collection still remains 
with the national tax administration.
In the end, there is always a balance to be struck between mobilizing ﬁnancial re-
sources to pay for local services and creating burdens on the local economy, especially 
for the poor who are involved in the informal sector. But in practice, local revenue 
potential remains largely untapped, due to lack of suitable revenue instruments, poor 
administrative systems, and lack of political will. What this study has found is that, all 
too often, those in the informal sector are often burdened with levies, little of which ever 
feeds through into the municipal budget to ﬁnance improved services. Instead, these 
resources are being extracted through fraud by tax collectors, illegal levies, bribes, and 
rent-seeking by oﬃcials, leading to both loss of revenue and inequitable tax burdens. 
Addressing these issues requires confronting vested interests, and so requires a degree 
of political will that is rarely present.
SOURCES CITED
Guha-Khasnobis, B., R. Kanbur, and E. Ostrom (2006) Linking the Formal and Informal Economy. 
Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs.
Pratap, S. and E. Quintin (2006) The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets and 
Employment. UNU-WIDER Research Paper.
Yuki, K. (2007) “Urbanization, Informal Sector and Development.” Journal of Development 
Economics, 84(1): 76–103.
15
I n t r o d u c t i o n
NOTES
1 This immediately raises the question about what constitutes local taxation or local revenues, 
and in particular, whether shared national taxes (a major revenue source in many transition 
countries) count as local own revenues. For the purposes of this book, local own revenues 
are those over which the local government has some choice about levying (e.g., setting the 
tax rate, although that choice may be quite limited), and has responsibility for collecting. 
Thus, for our purposes, shared national taxes that are centrally levied and collected are not 
regarded as local own revenues, even though the local government may be free to spend the 
money as it chooses. However, a problem in most former communist countries is that all (or 
nearly all) revenue collection is carried out under by the national revenue administration, 
so that local governments eﬀectively have very little revenue that is really under their direct 
control.
2 Even here there is great variation, with local governments in the UK ﬁnancing less than 15 
percent of their budgets from local taxation, and around 30 percent from total local own 
revenues; by contrast, the comparable ﬁgures for Germany (state plus local government) 
are 61 percent and 77 percent, respectively, and for France 45 percent and 72 percent: see 
Table 1.
3 For example, until recently, there were no central transfers to local governments in Kenya: 
the consequence of this complete dependence on local own revenues was that most local 
governments were insolvent and provided few, if any, services.
4 An early conception of the informal sector was that it was outside the tax system. Clearly, 
this is not necessarily the case, although much tax may be evaded, and greater eﬀort may 
be required to tap the revenue potential from it.
5 Of course, in some countries and some local governments, the revenue collection “costs” 
may be regarded as the whole purpose—i.e., creating employment, particularly for political 
supporters. However, the burden to the economy is wholly negative, not to mention the 
inequities involved.
6 There are exceptions, where taxation is used to reduce consumption or production of what 
is regarded as “economic bads,” although such an analysis is rarely applied systematically.
7 Computerization does not eliminate errors, collusion, and fraud, but a properly designed 
computer system makes these much less likely, with in-built cross-checks and a reduced 
scope for discretion by tax oﬃcials.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The policy paper on Local Taxation of Informal Economies is an outcome of LGI Policy Fel-
lowship program to support policy research aimed at stimulating innovative and practical 
policy reform. The research is based on case studies of select municipalities in the states of 
Karnataka and Uttarakhand1 in an attempt to identify the local taxation structure of urban 
local bodies in a country like India where the local economy is largely informal. It analyzes 
the local tax base of the selected municipalities and identiﬁes the scope for taxing the 
informal sector based on both secondary and ﬁeld-based data as well as identifying best 
practices across the country. 
A common feature of urban local bodies (ULBs) is inadequate own sources of revenue, 
a narrow tax base, and dependence of urban local bodies on state and other ﬁscal transfers. 
Own taxes, levies,  and user charges of urban local bodies in India are grossly inadequate 
to meet the expenditure needs of urban local bodies where the economy is largely informal 
in nature. There are some tax instruments which are unutilized or underutilized where the 
exclusion from the tax net is a deﬁning characteristic of the informal economy. The analysis 
of local revenues from small municipality like Mussoorie municipality in Uttarakhand shows 
that local tax revenue accounts for around 20 percent of the municipality’s income, the 
nontax revenue accounts for around 23 percent, and the other sources like state transfers, 
etc., account for 57 percent of the total sources of income. The nontax revenues accounts 
to 54 percent of local own revenues and form a higher share of revenue among the local 
own revenues. Similarly in case of large municipality like Dehradun Nagar Nigam, the aver-
age per capita revenue from nontax sources is observed much higher than the average per 
capita revenue from tax sources. The street vendors forms the major informal sector and face 
constraints in investing in and growing their businesses in the absence of formal licensing 
and fees from the municipality. There is more scope for revenue mobilization by the way of 
policy interventions like revised user fees, licensing fees, rentals, etc., as compared to the 
nominal values at present.
Similar to the national level, in Karnataka too, property taxes are relatively more important 
for bigger ULBs than smaller ULBs, where grants form a higher share of their revenues. An 
analysis of per capita revenue by various sources and type of ULBs in Karnataka shows that 
that city corporations generate more per capita revenue than the other classes of ULBs. They 
generate three times more per capita revenue than the town panchayats and double that 
of city municipal councils. Cesses, fees, and ﬁnes were the other major sources of revenue 
followed by the surcharge on stamp duty. In the case of medium-size ULBs like Nagar Palika 
Parishads and Nagar Panchayats, nontax revenues forms the largest component of local 
own sources of revenues comprising of license fees, rents, stamp duties, entry taxes, etc. 
Street vendors form an important part of local economy and varies according to the size 
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of the cities. The innovative measures adopted by Bangalore Municipal Corporation has 
resulted in mainstreaming the street vendors as part of the local economy and generating 
income from local own sources. Until recently, municipalities have paid little attention to 
mobilizing resources from their own local resources. A majority of the municipalities often 
does not exercise their potential ability to realize revenues from potential sources in their 
local economies. There are various classiﬁed categories of levies that have not been revised 
for decades and, at the same time, are not subject to effective taxation. This has largely 
resulted in evasion of the taxation system, compounded by lacuna in administration, and 
resulting in the weak ﬁnancial health of the many municipalities. The evidence from the case 
studies undertaken show the potential options available for the municipalities to increase 
their income from own sources. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The licensing of businesses by local governments is common in developing economies, 
including India. It serves two aims: that of regulating business activities and generating 
revenue for the respective local government.2 Recent years have seen a sea change in the 
perception and practice of regulation across the globe. Economies have been “deregulated” 
in order to stimulate economic growth through the private market.3 It is argued that 
the small formal sector typically bears a heavy ﬁnancial burden and time constraints in 
complying with tax obligations, which creates a strong disincentive to investment and 
participation in the formal economy. The more the informal sector is incorporated into 
the tax system, the wider becomes the relationship between state and citizens. The creation 
of a deeper ﬁscal social contract is essential, since tax helps construct state-citizen rela-
tions and the mutual obligations between the two.4 For scholars working on tax policy, 
the issue of taxation of the informal sector has generally not been of much interest and 
has been considered too diﬃcult, requiring considerable eﬀort and resulting in no great 
research outcomes. Rather, the focus of tax reforms has been on simplifying tax systems, 
widening the tax base, and improving tax administration.5 Similarly, taxation has not 
been of principal concern to scholars working on the informal sector.6
Research shows that tax evasion is not the primary reason for the units keeping their 
status informal.7 Avoiding cumbersome regulations have been noted as more powerful 
motivation.8 Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas (2003), on the basis of their survey data, 
argue that non-compliance with the tax system in the informal sector often results 
from ignorance of the legislation or the complexity of the tax system rather than from 
deliberate evasion. Research shows that informal sector operators are willing to pay 
taxes, speciﬁcally when these are in exchange for some legitimacy, predictability, and 
protection from arbitrary harassment from state agents (Baross and van der Linden 
1990, Dickovick, forthcoming, Roever 2005).9 
In India, the terms “organized” and “unorganized” are used as synonyms of the 
terms “formal” and “informal” that are used internationally. The organized/unorganized 
sector is thus used interchangeably with the formal/informal sector, the latter having a 
standard international deﬁnition as recommended by the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO). However, the usage of the terms of unorganized sector and unorganized 
employment in India lacks conceptual clarity and uniformity across the subsectors of 
the Indian economy. Employment in the unorganized sector has so far been derived 
as a residual of the total workers with those in the organized sector, as reported by 
Directorate General of Employment and Training (DGET).10 As per the estimates of 
the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, the unorganized 
sector accounted for 86.3 percent of employment in the country in 2004–05.11 The 
state of Karnataka accounted for 86.6 percent in 2004–05, slightly above the national 
average, while Uttaranchal accounted for 87.4 percent. 
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Few studies have been conducted to study the inﬂuence of tax regime on informal 
economy in India.12 Sharit K. Bhowmik concluded in his study13 that Asian govern-
ments are by and large indiﬀerent to the needs of the informal sector that constitutes 
a large part of their urban economy. The goods sold by street vendors are sold to the 
poorer sections of the society, as they are cheap. Moreover, a signiﬁcant amount of goods 
produced by small industrial units in the informal sector is marketed through them. 
The National Alliance of Street Vendors in India (NASVI) organized a study on 
hawkers in seven cities, namely, Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Bhubaneswar, Patna, 
Ahmedabad, and Imphal in 2000. In 1998, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corpora-
tion (BMC) commissioned the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) and Youth for 
Voluntary Action and Unity (YUVA) to conduct a census of hawkers on municipal 
lands. In 2001, SNDT Women’s University, in collaboration with the International 
Labour Organization conducted a study on street vendors. Interestingly, all studies 
found common features among street vendors. Their earnings varied between INR 50 
and INR 80 per day for men. Women earned between INR 40 and INR 60 per day and 
were frequently harassed by the municipal authorities and the police. The NASVI study 
found that around 20 percent of their earnings are taken as rent by the civic authorities. 
India, which ﬁgures in the middle rung in the hierarchy among low-income coun-
tries, is facing a shortage of resources for the provision of basic services for its growing 
urban population in general, and the poor in particular. This problem is more serious 
in towns and cities where the economy is largely informal. Many of the newly formed 
states,14 too, are facing diﬃculties in generating adequate revenues for providing a mini-
mum level of amenities. Most municipal governments in India lack the ﬁnancial and 
administrative resources to provide basic urban services. As a result, the urban poor in 
many cities have resorted to informal mechanisms to obtain basic services. However, 
the availability of services is very low due to their low capacity to pay, uncertainties of 
service delivery, and very high costs due to the illegal or semi-legal nature of functioning 
in the informal market (Cheema 1987, Rondinelli and Cheema 1988, Rodwin 1987).15 
Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) derive their revenue from own sources consisting of: 
(i) tax sources and (ii) nontax sources. This revenue is then supplemented by: (i) ﬁscal 
transfers and (ii) loans. A common feature of urban local ﬁnance across all develop-
ing countries is inadequate own source revenues. The devolved sources of revenue do 
not match a wide range of functions that are required to be performed by them. Local 
ﬁnance is characterized by a mismatch between functions devolved to ULBs and the 
devolution of tax authority. This mismatch is exacerbated by the lack of: (i) buoyancy 
and elasticity in local ﬁscal instruments, (ii) a narrow tax base, (iii) the abolition of a 
buoyant and elastic source of revenue (octroi16), and (iv) dependence on only one or 
two taxes that are not easy to implement (Dillinger 1991). 
This policy paper attempts to analyze the main local revenues (both tax and nontax) 
and their administration in the select cities/towns of India and examine how far such 
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local tax instruments (both tax and nontax) in the informal economy are able to gener-
ate adequate revenue, are eﬀectively and eﬃciently collected and are equitable, neutral 
and transparent. It also tries to suggest proposals for reforms based on the results of 
the policy research. 
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The informal sector is large in most developing countries, including India. Govern-
ments obtain little tax revenue from this sector. Exclusion from the tax net is a deﬁning 
characteristic of the informal economy. On the contrary, licensing of businesses by local 
governments is a common practice in many cities in India. While business licensing 
has its origins in regulation, it is often seen as a source of revenue earnings for local 
governments. Studies on local taxation in India have brought out that there is a mis-
match between functions and ﬁnances of ULBs, which primarily explains the vertical 
imbalance. Out of 18 functions to be performed by the municipal bodies in India,17 
less than half have a corresponding revenue source. Own taxes and user charges of the 
ULBs in India are grossly inadequate to meet the expenditure needs of ULBs where 
the economy is largely informal in nature. This problem is more serious in the newly 
formed states that lag behind in the rapid socio-economic changes occurring in India 
at present. Elaborate state government controls on municipal authorities to levy taxes 
and user charges, to set rates, to grant exemptions, to borrow funds, etc., and on the 
design, quantum, and timing of intergovernmental transfers constrain the ability of the 
ULBs in mobilizing resources. There are some tax instruments, which are unutilized or 
underutilized. Therefore, the backlog of current and projected growth needed to fund 
infrastructure in cities and towns, far exceed the resources at the disposal of the ULBs. 
3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY18 
The policy paper is an attempt to achieve the following:
 a) Analyze the main local revenues (both tax and nontax) and their administration 
in the select cities/towns.
 b) Analyze how far such local tax instruments (both tax and nontax) in the informal 
economy:
  — Generate adequate revenue, 
  — Are eﬀectively collected, 
  — Are eﬃciently collected, 
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  — Are equitable—especially in relation to informal sector (which bears the 
burden),
  — Are neutral (do not create undesirable incentives/disincentives), and
  — Transparent and have built-in accountability. 
 c) Suggest proposals for reform based on the results of the policy research.
4. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The focus of the macro-level study is on the local taxation structure of the major states of 
India. The state level study looks at the taxation structure of two states, viz., Karnataka, 
a developed state, and Uttarakhand, a newly formed and poorly developed state. At the 
city level, the taxation structure of Bangalore Municipal Corporation (a metropolitan 
city) was studied in detail to identify the best practices as well as problems in taxing the 
local economy in a developed state. Likewise, the local taxation structure of two ULBs 
in Uttarakhand,19 viz., Mussoorie and Dehradun, were analyzed to bring about the 
variations in the taxation structure of large and small ULBs. In these towns as well as 
in Bangalore, both locally collected taxes and charges like market fees, business licenses, 
etc., have been analyzed with respect to the focused emphasis on the nontax revenues 
and the informal sector.
5. AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL FINANCES: MACRO SCENARIO
5.1 Trend of Municipal Finance in India—An Overview 
Urban development is a state subject20 in India. Therefore, the revenue of urban local 
governments, their tax structure, type of taxes, fees, and ﬁscal transfers vary from state 
to state. However, property tax is the mainstay of municipal ﬁnance in almost all states 
in India except a few where octroi is levied. In India, the aggregate revenue of all ULBs 
is very low, at around 0.75 percent of the country’s GDP. Primary data obtained from 
the budgetary documents of 35 major municipal corporations (MCs)21 for the period 
1999‒2000 to 2003‒04 reveal broad trends about the structure and composition of 
their revenue and expenditure in a study conducted by the Economic Analysis and 
Policy Wing of Reserve Bank of India. Tax revenue accounted for 45.2 percent of total 
own revenue of MCs, followed by 28.7 percent of nontax revenue during 2000‒04. 
An analysis of the revenues and expenditure of these MCs reveals that most MCs have 
a revenue surplus and their overall resource gaps are not very large, but a consequence 
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is lower levels of spending than are required for providing a minimum level of civic 
amenities. This apparent contradiction of sound ﬁscal health and a high level of un-
derspending is due to statutory obligations, whereby ULBs are bound to restrict their 
expenditure to the resources available. In India, the revenue instruments, assigned to 
ULBs by the state governments, at present, are grossly inadequate and not commensu-
rate with the functions expected to be performed by them in accordance with the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Act. 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1995) studied 293 municipalities 
in India spread over seven states: Andhra Pradesh (54), Assam (21), Gujarat (63), Kerala 
(57), Maharashtra (33), and West Bengal (32). The study documents the problems of 
vertical and horizontal imbalances, the inadequate exploitation of existing resources by 
local authorities, the high cost of administration and for the collection of local taxes, 
and an arbitrary system of ﬁscal transfers from state governments to ULBs as the com-
mon features of the municipal ﬁnance system in the country.
Kundu, Bagchi, and Kundu (1999) ﬁnd that the levels of inequity in the provision 
of basic services across the states and size categories of urban centers are extremely high. 
Given the resource crunch in state governments and urban local bodies, the authors 
recommend privatization, public-private partnerships, and the promotion of commu-
nity-based projects as options for undertaking investments to create civic amenities. 
However, the aspects of equity are required to be addressed through speciﬁc measures. 
Bagchi and Chattopadhyay (2004) analyzed the impact of decentralization on the 
mechanism for ﬁnancing basic urban services in India. The study ﬁnds that domestic 
institutional funds and external assistance ﬂow to developed states and larger cities/
towns. It further argues that the emphasis made on a full cost recovery and the imposi-
tion of strict ﬁnancial discipline on state governments by the Reserve Bank of India are 
likely to result in a further concentration of funds in developed states or regions and 
lead to intra-regional disparity. 
Chattopadhyay (2004) further examined the impact of decentralization—both 
revenue and expenditure—on the ﬁnancial health of urban local bodies through an 
empirical study of the aggregates of three states in the post-74th Constitutional Amend-
ment Act era. The study observes that decentralization improved the revenue structure 
of the municipal corporations and positively aﬀected their tax and nontax revenue 
generation. However, it is only the large urban local bodies that have beneﬁted most 
from the decentralization initiatives, accentuating inter-regional disparity.
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5.2 Best Practices in Municipal Resource Mobilization 
 (Selected Case Studies)
The present section attempts to overview a few case studies pertaining to reforms in 
municipal resource mobilization in the country.
The Mall Road Entry Fee, Mussoorie Municipality
The town of Mussoorie is predominantly a tourist destination, known as the Queen 
of Hills among the hill destinations of India. Tourists ﬂock there year-round, whether 
winter or summer. Tourists enjoy taking long walks along its picturesque Mall Road, 
which stretches for more than 3.5 kilometers in length. However, due to the high 
tourist inﬂow in peak seasons, it was becoming diﬃcult for the municipality to main-
tain as well as provide services, especially solid waste management, street sweeping, 
street lighting, etc.
The municipality introduced a Mall Road entry fee, where users were provided 
with entry permits, especially those wanting to allow their vehicles along the road. The 
special permits were introduced for permanent residents of the town on a monthly 
basis system, whereas the entry fee for tourists was based on each entry and valid for 
certain hours. 
For local residents, a permit fee of INR 500 was introduced, where as for tourists 
an entry fee of INR 100 was introduced. Initially, the municipality managed the system 
through its own resources and arrangement. However, the system is presently managed 
based on annual auction or contract system, where bids are invited for the collection 
and management of the entry fees. The highest bidder to the municipality gets the 
contract for revenue collection and management of the entry of vehicles to Mall Road. 
Over the period of years, the revenue from the Mall Road entrance fee has been a 
signiﬁcant source of revenue for the municipality. The revenue collected from this source 
forms around 10 percent of local own source revenues at the municipal level, showing 
a growth rate of around 35 percent from 2004‒2008. 
Eco-Tax System, Mussoorie Municipality 
Nestled in the foothills of Himalayas, Mussoorie is a transit town towards the Garhwal 
Hills and other scenic spots and destinations of Uttarakhand. Within 32 kilometers of 
the city of Dehradun, known as the “Gateway to the Himalayas,” it is frequented by 
many tourists throughout the year. The town of Mussoorie is nestled in environmen-
tally fragile environment, and in order to care for its environment and ecology, due to 
the increasing inﬂow of tourist as well as vehicular traﬃc, the Mussoorie municipality 
recently introduced an eco-tax system for all the vehicles entering its jurisdiction. The 
new tax is expected to substantially contribute to the overall revenue base of local own 
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resources of the municipality. Under the new system, the eco-tax is imposed on various 
categories of traﬃc, including: INR 100 from heavy vehicles and INR 30 for cars and 
jeeps, and INR 5 for two-wheelers. 
The objective is to collect revenue for preserving the town’s environment and its heri-
tage, apart from maintaining its sanitation and cleanliness. The money will be spent on 
encouraging plantations and educating tourists against using plastic while in Mussoorie.
Advertisement Tax Reforms, Dehradun Municipal Corporation 
With a limited tax base and collection system as well as limitations in increasing property 
taxes, the municipal corporation in Dehradun analyzed its local own resources and brought 
innovative reforms to revenue mobilization. After the formation of Dehradun as a capital 
for the newly formed state of Uttarakhand, business, real estate development, and tourism 
ﬂourished considerably. As the “Gateway to the Himalayas,” Dehradun quickly became 
the focus of many government institutions, the corporate sector, and business entities. 
The diﬀerence could easily be seen by way of the investments and marketing drives in 
the city. Billboards around the city were mushrooming without any coordinated eﬀort 
on the management of advertising revenue by the municipal corporation. 
The municipal corporation in Dehradun took the initiative of documenting the 
number of such billboards in the entire city. It then analyzed the potential of maximiz-
ing the revenue from its local own resources by regulating the billboards by imposing a 
tax. A policy was drafted and introduced for allowing advertising spaces to be auctioned 
against the assured revenue from a private party that would maintain the billboards, 
advertisement spaces, manage its clients, and ensure a one-time upfront payment to the 
municipal corporation. The highest bidder was awarded the contract of managing the 
entire city’s advertisements. The advertisement spaces were sold as per location, sizes, 
and type like reﬂective, illuminated, etc. Over a period of years, the municipal corpora-
tion has been able to generate around six percent of the local own revenues from the 
advertisement revenue, with a growth rate of around 33 percent from 2003 to 2008. 
With a further, revised advertisement policy, the municipal corporation has ﬁxed 
the advertisement sites on its seven major roads, and banned hoardings at various places 
to enhance the the roads, streets, and roundabouts. In one year, the municipal corpora-
tion would hardly make INR 5.6 million, but now due to strictness of the corporation, 
they have received INR 7.2 million from advertisements on poles only. Once this policy 
comes into full operation, the corporation should make INR 30 million every year 
only from the advertising, as stated by the mayor of Dehradun municipal corporation.
Trade License Reform in Bangalore 
The duty to issue trade licenses in Bangalore vests with the Health Department, which 
issues license to a broad range of professions, trades, and occupations like healthcare 
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institutions and their employees, for example, hospitals, nursing homes, laboratories, 
and diagnostic centers, as well as people engaging in trades or occupations that aﬀect the 
public’s health and safety, for example, barbers, beauty technicians, launderers, or hotels 
and restaurants. The process of obtaining trade licenses in the past was cumbersome, 
leading to complaints about the delays and oﬃcial harassment. The issue of licenses was 
simpliﬁed with the introduction of “Suvarna Arogya Paravanige” in 2007. Under the 
new scheme, for a limited period each year, the trade license was to be automatically 
renewed and issued within 24 hours. For new applicants the trade license will be issued 
within seven working days. To cut down on paperwork, the number of documents to 
be ﬁled has been reduced and a simple application form has been devised. To avoid 
ambiguity, trades have been reclassiﬁed as well as the relevant fees. In the past, if one 
carried on multiple trades, one had to apply separate for licenses for each trade. Now, 
under the scheme, only one license will do for multiple trades. 
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palika: Property Tax Self-assessment Scheme
The area-based property tax assessment of the city of Patna became the model for all 
ULBs to implement widespread property tax reforms. Most of the cities introduced the 
area-based system during 1999 and 2002. However, after this ﬁrst revision of property 
tax, none of the ULBs have been successful in revising their property tax assessment 
processes except Bangalore, for unless there is a mechanism devised to enable periodic 
revision of the property assessment values, property tax revenue will stagnate and will 
lose all its buoyancy. Bangalore is an exception as it has shown how the area-based sys-
tem can be as eﬀective and revenue productive as in a system under capital valuation. 
The Bangalore property tax collection that stood at INR 4.4 billion during 2007–08 
rose to INR 7.8 billion during 2008–09 and is expected to touch INR 10 billion by 
the end of 2010.22 
Bangalore introduced its property tax reforms in 2000 when it ﬁrst brought forward 
the optional Self-assessment of Property Tax scheme. Under the scheme the location 
of the property was classiﬁed into zones based on the published guidance value set by 
the Department of Stamps and Registration. For each of the zones the rental rates per 
square foot were pre-determined, linking each building to its age, location, type, and 
quality of construction. The zone, here, refers to a land value category rather than to a 
contiguous area and hence, a street could fall in any zone in the municipal jurisdiction 
depending on the rental value assigned.23 
Bangalore did not bring about the reforms through any amendment of the existing 
provisions of the Property Tax Act, as any amendment would take considerable time for 
enactment. Instead it made the scheme optional to avoid any legal challenge. Those who 
opted for the scheme could assess their property in a manner prescribed under the scheme 
and those who did not opt for the scheme, would be inspected by the Revenue oﬃcials 
and assessed the property to tax in the same manner prescribed under the scheme. The 
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scheme’s objectives were to get property owners to voluntarily declare their property tax 
liability and to make timely payment. The “inducement” was to free property taxpayers 
from harassment by tax collectors and to lower the compliance costs of tax payments.
The self-assessment and revaluation reform processes were also politically sensitive. 
A cap on the property tax increase was set at 2.5 times the existing tax liability. This 
cap on the net increase in the tax payable also contributed to the taxpayers’ success in 
acknowledging tax obligations since there was a certainty that the taxpayer was made 
aware that irrespective of the net increase by the new valuation method, he or she would 
not pay beyond two and a half times the tax paid previously. About two-thirds of all 
taxpayers reached this cap. 
The new initiative did work. In its ﬁrst year Bangalore’s property tax collection in-
creased by 33 percent. It is not just the increase in revenue that mattered. The taxpayers 
ﬁnally understood the norms about how property is assessed to property tax and thus 
heightened their satisfaction with and the acceptance of the new system. Another suc-
cess of the reform has been a reduction in compliance costs. The taxpayers were relieved 
from harassment from the oﬃcials, who under the cover of the earlier, opaque system 
of assessment, forced taxpayers into “negotiated” property tax liability. A well-designed 
education program as part of the marketing plan for this reform was another reason 
for its success. 
6. THE REVENUE BASE OF ULBS IN UTTARAKHAND 
 (MUSSOORIE AND DEHRADUN) 
6.1 Municipal Structure—An Overview 
The state of Uttarakhand is located in the northern part of India, carved out of the 
Himalayas and the adjoining district of Uttar Pradesh on November 9, 2000, becom-
ing the twenty-seventh state of the Republic of India. In January 2007, the name of 
the state was oﬃcially changed from Uttaranchal, its interim name, to Uttarakhand. 
The provisional capital of Uttarakhand is Dehradun, also a railhead and the largest city 
in the region. There are three categories of urban local bodies (ULBs) in Uttarakhand: 
Nagar Nigam (NN) or municipal corporation, Nagar Palika Parishad (NPP), and Nagar 
Panchayat (NP), the latter two constituting medium- and smaller-size municipalities. 
There are 63 ULBs, which comprise one Nagar Nigam (NN) or municipal corporation 
at Dehradun, and 31 NPPs and NPs each. The ULBs of Uttarakhand are governed by 
the municipal legislation of Uttar Pradesh, viz., the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act of 
1959, which is applicable to the sole municipal corporation of Uttarakhand, viz., the 
Dehradun and U.P. Municipalities Act of 1916, which is applicable to NPPs and NPs. 
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6.2 Resource Base of Municipalities in Uttarakhand 
6.2.1 State Level Overview—Municipalities 
The ﬁnancial condition of most of the ULBs (with only a few exceptions) is not very 
robust. Their main sources of income are the taxes and fees levied by them, grants from 
the Central Finance Commission, grants from the state government, and devolution 
recommended by the State Finance Commission. Nagar Palika Parishads (NPPs) and 
Nagar Panchayats (NPs) do not have any mandatory power to raise revenue unlike a 
municipal corporation, which has the mandatory power to levy property tax (includ-
ing general, water, drainage, and conservancy taxes), animal-ownership tax, and vehicle 
and boat tax. The discretionary powers given to NPPs and NPs include power to levy 
taxes on properties, trades, professions, theaters, vehicles, dogs, animals, water drainage, 
salvaging, and conservancy, in addition to licenses and user fees.
A municipal corporation has the discretion to levy taxes like betterment charges,24 
advertising, professions, dog ownership, and theaters (public entertainment/cinemas). The 
other sources of revenue are transfers from the central and the state governments (through 
the mechanism of ﬁnance commissions as well as other modes). Some of the ULBs earn 
revenue by exploiting their immovable assets through rental arrangements or sale. 
In actual practice, however, the property tax is the single most important tax (in 
many cases the only tax) being levied by the municipalities and is also their main source 
of own income. The other important source of income of the municipalities is licensing 
fees. These are being levied to a varying extent by all municipalities. In general, the larger 
municipalities and those located on the plains (the districts of Hardwar and Udham 
Singh Nagar, the Nainital, Pauri and Champawat districts, and in the Doon valley) are 
able to raise more money from licensing fees as compared to the smaller municipalities, 
especially those located in the hills. This is to be expected, since the income from licensing 
fees is dependent on the level of economic and commercial activity in the urban centers. 
Table 1.1
Consolidated Municipal Revenues (Tax, Nontax, Other Sources) (INR 100,000)
No. Details 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05
1. Nagar Nigam Dehradun 1,539 1,505 3,915 2,165 1,606
2. Nagar Palika Parishads 5,640 7,478 9,973 10,555 9,400
3. Nagar Panchayats 483 762 1,047 1633 1,326
 Total ULBs 7,662 9,745 14,935 14,353 12,332
Source: Compiled from First & Second State Finance Commission Reports.
32
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
Table 1.2
Consolidated Municipal Revenues—Local Own Sources (INR 100,000)
No. Details 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05
1. Nagar Nigam Dehradun 355 469 478 451 324
2. Nagar Palika Parishads 1,631 1,863 2,219 2,214 2,200
3. Nagar Panchayats 125 256 229 259 294
Total ULBs 2,111 2,588 2,926 2,924 2,818
The average tax revenues account for 9.6 percent of the total revenues of all ULBs, 
the nontax revenues on average account for 13.8 percent, and other sources, which in-
clude grants and other revenues from the state, account for around 76.6 percent of the 
total revenues of all ULBs. The distribution of revenues gives a clear picture at the state 
level that revenues from nontax sources are higher than revenues from tax sources. The 
nontax revenues account for 59— percent of the revenues from own resources, where 
as tax revenues account for 41 percent of the total own revenues at the state level. Both 
the tax and nontax revenues have shown an increasing trend from 2002–03 to 2004–05, 
which shows the ULBs’ dependency on grants and transfers from the state has reduced. 
Distribution of Revenues by Type of ULBs 
The following table provides a comparison of tax, nontax, and other sources of rev-
enues as a percentage of total revenues and own revenues in diﬀerent types of ULBs 
in Uttarakhand. 
Table 1.3
Distribution of Revenues by Type of ULBs, in Percent
Type of ULBs Tax Revenue
(Percentage of 
total revenue )
Nontax Revenue 
(Percentage of 
total revenue)
Other Sources 
(Average 
percentage 
of total revenue 
2000–05)
Nagar Nigam Dehradun (NND) 11.93 7.54 80.64
Nagar Palika Parishads (NPPs) 8.51 15.01 76.47
Nagar Panchayats (NPs) 8.78 13.38 77.85
All ULBs 9.16 13.49 77.35
The nontax sources of revenues is higher than tax revenue sources among Nagar 
Palika Parishads (NPPs) and Nagar Panchayats (NPs); however, in the case of Nagar 
Nigam Dehradun, the tax revenue sources contribute more as compared to nontax 
33
I n d i a
sources of revenues. The nontax revenue resources forms the major component of 
revenue sources from local own revenues in case of NPPs with around 63.82 percent 
of local own revenues, and around 60.38 percent in case of NPs, whereas in the case of 
Nagar Nigam Dehradun (municipal corporation), the percentage is the reverse, where 
the tax revenues contribute to around 62 percent of local own revenues. 
Per Capita Revenues at Constant Prices (2003–04)
The average per capita revenues as constant prices are observed to be the highest 
among NPPs with INR 600, followed by NPs, at INR 459, and is lowest for Nagar 
Nigam Dehradun with INR 406 (all consolidated revenues). An analysis of per capita 
revenue of diﬀerent categories of ULBs shows that the growth of per capita revenue 
in real terms has been the highest for Nagar Palika Parishads, followed by Nagar 
Panchayats. The per capita revenue has shown a decline from 2002–03 to 2004–05, 
for both NPPs, and NPs.
The per capita revenue from tax, nontax, and other sources among the type of ULBs 
shows that per capita revenue is the highest from the other sources of revenues that 
include revenues from state transfers, etc. The per capita revenues tax sources are higher 
than per capita revenue from nontax sources. The per capita revenue among the NPPs is 
higher than among NNDs and NPs in the case of tax and nontax revenues (Table 1.4).
Table 1.4
Per Capita Revenue from Tax, Nontax, Other Sources (ULBs)
Per Capita Revenue Distribution 
at constant prices (INR)
NND NPP NP All ULBs
Tax Revenues 57 150 17 189
Nontax Revenues 13 98 10 104
Other Sources 910 3182 368 3,823
Total 117 428 48 505
Table 1.5
Per Capita Income in 2000–2001 Prices (Tax Revenues)
Per Capita Income at 2000–01 prices 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05
Municipal Corporation Dehradun 55 50 50 46 42
Nagar Palika Parishads 57 140 140 127 134
Nagar Panchayats 93 75 89 120 84
All ULBs 205 266 279 293 260
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The per capita nontax revenue at a constant price shows a gradual decrease in case of 
Nagar Nigam Dehradun (NND) from 2001–02, and a similar declining trend in Nagar 
Palika Parishads (NPPs) from 2002–03 to 2004–05. In the case of Nagar Panchayats 
(NPs), the trend shows a gradual increase in per capita nontax revenue from 2002–03 
to 2004–05 (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6
Per Capita Income in 2000–2001 Prices (Nontax Revenues)
Consolidated Revenues at 2000–01 prices 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05
Nagar Nigam Dehradun 108 211 195 165 58
Nagar Palika Parishads 946 1,119 1,356 1,314 1,168
Nagar Panchayats 84 167 119 122 148
All ULBs 1,138 1,497 1,670 1,601 1,374
Table 1.7
Per Capita Revenues at Constant Prices by Type of ULBs
Type of ULBs 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 Average 
Nagar Nigam Dehradun 344 307 740 379 261 406
Nagar Palika Parishads 469 569 703 690 570 600
Nagar Panchayats 254 368 471 684 517 459
All ULBs 416 484 688 614 489 538
Source: Based on the Second State Finance Commission Report of Uttarakhand. 
6.3 Case Study 1—Mussoorie Municipality 
6.3.1 Background 
Mussoorie (Hindi: Masūrī) is a city and has a municipal board, and it is about 34 kilo-
meters from the state capital of Dehradun in the Dehradun district of the Indian state of 
Uttarakhand. This hill station, situated in the foothills of the Himalayas, is also known 
as the “Queen of the Hills.” The municipality of Mussoorie was constituted by the Brit-
ish in 1850 and has been run successfully to the present day, with a total staﬀ of 351. 
In the census of 2001, Mussoorie had a population of 26,069, and the municipality is 
authorized to execute some public services like birth and death registration, street light 
maintenance, sanitation and drainage, bus stand and shopping complex maintenance, 
public grievances, property tax and assessment, traﬃc and tourist control, ropeway, 
parking, health and construction department, etc.
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6.3.2 Functions of the Municipality
The functions of the Nagar Palika Parishads and Nagar Panchayats are deﬁned in Sec-
tion 7 and 8 of the UP Municipalities Act as obligatory functions (Annex 12.1) and 
discretionary functions, respectively. There are 36 functions in the obligatory list and 
25 in the discretionary list. The functions broadly include public health, street lighting, 
sanitation, roads, water supply, urban planning, conservancy, drainage, regulation of 
oﬀensive and dangerous trades, construction and maintenance of parking lots, public 
conveniences, etc. 
6.3.3 Analysis of Local Revenues 
The revenue receipts of Mussoorie municipality shows that local tax revenue accounts 
for around 20 percent of the municipality’s income, the nontax revenue accounts for 
around 23 percent, and the other sources like state transfers, etc., account for 57 per-
cent of the total sources of income. In terms of revenue from own sources, the local tax 
revenue accounts for 46 percent, whereas the nontax revenues account for 54 percent 
of local own revenues. Among the local own revenues, the property tax forms the major 
source of the total revenue, and accounts for around 13 percent of the total sources, fol-
lowed by the salvage tax at 3.54 percent. Among the nontax revenues, the rentals from 
parking, shops, gardens, ropeways, etc., form the highest revenue share of around 10 
percent, followed by seven percent from the Mall Road entry fees (a road toll). Among 
the other state transfers, the share from State Finance Commission accounts for around 
44 percent of the total revenue sources. 
The local own tax revenues in real terms is showing annual growth on average of 
15.7 percent, whereas inﬂation averages around 4.9 percent, so in real terms (constant 
2004 prices), local own revenues are growing at 10.4 percent per year. Although, in-
ﬂation is below the average growth per year, the local own revenues are not keeping 
pace with the revenues in real terms. In case of nontax revenues, in real terms the 
average annual growth amounts to 11.9 percent. The nontax revenues are more than 
keeping pace with the inﬂation averaging at 6.5 percent. Adjusting for the annual 
population growth of 1.73 percent, we ﬁnd that local own tax revenues per capita are 
increasing from INR 362 to INR 371 (8.5 percent per year), as are total revenues per 
capita (27.9 percent) in real terms. However, the municipality has become increas-
ingly dependent on central transfers, with the share of local revenues in total revenues 
down from 60 to 30 percent. 
The highest average growth rate among the components of the local own tax revenues 
has been observed in the horse and/or pony tax (65 percent), which can be attributed to 
tourism. Similarly, the highest average growth rate among the components of the local 
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own nontax revenues has been observed in municipal ﬁnes (600 percent), followed by 
copying fees (313 percent), largely attributed to the strict enforcement of ﬁne collec-
tion and building permit at the municipal level, after the Supreme Court directives for 
building permits in Mussoorie city. 
The revenue from the Mall Road entrance fee has been a signiﬁcant source of revenue 
for the municipality. The revenue collected from this source forms around 10 percent 
of the local own source of revenue at the municipal level. The Mall Road entry fee has 
grown around 35 percent from 2004 to 2008.
Table 1.8
Revenues of Mussoorie Municipality (INR)
Municipal revenues 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Property tax 
(house/occupation tax)
7,950,263 7,934,003 15,113,915 9,511,758 10,334,025
Cycle rickshaw tax 4,945 1,953 8,858 960 3,419
Horse and pony tax 303 1,182 1,188 4,247 1,092
Salvage tax 1,961,672 2,369,946 4,033,165 2,552,451 2,922,322
Slaughter tax 3,757 3,625 3,614 2,283 3,201
Entertainment tax 1,490 1,000 7,454 800 760
Rentals (land, parking, 
shops, gardens, 
waterfalls, telescope 
viewing, ropeways)
7,026,759 3,842,515 7,478,683 9,336,935 11,105,776
Slaughterhouse fees 22,731 25,565 58,159 40,048 45,360
Copying fees 31,829 121,728 285,033 276,173 430,733
Dog registration 90 10 60 50 90
License fees (contractors, 
photographers, hotels, 
catering)
136,886 207,086 171,537 420,596 240,741
Miscellaneous 
(fines, road cutting, 
encroachment removal )
255,052 34,025 59,865 254,250 107,017
Revenue from interest 193,010 224,102 136,280 1,449,975 1,740,050
Others (Mall Road entry) 8,590,654 4,561,756 5,306,644 5,645,174 6,179,234
Municipal Act fines 4,035 38,335 60,795 95,774 100,963
Security deposits 41,500 103,400 4,500 54,950 34,000
Total local own revenue 26,224,976 19,470,231 32,729,750 29,646,424 33,248,783
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Municipal revenues 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Grants and other 
transfers
State Finance 
Commission 
16,250,400 11,404,000 21,135,300 55,315,000 66,215,000
11th Finance Commission 1,336,801 1,371,078 1,823,300 2,115,728
Miscellaneous (CM fund) 500,000 3,433,000 3,670,000
MLA fund 151,000 49,000 1,212,000 67,270
MP fund 59,736 19,905
Stamp duty 2,538,530 1,915,360
Others (tourism) 1,028,040
Infrastructure 6,690,000 38,633,000 8,000,000
Loan from government 
(without interest) 
4,606,446 35,685
Total transfers 17,646,937 17,552,429 33,799,855 102,624,088 77,952,270
Total revenue 43,871,913 37,022,660 66,529,605 132,270,512 111,201,053
Local own revenues as 
share of total revenue
59.78% 52.59% 49.20% 22.41% 29.90%
Local tax revenues as 
share of total revenue
22.62% 27.85% 28.81% 9.13% 11.93%
Local nontax revenues as 
share of total revenue
37.16% 24.74% 20.38% 13.29% 17.97%
Local tax revenue as share 
of local own revenue
37.84% 52.96% 58.57% 40.72% 39.90%
Local nontax revenues 
as share of local own 
revenue
62.16% 47.04% 41.43% 59.28% 60.10%
The Tax Base 
At present, the property taxation is based on the ARV (Annual Rental Value) method. 
The categories for the assessment under the house tax/property tax include: residential, 
commercial, and institutional structures. There is a separate method of calculation of 
tax for each type of categories. In case of simple residential structures, it is arrived at 
by calculation the 12.5 percent of the total assessment derived from the assessed value 
of the structure. For commercial, and other categories, the structure is diﬀerent and is 
based on the cost of construction, cost of land, and ﬁxed multiplier of ﬁve percent to 
arrive at the assessment value. 
38
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
The rate of assessment is not uniform among Uttarakhand’s urban local bodies. 
In the case of Mussoorie municipality, 15 percent of the assessed value is taken in the 
form of property tax, whereas it varies in other local bodies of Uttarakhand from 12.5 
percent or less. 
The following table describes the details of taxation, fees, and user charges levied 
by Mussoorie municipality. 
Table 1.9
Tax, Licensing, User Charges, and Fees in Mussoorie
No. Description Tax/license fee/permit details (Annual)
1. House tax/Property tax
(Residential, Commercial, Residential)*
(* a breakdown of the property tax is 
unavailable)
15 percent of ARV 
2. Cycle rickshaw tax INR 25 
3. Horse/Pony tax INR 75
4. Salvage tax 3.75 percent of ARV (Residential)
4.50 percent of ARV (Commercial)
5. Slaughter tax INR 7–12
6. Show tax INR 10/show 
7. Rentals Leased Amount/Auction 
8. Dog registration INR 10
9. Slaughter fees
10. License fee—contractors INR 300 (Category A), INR 200 
(Category B), INR 150 (Category C)
11. License fee—hotels
(Hotels: 176 numbers)
INR 15 per bed 
12. License fee—photographers INR 205 per license
13. License fee—food (800 numbers) INR 20 per license
14. Copying fees INR 10–500/per copy
15. Miscellaneous
16. Entry fees (Mall Road), permits INR 100 per car/entry
INR 500 per year (permit fee)
17. Mutation fees (fees charged for alteration or 
substitution of title of a person in municipal 
property records)
INR 500–1,000 per case (residential)
INR 1000–2,000 (commercial)
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No. Description Tax/license fee/permit details (Annual)
18. Projection fees (extra construction 
above windows at lintel level for 
protection from rain/direct sun) 
INR 3 per square foot
19. Hoarding fees INR 120 per square meter
20. Kerosene license INR 500 
Administration 
The tax collection is managed by eight full-time revenue staﬀ members who are spread 
over 11 wards of the city. The total area of the city covers around 64 square kilometers, 
with around 5,000 households and 167 hotels. The tax assessment is done annually for 
all the categories of the properties like residential, commercial, or institutional. However, 
the religious organizations and their assets are exempt from the assessment like temples, 
mosques, churches, religious societies, etc. The assessment notice is sent by post to the 
taxpayers and if they pay within the stipulated period they receive a 20-percent discount. 
Around 80 percent of the tax is realized within this period, and those who fall outside 
this period are subjected to the levy of additional 10 percent in form of ﬁnes. At present, 
tax collection eﬃciency is around 85 percent. Fraud and/or collusion on the parts of 
the collectors come in the form of underassessment of the properties or exemption or 
revised taxation of the properties after the intervention by the tax assessment commit-
tee. At present, elected oﬃcials form part of the hearing committee for any exemptions, 
thus inﬂuenced by the political system. 
The Scope of Nontax Revenues 
Nontax revenues contribute almost equally to the share of local own revenues as local 
taxes. However, there is a more scope for revenue mobilization by the way of policy 
interventions like revised user fees, licensing fees, rentals, etc., as compared to the 
nominal values at present. Furthermore, since all the professions, trades, and other 
actors in the informal sector are covered by the present taxation system, there is more 
scope to strengthen the nontax revenue sources as they provided a considerable yield 
in previous years. The municipality has recently introduced levying additional tax in 
form of an ecological tax on tourists entering the municipal limits, and is expected to 
contribute substantially to the overall revenue base of the municipality. This is levied 
as an entry tax for vehicles: INR 100 for heavy vehicles and INR 30 for cars and jeeps.
 
The Extent of the Informal Sector 
The key categories of the informal sector at Mussoorie mainly include street vendors 
(involved in the business of selling food items, souvenirs, handmade garments/textiles, 
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etc.), cycle rickshaw pullers, and horses and ponies. However, the municipality regulates 
some of the businesses by issuing licenses and levying fees. The license categories in-
clude: photographers, cycle rickshaw pullers, horses and ponies, hotels and restaurants, 
and contractors. The major category of the business sector that includes businesses by 
shopkeepers of various categories, traders, retailers, wholesalers, enterprises, etc., are not 
covered by such licenses and fees except the property tax. The local sales tax or VAT 
is directly regulated by state government and is not controlled by urban local bodies. 
Table 1.10
Categories of Informal Sector in Mussoorie, in Percent
No. Categories of informal sector Percentage
1. Street vendors 
(Food, souvenirs, handmade garments/goods, readymade garments, footwear) 
65.0
2. Business shops/retail 
(souvenirs, readymade garments, etc.) 
25.0
3. Bookshops/stationery 4.0
4. Hardware 2.5
5. Entertainment/amusement 3.5
Source: Mussoorie Municipality 2009.
The Extent of the Taxation of the Informal Sector 
Based on the primary survey, it was observed that informal operators and their enterprises 
are not subject to taxation; this is mainly due to the political interference and the low 
scale of the informal sector. However, the average bribe paid by actors in the informal 
sector to the local authorities range from INR 20–100, depending on the amount of 
business being done and the location of the street vendor. Presently, permits and/or 
licenses are not been provided to the informal sector. Based on the ﬁeld visit, many of 
those doing business in public space like street traders and vendors do want to pay for 
their sites. In the absence of formal licensing and fees from the municipality, the informal 
sector had to pay bribes to the municipality as well as to the police. Due to this system, 
the street vendors face a constraint in investing in and growing their businesses. The 
informal sector with categories like food sellers, souvenirs, handmade garments, goods, 
entertainment and amusement showed a willingness to pay for tax and/or a licensing fee 
under the regulated mechanism and range from INR 50–300 depending on the type 
of business and season of operation. 
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6.4 Case Study 2—Dehradun Nagar Nigam 
 (Dehradun Municipal Corporation) 
6.4.1 Resource Base of Revenues
The Composition of the Total Revenues (Tax, Nontax and Other Sources/Transfers). 
The municipality of Dehradun, among the earliest of municipalities formed in the 
nineteenth century, was dissolved in December 1998 to make way for an upgraded 
institution, that is, the present Nagar Nigam (municipal corporation). The total popu-
lation now stands at nearly a half million(from the census of 2001), estimated in the 
absence of the local census data comprising 344,858 people in the old areas of the city, 
and 102,950 in new areas. 
 The comprehensive functions of the Nagar Nigam Dehradun are laid down in 
Sections 114 and 115 of the UP Municipal Corporation Act of 1959, and subsequent 
amendments; these are classiﬁed as obligatory (41 items), and discretionary (43 items), 
and include public health, street lighting, roads, water supply, urban planning, con-
servancy, drainage, regulation of oﬀensive and dangerous trades, construction and 
maintenance of parking lots, public conveniences, etc. 
 The capacity of the Nagar Nigam Dehradun to fulﬁll its functions depend upon the 
resource base that it created from: (i) revenues raised through taxes; (ii) nontax measures 
and the sale of municipal assets (such as land); (iii) statutory transfers on the basis of 
the SFC recommendations, (iv) transfers on account of the dispensation of the Tenth, 
Eleventh and now the Twelfth Finance Commission, (v) state and central government 
grants on plan or non-plan account, including from the MP and MLA Funds, and (vi) 
other receipts, including loans from government sources, or ﬁnancial institutions, if 
any. Over the period 2003–08, the total revenues of the Nagar Nigam Dehradun went 
up from just under INR 2 billion in 2003–04 to almost INR 2.7 billion in 2007–08, 
recording an increase of around 36 percent. 
Table 1.11
Sources of Revenue of Nagar Nigam Dehradun (INR hundred thousands)
Sources of Income 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Tax revenues 264.47 256.00 278.20 296.38 354.83
Nontax revenues 231.79 136.92 837.52 1,010.01 176.46
SFC, grants, other income 1,480.55 1,090.74 1,657.28 1,949.69 2,148.57
Total 1,976.81 1,483.66 2773 3,256.08 2,679.86
Source: Nagar Nigam Dehradun. 
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Among the revenues at Nagar Nigam Dehradun, tax constitutes around 13 percent 
of the total revenue sources, nontax revenues constitute around 17 percent of the total, 
whereas the revenues from the state transfers and other sources constitute around 70 
percent of the total. Overall, nontax revenues also constitute a major source of income 
and amount to around 53 percent of the local own revenue, as compared to around 47 
percent of the tax revenues. The average nontax revenues have shown a steep growth 
rate of around 32 percent as compared to six percent from tax revenues from 2003–04 
to 2007–08. However, the a much higher average growth rate from tax sources has 
been observed as compared to nontax revenues from local own sources, and the aver-
age growth rate of tax revenues is 36 percent as compared to nine percent from nontax 
sources, which is mainly attributed to the eﬀective property tax collection and revenue 
realization of local tax sources It is important to note that the contribution of own rev-
enues to the total resources has declined from 40 percent to 20 percent, from 2005–06 
to 2007–08. This reﬂects the growing dependency on outside sources, mainly the state 
government, with other sources (including transfers on the SFC account) contributing 
to more than 70 percent of spending. The Nagar Nigam’s performance, measured in 
terms of own revenue generation per capita stands at INR 120, much lower than that 
of the Nagar Palika Parishads with an average level of INR 166.
A detailed examination of tax and nontax revenues provides a more complete picture 
of the potential for raising revenues. As per the trends, tax revenues have shown less 
buoyancy than nontax revenues. 
Receipts from Tax Revenues 
Property tax is the major source of tax revenue, and constitutes around 88 percent of 
the total tax revenues, and around 41 percent of the total revenues from own sources. 
The per capita property tax has shown a steady increase from 2005–06 to 2007–08, 
mainly due to the eﬀective property tax revenue realization. Property tax may be 
levied on all properties within the municipal limits, including state government and 
central public sector properties, and service charges may be levied on all users of 
such services. However, as per the Eleventh Finance Commission’s examination of 
the question, central government properties enjoy immunity under Article 285 of 
the Constitution, on the principle that the sovereign cannot be taxed except with his 
consent; state government properties and income are exempt from union taxation, 
with some limitations, under Article 289. 
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Table 1.12
Tax Revenues from Diﬀerent Sources of Nagar Nigam, Dehradun (2003–2008)
Heads of Income (INR)
Local tax revenues
2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Property tax (house/
occupation tax)
24,386,804 23,317,442 23,713,240 25,248,009 29,690,189
Dog/animal tax 1,530 1,380 2,160 1,330 3,500
Advertising tax 1,839,813 2,150,579 3,952,748 4,277,778 5,561,387
Entertainment tax 205,570 131,340 151,995 111,020 228,240
Projection tax 
(construction)
13,424 78
Total local tax revenues 26,447,141 25,600,819 27,820,143 29,638,137 35,483,316
Growth –3.20% 8.67% 6.53% 19.72%
Percentage of total 
revenues
13.38% 17.25% 10.03% 9.10% 13.24%
Percentage of local 
own revenues
53.29% 65.15% 24.93% 22.69% 66.79%
(INR in hundred thousands)
Details 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Property tax 243.86 233.17 237.13 252.48 296.90
Percentage change  –4.39% 1.70% 6.47% 17.59%
Property tax as a percentage of 
tax revenue
92.21% 91.08% 85.24% 85.19% 83.67%
Property tax as a percentage of 
total revenue from own sources
49.14% 59.34% 21.25% 19.33% 55.88%
Per capita property tax 48 46 47 50 59
Source: Nagar Nigam Dehradun, 2009.
Nontax revenue sources of the Nagar Nigam consist of license fees, tehbazari 
(fees from street vendors), income from rent, ﬁnes, and penalties, interest, recover-
ies against loss of municipal property, and other miscellaneous sources. Among the 
nontax revenues components, the revenue from stamp fees accounts to the highest 
component, around 23 percent of local own resources, followed by hotel licenses, 
parking fees, and rent from land, constituting two percent, two percent, and 1.4 per-
cent, respectively. The nontax revenues constitute around 53 percent of the revenue 
from own sources and is higher than revenue from tax sources that make up around 
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47 percent of local own revenues. The average per capita revenues from nontax sources 
is INR 95, which is much higher than the average per capita revenue from tax sources 
at INR 50, from 2003–08. 
Table 1.13
Receipts from Nontax Revenues in Nagar Nigam Dehradun
(INR in hundred thousands)
Details 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Nontax revenue 231.79 136.92 837.52 1010.01 176.46
Percent change  –40.93% 511.65% 20.60% 82.53%
Nontax revenue as a percent 
of revenue from own sources
46.71% 34.85% 75.07% 77.31% 33.21%
Nontax revenue as a percent 
of total revenue receipt 
11.73% 9.23% 30.20% 31.02% 6.58%
Per capita nontax revenue 46 27 166 200 35
Source: Nagar Nigam Dehradun. 
An advertising tax was introduced by regulating the hoardings and advertising 
spaces and signage across the city. The advertising/hoarding sites were managed on 
an annual contract system by auctioning the site spaces on an annual basis to private 
contractors. A revenue of around 6 percent of the local oven resources was generated 
from the advertising spaces/hoardings, with a growth rate of around 33 percent from 
2003–2008. 
7. ANALYSIS OF REVENUE BASE OF ULBS IN KARNATAKA, WITH 
 PECIAL REFERENCE TO INFORMAL SECTOR IN BANGALORE
Recent years have witnessed a shifting of the responsibility for the provision of urban 
public services to local governments in India.25 However, corresponding ﬁnancial re-
sources have often not been devolved to ULBs. ULBs in Karnataka, like other states 
of India, do not have a large independent tax domain and do not enjoy autonomous 
revenue sources. Property tax is the mainstay of the ULBs’ own ﬁnancing in the state. 
The receipts of ULBs may broadly be classiﬁed as (a) tax and nontax revenue and (b) 
grants and loans. It should be noted that while the power to collect certain taxes is 
vested with the ULBs, powers pertaining to the rates and revision thereof, procedure 
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of collection, method of assessment, exemptions and concessions, etc., are vested with 
the state government. 
The municipal earnings of ULBs of Karnataka26 has been analyzed in the present 
section based on data available in the third State Finance Commission Report of Kar-
nataka. Since local bodies are statutorily not allowed to have deﬁcits in their budgets, 
their resource gaps (in terms of the resources they really need) cannot be assessed from 
the budget documents. Hence, the ULB budgets can only indicate the trends in revenue 
and expenditure and their composition. 
An analysis of the per capita revenue of diﬀerent categories of ULBs is presented 
here for the period of 2002–03 to 2005–06 (Figure 1.1). The analysis indicates that the 
growth of per capita revenue in real terms has been highest for the city corporations. A 
steady growth is perceptible over the years for all classes of ULBs, except city corpora-
tions where the per capita revenue registered a slight decline in 2004–05 but picked 
up in the following year. 
7.1 Revenue Base of ULBs in Karnataka27 
Figure 1.1
Per Capita Revenue of ULBs of Karnataka by Type of ULBs at Constant Prices in INR
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Source: Based on the third State Finance Commission Report of Karnataka.
The percentage distribution of average revenue for the period 2002–07 by various 
sources and type of ULBs are shown in (Figure 1.2).28 Property taxes form the major 
source of revenue for all types of ULBs. The share of property tax decreases from larger 
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to smaller ULBs. Property taxes are relatively more important for larger ULBs than the 
smaller ULBs where grants form a higher share of revenue. City corporations generate 
20 percent of their total revenue from property taxes, compared to 9.23 percent in town 
panchayats. The corporations generate a modest share of their revenue from charges, fees, 
and ﬁnes and cesses, which is not the case for the other classes of ULBs. Here, the share 
of all types of local own revenue is very small, which is compensated by a higher share of 
grants and transfers, the percentage of grants being the highest for the smaller ULBs.29 
Figure 1.2
Percentage Distribution of Revenues of ULBs in Karnataka by Type of ULBs 
(2002–2007)
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Source: Based on the third State Finance Commission Report of Karnataka.
An analysis of per capita revenue by various sources and type of ULBs for the aver-
age of the period 2002–07 has been attempted in (Figure 1.3). The analysis shows that 
that city corporations generate more per capita revenue than the other classes of ULBs. 
They generate three times per capita revenue than the town panchayats and double that 
of city municipal councils. Property tax forms the most important source of revenue 
generation for all classes of ULBs. Furthermore, city corporations are able to generate 
higher revenue from property taxes as well as from fees/ﬁnes and cesses. 
47
I n d i a
Figure 1.3
Average Per Capita Revenue of All ULBs in Karnataka by Type of Revenue 
at Constant Prices for 2002–2007
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Source: Based on the third State Finance Commission Report of Karnataka.
7.2 Revenue Base of Bangalore Municipal Corporation
In 2008–09, with the adoption of the Unit Area Method, property tax collection has 
increased from INR 3,800 million to INR 7,800 million (see the case study in Section 
2.2). This has happened because, for the ﬁrst time, Geographical Information System 
(GIS) have mapped the entire city. This has helped in identifying and bringing the 
properties within the city into the tax net. Over 150,000 unauthorized properties have 
ﬁled their returns during the 2008–09 tax year. 
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Table 1.14
Bangalore: Per Capita Total License Fees and Its Components at Constant Prices
2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Hotel and restaurant fees 3.04 3.73 4.22 3.23 3.07 9.42
License fees—us shelters 0.07 0.33 0.54 1.72 0.52 7.96
Power license fees 1.62 1.59 1.86 1.27 0.85 4.97
Others 0.62 0.37 0.63 0.71 0.38 5.20
Total license fees 5.35 6.02 7.26 6.92 4.82 27.55
Source: Calculated from budget documents of the Bangalore Municipal Corporation.
Figure 1.4
Per Capita Total Receipts of Bangalore Municipal Corportation 
and Its Components at Constant Prices in INR
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Source: Calculated from budget documents of the Bangalore Municipal Corporation.
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Per capita total receipts at constant prices30 registered an increase from INR 1,622 
to INR 2,633 during 2002–03 to 2007–08. Property tax accounted for the high share 
of per capita receipts, which increased from INR 425 to INR 574 during 2002–03 to 
2007–08 (Figure 1.4). All components of the per capita receipts registered an increase 
other than surcharge on stamp duty, which registered a steady decline from INR 111 
to INR 9 during the same period. Per capita licence fees, which ﬂuctuated between 
INR 5 and INR 7 during 2002–03 to 2006–07, registered a steep increase to INR 28 
in 2007–08. This may be attributed to the increase in trade license fees as well as inclu-
sion of more business in the licensing net with the adoption of the new policy of trade 
license reform during 2007–08 (as described in Section 2.2). 
Incentives and Disincentives
The new property tax collection system created incentives for prompt tax payment by 
allowing citizens to enjoy a ﬁve-percent tax rebate on timely payment of taxes. Those 
who paid before March 31, 2009 enjoyed a ﬁve-percent rebate and they were allowed 
to ﬁle returns without being penalized till April 30, 2009. Furthermore, a disincentive 
for late payment was built into the system as well. Those citizens paying taxes after the 
due date had to pay two percent of the property tax as penalty. Also, those who have 
ﬁled wrongful information would end up paying double the taxable amount evaded, 
besides two-percent interest per month. If a property owner has paid INR 2,000 less than 
what he should have paid the penalty would be INR 4,000 plus two-percent interest. 
Political Acceptability and Equity in the Unit Area Value System
The involvement of fellow citizens in campaigning for this reform explained in Section 
2.2 helped to bring about political acceptability of the tax system. Further, the ruling 
government supported this move. The steep jump in the voluntary payment of taxes in 
the ﬁrst half of this year corroborates the above argument. Equity has been built in the 
new system as the entire city has been divided into six zones. The tax rates are highest 
in zone A that has high land and property values and decline systematically with zones 
B–F representing lower land values. Furthermore, urban slums are fully exempted from 
the payment of property tax to ensure concerns about equity.31 
7.3 A Study of Informal Sector in Bangalore
Urban vending is not only a source of employment but provides “aﬀordable” services 
to the majority of the urban population. The National Policy for Urban Street Vendors 
(2004) noted the role played by the hawkers in the economy and also in the wider 
society needs to be given due credit, but hawkers are considered unlawful entities and are 
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subjected to continuous harassment by the police and civic authorities. This is reported 
to be continuing even after the ruling of the Supreme Court that: 
if properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the 
small traders on the side walks can considerably add to the comfort and 
convenience of the general public, by making available ordinary articles 
of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. The policy further men-
tions that an ordinary person, not very aﬄuent, while hurrying towards 
his home after a day’s work can pick up these articles without going 
out of his way to ﬁnd a regular market. The right to carry on trade or 
business mentioned in Article 19(1)g of the Constitution, on street pave-
ments, if properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the 
streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and no other use. 
The municipal and police laws of various cities vary with regard to the legal status of 
the hawkers. Even in other cities, the legal provisions are far from the ones that would 
encourage or ease the problem of street vendors. Furthermore, in each city, there is a 
cap on the number of licenses that can be issued in a particular year. In Patna, elaborate 
details pertaining to the articles sold, place, time of sale and also the stall/booth details 
from which they will be sold, must be speciﬁed to obtain a license. Provision of these 
details is a hurdle for most hawkers who are generally illiterate. In most cities, the street 
vendors face heavy ﬁnes and harsh punishment if found without a license or working 
against the regulations. Importantly, the street vendors pay bribes to the local police and 
municipal oﬃcers even if they are paying the license fees to the municipal authorities. 
This is also true for street vendors, who have a license to run their trade but are not 
licensed traders. They need to bribe the local police and municipal oﬃcers since they 
feel insecure even if they are paying license fees.
Although street vendors have a signiﬁcant role in the daily lives of all individuals 
in the urban areas, they are considered a hindrance in the urban space by government 
oﬃcials as well as the urban vehicle owners, who believe that they occupy what little 
urban space remains in a rapidly growing country like India and prevent the smooth 
ﬂow of traﬃc. The essence of the problem lies with the legal system of the cities, which 
fails to provide any space to street vending as an activity and recognize its signiﬁcance 
in retail trading.
The informal economy makes up a whopping 86.6 percent of the total economy of 
the state of Karnataka, slightly above the national average.32 One would also expect the 
share of informal sector to be even higher in Bangalore, although this data is unavailable 
at the city level from any government agency. A primary study of the street vendors 
was carried out in the city of Bangalore to assess the costs incurred in doing business as 
well as in understanding the their problems in running their business. Three hundred 
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vendors were surveyed at random along the Avenue Road at the city market, which is 
one of the busiest locations in the city. Interviews were conducted with its informal 
traders: readymade garment vendors, fruit sellers, ﬂower and vegetable sellers, plastic 
product and spice sellers, in addition to various street vendors’ associations and market 
and traders’ associations to assess the impact of the reforms. 
The interview with street vendors brought interesting results across the market. On 
average, each hawker had to pay bribes of INR 60 on a daily basis to the police (who 
deal with the ﬂow and regulation of traﬃc and safety of the citizens using the road) and 
INR 20 to the municipal corporation oﬃcials (who regulate the use of pavements and 
trade). Compared to the formal payments made by the licensed traders, the informal 
payments work out to be much higher. The street vendors were not the regular license 
holders; however, they were keen to apply for vending license. Unfortunately, no des-
ignated hawking zones have been planned for Bangalore.
Figure 1.5
Types of Vendors Interviewed
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garment vendors
33%
Fruit sellers
17%Flower sellers
13%
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Plastic product 
sellers 7%
Spices sellers 
7%
The municipal authority did not really try to bring these street traders under the 
purview of legislation. It cited the lack of commercial space to accommodate the 
huge chunk of the informal sector. Moreover, municipal oﬃcials were of the view that 
various other potential sources of revenue like the property tax, could be tapped in 
order to increase municipal revenue. About 50 street vendors were interviewed from a 
sample of 300,33 representing a diversity of trades. More interviews with various trad-
ers’ associations was also held in the city. But the traders’ association expressed their 
pleasure at the adoption of the reform. According to them, the reform had reduced 
the time taken to obtain trade licenses from a year to only one week. The Chemical 
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Association was of the view that the renewal of a trade license could be tied with the 
annual property tax payment. A few traders’ association argued that the traders were 
already paying sales tax and profession tax to the state government and payment of 
trade licenses was an additional burden. However, almost all associations unanimously 
acknowledged the fact that the payment of trade licenses brought legitimacy to the 
survival of the traders. Further, the recent reforms in the issuance of trade licenses 
within a period of one week and requiring a minimum of paperwork34 were cited as a 
laudable achievement of the local body.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Property taxes are relatively more important for bigger ULBs than smaller ULBs where 
grants form a higher share of their revenues. An analysis of per capita revenue by various 
sources and type of ULBs shows that that city corporations generate more per capita 
revenue than the other classes of ULBs. They generate three times more per capita 
revenue than the town panchayats and double that of city municipal councils. Cesses, 
fees, and ﬁnes were the other major sources of revenue followed by the surcharge on 
stamp duty. In the case of medium-size ULBs like Nagar Palika Parishads and Nagar 
Panchayats, nontax revenues forms the largest component of local own sources of rev-
enues comprising of license fees, rents, stamp duties, entry taxes, etc. Street vendors 
form an important part of local economy and varies according to the size of the cities. 
The innovative measures adopted by Bangalore Municipal Corporation has resulted in 
mainstreaming the street vendors as part of the local economy and generating income 
from local own sources. 
So far, municipalities have paid little attention to mobilizing resources from their 
own local resources, especially those which are not the major components of the revenue 
sources at present. A majority of the municipalities often does not exercise their poten-
tial ability to realize revenues from potential sources in their local economies. There are 
various classiﬁed categories of levies that have not been revised for decades and, at the 
same time, are not subject to eﬀective taxation. This has largely resulted in evasion of 
the taxation system, compounded by lacuna in administration, and resulting in the weak 
ﬁnancial health of the many municipalities. The evidence from the case studies under-
taken show the potential options available for the municipalities. However, the reforms 
vary in nature and scope and are subject to the political and administrative willingness 
to bring them about. All these gaps have resulted in revenue leakages, giving rise to an 
informal system of functioning at various levels. Some of the key recommendations for 
ULBs to be adopted include: 
53
I n d i a
  The ULBs should adopt a uniform taxation system for various professions, salaried 
persons, and should switch to the Unit Area Method (UAM) for tax collection. 
  There are various professions and trades that have the potential to bring 
substantial business and ﬁnancial resources to the municipalities. Under the 
old valuation system, levies have not produced much revenue, either by failing 
to bring some professions into the tax net or undervaluation of such trades and 
professions for deﬁning undervalued levies and taxes. 
  Although it is evident that the property tax is the major source of revenue from 
local own sources, the ULBs can adopt innovative approaches for resource 
mobilization through local tax administration, as observed from the case studies 
from two states.
  The mobilization of resources by regulatory and tax administration reforms, 
for example, an advertising tax, an entry tax or fee at tourist destinations, or 
the privatization of parking places, thereby generating revenues from informal 
sector by bringing its actors into the overall tax net.
  The ULBs may introduce and implement new tax revenue for sources like the 
profession tax and business and trade licenses for various forms of business and 
professional entities within municipal limits. 
  At present, selected professions are subject to eﬀective taxation and levies in the 
form of licenses/fees as compared to other less popular professions and trades in 
the excuse of low generating sources. The ULBs should exercise the full imple-
mentation of taxation applicable to all professions as per their bylaws and acts.
  The eﬀective regulation and recognition of the informal sector would control 
revenue leakages and corruption, and bring economic opportunities to the 
local level. 
  The ULBs should take steps to give vendors proper legal status by amending, 
enacting, repealing, and implementing appropriate laws and providing legiti-
mate hawking zones in urban and economic planning and bring them under 
the municipal tax net.
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ANNEX 1
1.1 Database 
The study is based on secondary as well as primary data. The macro-level analysis has 
been draw on data from various secondary sources like the Eleventh and Twelfth Finance 
Commission Reports, various volumes of Economic Survey, the Bulletin of the Reserve 
Bank of India, etc. Also, reports of various committees and working groups set up from 
time to time by the government of India and state governments on the subject have been 
utilized. For the city and town level analysis, primary information (ﬁve years, actual) 
was gathered from the select cities from the respective municipal budgets and through 
discussions with the concerned oﬃcials. Interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) 
were also conducted with taxpayers and informal traders, etc.
1.2  Methodology 
The study has been conducted at two levels, namely, at the state level taking the size 
of towns as the units of analysis and town level, taking towns as the level of analysis. 
Indicators had been constructed to analyze the main local taxes and their administration 
in the select states and cities/towns. Per capita revenue ﬁgures at constant prices had 
been calculated by deﬂating the current revenue ﬁgures by respective price index. The 
general consumer price index for non-manual workers has been used for the purpose. 
For calculating the per capita revenues, projection of population ﬁgures of ULBs have 
been carried out for the speciﬁc years of 2003–04, 2004–05, 2005–06, 2006–07, and 
2007–08, based on the growth pattern of the previous decade (1991–2001) using ex-
ponential growth rates. Interviews and focus group discussions with key oﬃcials (state 
and local levels), taxpayers and informal traders (associations of street vendors, trade 
associations, business associations, etc.) have been conducted.
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ANNEX 2
2.1 Second Phase of Reform
In 2002, the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act pertaining to the method for 
the proper assessment of property was amended to bring in a Capital Value System or 
CVS. While the amended property tax assessment by the capital value method law was 
introduced in all the urban local bodies, the taxpayers of Bangalore protested against 
its implementation as they feared that valuation by market value would abnormally 
inﬂate the property tax and several resident welfare associations and trade bodies called 
on the government to amend the law to bring in an area-based system of property tax 
for Bangalore, similar to the optional scheme introduced in 2000. 
In January 2007, seven city municipal councils (CMCs), one town municipal council 
(TMC), and 110 villages merged with Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP) to form 
the new Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP). While the erstwhile CMC and 
TMC were collecting property tax under the CVS scheme, the ARV system was being 
followed in the erstwhile area under BMP. With the merger of the erstwhile CMCs and 
TMCs with BMP, there arose the problem of two simultaneous methods of property tax 
administration: CVS for the newly added zones and SAS for the old BMP area. Hence, 
there was an urgent need to bring in uniformity in tax administration. Since there was 
resistance from the taxpayers towards following CVS, the government was forced to 
concede to the people’s request and amended the law to bring in an area-based system 
of property tax assessment for the whole of BBMP’s jurisdiction. 
Rational for Adopting the Area-Based System
The property tax is normally based either on the capital value of land and/or building or 
the rental value it could hypothetically fetch. Alternatively, the property tax base could 
be derived extracting the essence of both CVS and ARV to arrive at a fair valuation 
basis. The principle adopted for valuation is: 
 a) predetermined value per square foot of built up area depending on the location 
of the property; 
 b) cost of construction of building depending on roof type or its usage. 
This method was deﬁned as “Unit Area Value” (UAV) as the unit of valuation is 
based on a square foot, depending on the location. The act allows the commissioner 
to ﬁx the average market rate for diﬀerent areas or streets and for diﬀerent classes of 
building as well as vacant land by a mass appraisal method (gathered through real estate 
market information or any other reliable source) that he or she considers as reasonable 
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and suﬃcient. Taxpayers accepted the new tax policy that was legislated as they found 
that the new system was not in essence diﬀerent from the old SAS of 2000. 
Valuation Process 
The fair valuation for each area has to be determined in an objective manner. One of 
the accepted norms of valuation is to ﬁx value bands based on the published guidance 
value (GV) of the Department of Stamps and Registration. Each value band then be-
comes a Value Zone (VZ). On this basis, six value zones within the BBMP jurisdiction 
were ﬁnally notiﬁed after seeking public objection, if any, to the classiﬁcation of zones.
The average expected returns (lease/mortgage/rental/rates) were ﬁxed based on the 
roof type or usage. Similarly, all commercial and non-residential properties were cat-
egorized based on VZ. However, 11 categories of non-residential buildings fall outside 
the VZ, which will have unit rates based on their kinds of usage.35 
While ﬁxing a base rate for the year 2008–09, a conscious decision was taken not 
to increase the rental rates for any of the categories ﬁxed during 2000. This was done to 
make the new policy acceptable to taxpayers. However, new categories were carved out 
depending on the usage and type of construction.36 A rebate of ﬁve percent was provided 
in the act for early payment and a penalty interest rate of two percent per month for 
those who were tardy with their payments. Owner-occupied properties are to get 50 
percent rebate. This rebate is not available for non-residential properties occupied by 
owners. Also, depreciation was provided for the age of the building.
Under the Act it was mandatory for all property owners to ﬁle returns in the pre-
scribed form every year and declare whether they have made any further improvements 
in the building or changed it usage. If there was no change in the extent of the built up 
area or its usage a simple return was prescribed. In an event there were changes a separate 
return form has to be ﬁlled up and submitted. All returns ﬁled would be automatically 
accepted. However, there would be random check of 15 percent of the returns ﬁled. 
The Act has made it mandatory for the Commissioner to revise valuation of all 
properties once in three years by 15 percent. The Council could however revise up to 
30 percent for any class of property. The revision will be on the base year 2008–09. 
The mandatory revision for the block period will thus ensure buoyancy and secondly 
taxpayers will receive automatic bill informing them of the enhancement. Although 
there was no increase in the rental rates ﬁxed during 2000, BBMP was able to increase 
its property tax collection as several properties shifted from a lower zone to a higher 
zone.37 This zone classiﬁcation was made as scientiﬁc as possible and every street in the 
jurisdiction was physically tracked and the zonal location was ﬁxed. After completing 
this elaborate exercise the zone classiﬁcation was banded into six value zones and then 
notiﬁed calling for objections and suggestion. After this opportunity the ﬁnal zone 
classiﬁcation was published. 
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Reasons for Increased Revenue
Though the property tax rental rates were not increased but retained at the same level 
as during 2000, the property tax collection registered an all time record of over 100 
percent increase over the previous year. There are many reasons for this increase. The 
primary reason is the shift from lower zone to the higher zone. Therefore, despite nearly 
30 percent of the property owners in the erstwhile BMP area are yet to ﬁle their returns, 
there is an increase in the tax collection. While the rental rates remained same for all 
categories listed in 2000, the rental rates for the added categories were consciously 
made higher since those buildings have the potential for higher rent. Another area 
that the new law brought to tax net are exempted properties. The new law prescribed 
that all these properties exempted from property tax under the Act were obliged to 
pay service charges at 25 percent of the rates ﬁxed for such properties. Another factor 
that added for increase in revenue emerged from the provision that made it manda-
tory for all unauthorized properties to ﬁle their returns and pay property tax without 
prejudice for any action that may be taken against such buildings. Over 1,500,000 
unauthorized properties have ﬁled their return during the 2008–09. There may be 
another 2,000,000 more such properties that is still to come under the tax net. 
BBMP undertook a simple GIS mapping of all the properties within its 800 square 
kilometer. All properties were clearly identiﬁed and they were given GIS numbers. The 
GIS map has identiﬁed 17 lakh properties. However, nearly three lakhs properties are 
identiﬁed either as slums and government buildings. BBMP has used the GIS map to 
place all the returns particulars in the geo-reference in the base map. Hence for those 
properties that remained blank in the GIS map, automatic notices can be generated. The 
combination of the shift to one zone higher, service charges for exempted properties, 
mandatory ﬁling of returns by all property owners and the aid of GIS mapping have 
contributed for the increase in property tax revenue.38 
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NOTES
1 In oﬃcial parlance, Uttarakhand is also known as Uttaranchal.
2 Devas and Kelly.
3 Gausch and Hahn 1997. 
4 Moore 2004.
5 Bird 1992, Goode 1993, Taliercio 2003, Tanzi and Zee 2001.
6 The focus of attention has largely been on understanding the longevity of the sector, its 
contribution to the economy and its connections with the formal sector (Gerxhani 2004, 
Peattie 1987, Fortes and Sassen-Koob 1987). Until recently, the idea of taxing the informal 
sector might have been considered an oxymoron as one of the key features of informal activi-
ties is the ability to avoid taxes. Research suggests that losses from not taxing the informal 
sector could amount to 35–55 percent of total tax revenues in some countries (Aim and 
Martinez-Vasquez 2003, Terkper 2003). 
7 Friedman et al. 2000.
8 Ngoi 1997, De Soto 1990.
9 Negotiating Formality: Informal Sector, Market, and State in Peru. Available online: http://
www.wiego.org/occupational.../Roever.
10 In India, the informal sector is generally used synonymously as the unorganized sector, 
i.e., those enterprises whose activities or collection of data is not regulated under any legal 
provision and/or those, which do not maintain any regular accounts. Units not registered 
under the Factories Act of 1948 constitute unorganized component of manufacturing on 
account of activity not regulated under any Act. In case of the sectors like trade, transport, 
hotels and restaurants, storage and warehousing, and services, all non-public sector units 
constitute the unorganized sector. 
11 In 2005, the total employment (principal plus subsidiary) in the Indian economy was 458 
million, of which the unorganized sector accounted for 395 million.
12 Suresh N. Shende (2002) “Informal Economy. The Special Tax Regime for Small and Micro 
Business: Design and Implementation.” 
13 Sharit K. Bhowmik (2005) “Street Vendors in Asia: A Review.” Economic and Political 
Weekly, May 28‒June 4, 2005.
14 Three states were split to form three new states during the past few years due to regional 
demand for autonomy. Thus, Uttarakhand was formed by the Constitutional Amendment 
Act 2000 by dividing the state of Uttar Pradesh on November 9, 2000. Chhattisgarh was 
formed by the Constitutional Amendment Act, 2000 by dividing the state of Madhya 
Pradesh on November 1, 2000. Jharkhand was formed by the Constitutional Amendment 
Act, 2000 by dividing the state of Bihar on November 15, 2000.
15 It has been estimated that 30 to 50 percent of the residents of most large Asian cities live in 
such settlements (Cheema 1988).
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16 Octroi is a local tax collected on various articles brought into a town for consumption.
17 This is part of the decentralization eﬀorts brought about by the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act, 1992.
18 The methodology and database of the study have been detailed out in Annex 1.
19 Uttarakhand became India’s 27th state on November 9, 2000 (formerly known as Uttaranchal). 
20 In India, the power of the states and the Centre are deﬁned by the constitution and the 
legislative powers are divided into three lists. The state list consists of 66 items and individual 
states have exclusive authority to legislate on items included in this list. Urban development 
is such a subject in the state list.
21 In India, urban local bodies are deﬁned as per their population size. Municipal Corporations 
are cities with population above 0.3 million.
22 BBMP, Bangalore, 2009.
23 A handbook was published to deﬁne the zoning of the city for the purpose of the assessment 
to tax. The division of the city into zones was, in eﬀect, the ﬁrst level of reform to revalue 
properties on an annual rental base, but used an approach that features an assessment under 
a capital value system. 
24 “Betterment charge” means the charge declared to be payable in respect of an increase in 
the value of land resulting from the execution of a housing or improvement scheme in an 
urban area. 
25 The 74th Constitutional Amendment (1992) envisaged the creation of local self-governments 
for the urban population wherein the municipalities were provided with constitutional 
status for governance. The 74th Constitutional Amendment mandated that a State Finance 
Commission should be constituted at the expiration of every ﬁfth year for reviewing the 
ﬁnancial position of municipalities. The spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment was 
to empower ULBs to function eﬃciently and eﬀectively as autonomous entities for delivery 
of capital goods and services. 
26 160 ULBs.
27 The urban population of Karnataka was 17.62 million as of the 2001 census and ranked fourth 
among the highly urbanized states in India. The increase in urban population since 1901 in 
Karnataka was elevenfold as compared to the rural population, which was threefold. Karnataka 
has the following ﬁve categories of urban local bodies (ULB): eight city corporations (CC), 
44 city municipal councils (CMC), 94 town municipal councils (TMC), 68 town panchayats 
(TP), and 4 notiﬁed area committees (NAC). 
28 Here, total transfers and grants includes general grants, speciﬁc grants, head of transfer and 
scheme while others include theater tax, entertainment tax, professional tax, construction 
or building tax, consumption tax, and duties.
29 At times, ULBs also levy some other taxes and cesses as a percentage of property tax. These 
additional levies may be for municipal services or they may be collected on behalf of the 
state government. In Bangalore, the BBMP levies a certain percentage cess on property tax 
and collects it on behalf of the government. Thetoll tax is a user fee charged by the ULBs 
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to cover the construction cost of roads. When property is registered, the ULBs charge a 
surcharge on the stamp duty.
30 2002–03 prices.
31 Details of the second phase of reforms is given in Annex 2.
32 National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, Government of India, 2007.
33 The remaining 250 hawkers were from the same market and a discussion with the president 
of the Trader’s Union revealed that the system of informal payments was universal throughout 
the market.
34 Prior to the reforms, various documents were required to apply for a trade license. With the 
reforms, only proof of ownership and no objection letter from the immediate neighbor is 
required.
35 The tax rate was not altered from the previous rates and was maintained at 20 percent for 
residential and 25 percent for non-residential. The 2.5 times cap that existed in the earlier 
SAS 2000 scheme was removed and all property owners had to pay as per the rates ﬁxed. 
36 Average expected market rate per square foot/square meter per month Zonal RateABCDE
FResidential5.004.003.603.202.402.00Owner2.502.001.801.601.201.00 Non Residentia
l20.0014.0010.008.006.003.00Owner10.007.005.004.003.001.50The rental rates ﬁxed in 
the year 2000 for both residential and Non-residential remained same. If an area/street as 
per present (2008) classiﬁcation has moved to more than one higher zone then such change 
in zones shall be restricted to the value (rate) of the immediate next higher zone. 
37 The minimum increase in such shift from a lower zone to one zone higher would increase 
property tax by 15‒20 percent. Over 10,000 streets moved from a lower zone to one zone 
higher in both residential and non-residential property.
38 A comparison of the coverage and the revenue potential shows that while the new applicants 
have increased by 1,500,000. About 2,000,000 property owners are yet to ﬁle their returns. 
Therefore considering that nearly 0.4 million property owners are yet to ﬁle their returns it 
can be estimated that the property tax revenue could reach about INR 1,000 to 1,200 Crs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Indonesia has the largest informal economy in the world and the majority of its labor force 
works in the informal sector. One crucial issue is the opportunities and challenges for taxing 
the informal economy within the jurisdiction of Indonesian local governments. Focusing on 
street enterprises in urban areas of Jakarta and Bandung, this study provides a portrait of 
the informal economy in local economic development and explores how it might be taxed 
in future.
This study aims to identify the signiﬁcance of local tax derived from street enterprises 
in Jakarta and Bandung, and compares the proportion of local government budgets raised 
by each of these local taxes. In this regard, macro or national level data was generated on 
local government revenue sources disaggregated by type and tax/revenue instruments. It 
also provided a window to explore the characteristics of street enterprises in Jakarta and 
Bandung, including enterprise structures and the economic and demographic character-
istics of the operators in order to understand the capacity and willingness of the informal 
economy to pay tax. Third, it evaluates the perceptions of street enterprise operators towards 
the practice of tax/user charges collections so as to identify tax compliance and the impact 
of local taxation and equity effects on the informal economy, particularly on low-income 
groups, as well as economic distortions caused through undesirable incentives or disincen-
tives. Fourth, it examines the practical difﬁculties and the scope of abuse in administering 
the tax collection, including the likely extent of tax evasion, collusion between payers and 
ofﬁcials, and fraud by tax collectors.
This research-for-policy project employed the triangulation method. This mixed-research 
approach refers to a combination of strategies to study the same phenomenon employing 
quantitative and qualitative techniques of data collection, such as a comprehensive desk 
review, ﬁeldwork, seminars and focus group discussions, and workshops. The study shows 
that the informal economy is multifaceted, and hence most studies dealing with it remain 
vague. Some research papers simply give a list of characteristics of the informal economy by 
referring to activities which are per se illegal, fail to appear in statistical reporting mechanism, 
avoid regulatory requirements, or evade taxes, either as part of general ﬁscal collections 
or as speciﬁc service charges (Shende 2008: 1). This puts the informal economy as merely 
“petty traders” that powerfully hinder a country’s growth rate, locking it into a condition of 
“emerging but never quite making it,” and condemning those living from their unregistered 
businesses to a lifetime of insecurity and poor living standards (Farrel 2006). 
This view, however, is not supported by the evidence. While around the globe the 
informal economy contains a huge range of businesses (Farrel 2006), this research shows 
that street enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung could make potential contributions to the 
local revenues of the cities, albeit not the same, and that they have capacity and willingness 
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to pay tax and user charges to authorities. The potential contributions of street traders to 
local revenues in Bandung are relatively higher than in Jakarta. This is partly determined by 
the capacity of local governments in gaining revenues from their own sources. The local 
revenues in Jakarta are notably higher than that of Bandung. The main source of revenue in 
Jakarta is also mainly derived from its own source revenues. The local revenues of Bandung 
are mainly derived from transfers from central government.
It is not true that the informal economy and tax evasion is identical. This study supports 
the research ﬁndings of Joshi and Ayee (2008) that tax evasion is not the primary reason 
for continuing in the informal domain. While their level of income shows their potential 
capacity to pay tax and user charges, their willingness to pay fees is high and in the ma-
jority. However, noting that their incomes vary, and for many of them it is quite low, and 
involving daily and cash transactions, the informal sector’s activities are most likely to be 
regulated under user charges rather than tax. According to the law, district and municipal-
ity governments are allowed to collect user charges from street vending. In Bandung and 
Jakarta, collection of fees from street traders is possible since it is explicitly stated in Perda 
K3 (Kebersihan, Ketertiban, Keindahan) or the Local Regulation on Cleanliness, Orderliness, 
and Attractiveness of the Cities. 
This research-for-policy project has outlined evidence-based research on opportunities 
and challenges faced by local urban governments of Jakarta and Bandung in collecting 
revenues (taxes, fees) on predominantly informal economies. Except for the potential con-
tributions of street trading to local revenues, in general, the trajectory of ﬁndings in two 
cities under study shows similar trends. These ﬁndings form lessons and recommendations 
for effective taxing of informal economic activities that can be applied in other local govern-
ments in Indonesia and elsewhere.
The question is what strategies can be formulated to deal with such opportunities and 
challenges? In terms of increasing local taxation from street enterprises, the issue of regulation 
and formalization is central here to be addressed. Here, the extent to which formalization 
or regulation depends on the nature and characteristics of the informal economy in each 
particular region. It is clear that informal enterprises, even large ones, choose to stay that 
way if there is no change in the factors that generally drive them into informality, that are, 
high corporate taxes and the bureaucratic burden of operating formally. 
Therefore, the strategies that can be developed should take into account such a question 
as why do those involved in street trading remain informal? First, if the factor is related to 
proﬁt margins in the informal sector, which tend to be quite small, that regulation means 
the destruction of the activity itself. In this case, regulation in the way that it applies to 
formal establishments may not be suitable for those in the informal businesses. Regulation 
and tax will lead to economic distortions caused through undesirable disincentives. Second, 
if the factor has something to do with procedures and practices of the formalization of 
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trading that are often overly difﬁcult, then formalization can be selected as a strategy to 
deal with the informal economy.
In the case of street traders in Jakarta and Bandung, the second scenario is closer to the 
ﬁndings. The capacity and willingness of street traders in Jakarta and Bandung are relatively 
high and viable for local taxation. The formalization of street traders can be applied through 
a review of regulatory processes. It is argued that once the regulations and procedures are 
relaxed and improved, street traders will almost automatically follow the formalization of 
their business activities, including formal taxation. Discussions with resource persons and 
participants of seminar as well as interviews with government ofﬁcials in Jakarta and Bandung 
lead to a number of initial policy recommendations. In order to effectively and efﬁciently 
apply local taxation into the street trading, four options merit attention:
 1. Taxation of the informal economy is possible and viable in terms of economic and 
legal concerns, especially for those traders operating their business in ﬁxed and 
appointed locations. Such a tax needs to take into account the characteristics, 
typology, and economic scale of the trading. For example, user charges may be 
higher to those operating businesses in the attractive locations and obtaining high 
revenues. 
 2. Jakarta and Bandung have already Perda (local regulations) related to the collection 
of user charges. However, the regulation is only a part of the Perda on Cleanliness, 
Orderliness, and Attractiveness based on an “eradication” paradigm rather than 
a “regulation” approach. Therefore, regulating local taxation of the street traders 
needs a speciﬁc Perda using new approach under the paradigm of good governance. 
In terms of user charges, it also needs to be clearly stated that the fees collected 
will be associated with speciﬁc government services.
 3. It is clearly noted that the capacity and legitimacy of local governments in managing 
the tax are low. The improvement of good governance, including the enhance-
ment of government ofﬁcial commitment and administrative capacity, are highly 
demanded.
 4. Collection of tax or user charges needs to involve street traders’ associations, espe-
cially in collecting fees on a daily basis. The capacity building of such associations 
is required to improve their skills and commitments in doing such tasks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
As in many other developing countries, the informal economy in Indonesia still ac-
counts for much of the total employment in the country. It has created a more equitable 
distribution of incomes in rural and urban development, but also poses a great source 
of potential revenues for local governments. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the number of those who constitute the working-age 
population and who depend on the informal economy as their main source of employ-
ment and income has been consistently more than sixty percent of the total labor force 
(see: Sethuraman 1985, Evers and Mehmet 1994, Firdausy 1995, Azis 1997, CBS 2001, 
Suharto 2002). In 2007, it consisted of 43 million in rural areas and 14 million in urban 
areas or about 65 percent of the total working-age population (CBS 2008). This clearly 
shows that Indonesia has one of the largest informal economies in the world. 
Since businesses within the informal economy are not oﬃcially registered and 
consequently lack the required licenses or permits to operate, their contribution to the 
payment of taxes has not been explored and encouraged. For local governments, whose 
own source revenues in Indonesia are quantitatively and relatively low in local budgets, 
even a minimal amount of tax revenue from the informal economy would be a huge 
step toward greater ﬁnancial autonomy. In 2003, for example, own source taxes and 
charges made up less than eight percent of total local revenues; as such, the interest in 
expanding the local tax base is quite important for Indonesia (Lewis 2006: 214). 
In line with changes in control over local sources of revenue, the importance of 
local taxation in Indonesia is inﬂuenced by at least four issues (Lewis 2006: 214–215). 
First, it is well known that local governments were given the authority to create their own 
taxes and charges under the government’s decentralization program, the implementa-
tion of which began in 2001. Second, local governments seem to have created many of 
their oﬃcial new revenue instruments in an extralegal manner. Third, the conventional 
wisdom in Indonesia is that many of the newly established local revenue instruments 
were found to be economically harmful. Fourth, corruption linked to local taxation has 
become more than a “public secret” under decentralization.
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
The interest in examining opportunities and challenges of taxing the informal economy 
within the jurisdiction of local governments in Indonesia is one of the crucial issues. 
These pose a number of questions about local taxation of the informal economy by 
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local government. Is it possible for local governments to expand their revenues from the 
informal economy? Does the informal economy make signiﬁcant contributions to local 
taxes? What are the impacts of local taxes and levies on the informal economy? What 
are the issues of tax abuse relating to unoﬃcial levies, and the losses to local government 
through collusion, fraud by tax collectors, and rent-seeking by enforcement staﬀ? How 
should the management of taxing the informal economy be administered? In order to 
respond to such research questions, the objectives of this study are to:
 1. Identify the signiﬁcance of local tax derived from street enterprises in Jakarta 
and Bandung, and compare the proportion of local government budgets raised 
by each of these local taxes. In this regard, macro/national level data on local 
government revenue sources disaggregated by type and tax/revenue instruments 
were also analyzed.
 2. Explore the characteristics of street enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung, including 
the enterprise structures, and the economic and demographic characteristics of 
the operators in order to understand the capacity and willingness of the informal 
economy to pay tax.
 3. Evaluate the perceptions of street enterprise operators towards the practice of 
tax/user charge collections so as to identify tax compliance and the impacts 
of local taxation and equity eﬀects on the informal economy, particularly on 
low-income groups, as well as economic distortions caused through undesirable 
incentives or disincentives.
 4. Examine practical diﬃculties and the scope of abuse in administering the tax 
collection (i.e., identiﬁcation, assessment, collection, and recording), including 
the likely extent of evasion, collusion between taxpayers and oﬃcials, and fraud 
by tax collectors.
2. THE URBAN INFORMAL ECONOMY AND 
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES
2.1 Deﬁnition of Informal Economy
The informal economy is known by many diﬀerent names according to diﬀerent contexts 
and points of view (Suharto 2002 and 2008). Variously referred to as the informal sector, 
the unregulated economy, the unorganized sector, or unobserved employment to cite 
but a few of its titles, this economy typically refers to both economic units and workers 
involved in a variety of commercial activities and occupations that operate beyond the 
realm of formal employment. These economic activities involve simple organizational, 
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technological, and production structures. They also rely heavily on family labor and a 
few hired workers who have low levels of economic and human capital and work on 
the basis of unstandardized employment laws. 
The informal economy is multifaceted, and hence most studies dealing with it 
remain vague. Some research papers simply give a list of characteristics of the informal 
economy by referring to activities which are per se illegal, fail to appear in statistical 
reporting mechanism, avoid regulatory requirements, and evade taxes, either as part of 
general ﬁscal collections or as speciﬁc service charges (Shende 2008: 1). This labels the 
informal economy as the domain of mere “petty traders” that puts a powerful brake on 
a country’s growth rate, locking them into a condition of “emerging but never quite 
making it,” and condemning those working in unregistered businesses to a lifetime of 
insecurity and poor living standards (Farrel 2006). 
Historically, activities in the informal economy were not included in national em-
ployment statistics. In an attempt to bring this sector to national attention as well as 
to reduce the concern over high unemployment, the inclusion of the sector in national 
ﬁgures has now become a common feature in many developing and developed nations 
alike (see Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989; Thomas 1992; Williams and Windebank 
1998). However, the activities of the informal sector, which are mostly unregistered and 
unrecorded in national income accounts, are still the main determinant in referring to 
the sector as informal. The main reason is that the activities are almost always outside 
the scope of state regulation and protection. Even if their activities are registered, the 
informal sector does not follow any labor protection, job security, and other protective 
measures of the workplace (Williams and Windebank 1998). 
In the urban context, the informal economy often consists of small enterprise opera-
tors selling food and goods or oﬀering services, and thereby involving the cash economy 
and market transactions. This urban informal economy is more diverse than in rural areas 
and includes a vast and heterogeneous variety of economic activities through which most 
urban families earn their livelihoods. The main forms are retail trade, small-scale manu-
facturing, construction, transportation, services, and domestic work operating either as 
home or public activities. Activities of the urban informal economy in the public arena 
of cities are particularly apparent in street-based trading. The people engaged in street 
enterprises are termed as street traders or in what Indonesians commonly call pedagang 
kakilima (PKL). Though these street enterprises are mostly hidden from the state for tax 
reasons, they involve very visible structures, and are often subject to certain limited ad-
ministrative processes, such as simple registrations or daily fee collection (Suharto 2005).
This characteristic raises challenging issues and demands an evidence-based study 
to analyze the experience of selected local urban governments in Indonesia (i.e., Jakarta 
and Bandung) in collecting local government revenues (taxes and fees) on predominantly 
informal economies, and to draw lessons and recommendations for the eﬀective taxa-
tion of informal economic activities that can be applied to other local governments in 
Indonesia and elsewhere.
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2.2 The Issue of Legality
One of the most hotly debates regarding the informal economy is related to the legal aspect 
of the sector. This involves four dimensions (Mead and Morrisson 1996, Suharto 2002). 
 1. Registration. The informal economy is regarded as an enterprise that is not 
oﬃcially registered or does not have a required license or permit to operate.
 2. Payment of taxes. The informal economy does not pay taxes or operation-related 
costs.
 3. Regulations of working conditions of the labor force. The informal economy 
does not make payments for social insurance or payments for minimum wages 
and paid holidays.
 4. Other institutional regulations and requirements that are legally binding on 
producers and traders are often absent in the informal economy, such as those 
designed to protect consumers, control the quality of the product, or restrict the 
location in which the enterprise is permitted to operate or sell (Suharto 2002). 
The issue on the legality of the informal economy still provokes a lively debate. From 
the beginning, the deﬁnition of informal economy in both developed and developing 
countries is always connected to the concept of legal and illegal activities (e.g., Hart 
1973, de Soto 1989, Rakowski 1994, Mead 1994, Thomas 1995). Thomas (1992 and 
1995), for instance, distinguishes between legal and criminal activities, according to 
the nature of the outputs and the production and distribution of the outputs sold with 
reference to the impact of the policy implications: governments may seek to encourage 
legal informal activities, but would discourage those that are criminal. 
Based on this view, Thomas (1995:13–14) argues that the goods and services of 
the informal sector are regarded as legal, but that the production and/or distribution 
is “quasi-legal.” Although the informal sector may not follow the law, either in the 
production (e.g., not comply with the industrial safety or minimum wages or social 
security) or in the distribution of the product (e.g., through tax evasion), what it 
produces is not illegal. In contrast, the production and distribution of the criminal 
sector is entirely illegal, because the sector produces and distributes goods or services 
that fully break the law. For example, drugs and robbery in many countries, or gam-
bling and prostitution in Indonesia, are considered illegal both in the production and 
distribution of these outputs. 
In the case of street enterprises, this urban informal economy operates their businesses 
in the areas that can be classiﬁed as public spaces, which are not originally intended for 
trading purposes. therefore, most, if not all, street enterprises operate without licenses. 
For example, more than 90 percent of the street enterprises in Bandung operate with-
out licenses (Suharto 2002). Some of them, however, have some kind of identiﬁcation. 
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The common identiﬁcation is mainly in the form of a registration card with a photo 
stating the name of the owner, his or her main type of trading, and speciﬁed location 
(Suharto 2005). 
Although the informal sector is located outside the scope of state regulation, includ-
ing taxes, there are some kinds of “retributions” (user charges) that have to be paid by 
them. Most street enterprises in Bandung pay registration fees (Suharto 2002). Street 
vendors near an oﬃce building, public park, or market also rent regular stall space or 
pay a daily fee to set up a table or squat on the path. In 2000, the fees vary according to 
the value of the stocks and the attraction of the business location, but it generally costs 
between IDR 300 and IDR 1,000 per day (Suharto 2002). Other expenses, which are 
under the table and negotiable, include security fees, more often paid to illegal “police” 
or informal watchmen known as “jeger” (derived from Mick Jagger, leader of the Roll-
ing Stones) in the local language (Suharto 2002). As will be discussed in Section Four, 
this form of multiple levies is observed in all the study areas.
The licenses, rental, and security fees generally make street vendors safe from eviction, 
although this sort of business authorization is not protected by the law. Conversely, a 
lack of payment almost certainly leads to a convenient excuse for harassment and evic-
tion. Of course, formally and openly, authorities do not encourage such trading. Yet, 
in many main and secondary streets, vendor operations are tolerated most of the time. 
But they may be driven oﬀ the street by the police as part of a temporary smartening 
up of the city environment during national or international celebrations. 
In such events, street enterprises, viewed by city authorities as unsophisticated or 
unsightly, were covered temporarily to prevent important people or potential investors 
from seeing them and gaining a negative impression of the city. Once the celebrations 
ﬁnished, however, the traders went back to the streets and the city dwellers, including 
the authorities and the police, began again to purchase fresh fruits, cigarettes, second-
hand goods, clothes, and shoes from the street enterprises.
Thus, although it is problematic, the existence of the street enterprise in develop-
ing countries often results from the real condition of the country: governments cannot 
provide enough work opportunities and social security to the unemployed and the poor. 
One important implication of this condition is that the “guilty feeling” of the govern-
ment leads to a double standard regarding the informal sector: authorities may be fully 
aware of the unwanted eﬀects of the street enterprises but may choose not to enforce 
the rules, either because of lack of staﬀ or resources to do so, or because of concern that 
this would drive the enterprises out of business, with a consequent loss of employment 
(Mead and Morrisson 1996: 1,612).
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2.3 Local Tax and the Informal Economy
The issue of the taxation of the informal economy has generally not caught the attention 
of most professional specialists working on tax policy. Similarly, scholars working on the 
informal sector have no strong concern on taxation of the sector. The focus of many stud-
ies on the informal sector has been on its contribution to the economy and employment 
creation, its connections with the formal sector (backward and forward linkages), and its 
relationships with the issue of poverty (Joshi and Ayee 2008, Suharto 2002 and 2005). 
There is also little literature providing a practical guide on how to widen the tax base 
to include the informal sector, for taxing the informal economy is complicated in view 
of its economic, administrative, and political aspects. It is also considered diﬃcult to 
do and requires a great amount of eﬀort with few returns (Devas 2008, Joshi and Ayee 
2008, World Bank and DFID 2008, Shende 2008, Kuehn 2007).
The informal economy is complex and heterogeneous, encompassing large and 
small enterprises, rural and urban establishments, owners as well as workers, and local 
activities versus those that cross jurisdictional boundaries.
Most, if not all, informal economic activities are unregistered, with some involv-
ing underground, clandestine and illegal activities, and are therefore hardly appear in 
statistical reporting mechanisms.
  The informal economy is dominated by cash transactions, making data collec-
tion and tax registry diﬃcult. 
  The diﬃcult of collecting revenue from the informal economy means that the 
administrative costs of tax collection can be higher than actual tax yields.
  The low proﬁt margins and low productivity of most informal activities means 
that the tax burden may have a great impact on reducing employment creation 
in the local economy.
  Politicians tend to see the informal economy as an unpopular policy choice and 
they often make implicit contracts with those involved in informal activities to 
allow tax evasion in exchange for political support.
  Collusion between taxpayers and oﬃcials increases the likely extent of evasion 
and fraud by tax collectors. 
The fact that the informal economy is very large, encompassing much of the labor 
force in most developing countries, and that governments obtain little tax revenue from 
this sector, has dissuaded scholars from focusing their attention on the possibility of 
taxing the informal economy. But it is argued that extending taxation to the informal 
economy is not only based on pragmatic arguments, but also on longer-term political 
perspectives on the taxation relationship, that is, accountability (Joshi and Ayee 2008).
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Joshi and Ayee (2008, 184) stated that in so far as economies of developing coun-
tries are becoming increasingly informaliszed, policymakers should ﬁnd ways to tax this 
sector if the formal sector is not to bear an oppressive tax burden. They also aﬃrmed 
that taxing the informal sector more eﬀectively will make governments more legitimate, 
and enhance the positive relationship of taxation and accountability as an indication 
of robust democracy. Joshi and Ayee (2008: 186–188) furthermore outline six factors 
important to direct taxation of the informal economy:
 1. Growth of the informal sector. Recent calculations from developing nations 
reveal that the contribution of informal economy to GDP varies from between 
about 20 percent of GDP in Indonesia to around 67 percent in Bolivia; and 
that it accounts for over 40 percent of GDP in twenty-four of the ﬁfty-ﬁve 
countries under study.
 2. Revenue needs. Research shows that losses from not taxing the informal 
economy could amount to 35 to 55 percent of total tax revenues in some 
countries. The clear challenge for governments then is to map this potential 
and large source of revenue, whilst simultaneously keeping the costs of collec-
tion and administration low.
 3. Impact on tax compliance in the formal sector. Since the informal economy 
continues to operate untaxed, the formal sector taxpayers perceive the state as 
being unfair in pursuing them for taxes. Thus, whilst ignoring taxation of the 
informal economy decreases morale, it increases the risk of low tax compliance 
elsewhere.
 4. Demands from the informal sector. The informal sector itself does not reject to 
taxation as one might expect. Some studies suggest that tax evasion is not the 
primary reason for being informal. It was found that informal sector opera-
tors are willing to pay taxes, especially when these are in exchange for some 
legitimacy, predictability, and protection from arbitrary harassment from state 
agents. Formal taxes are likely less costly than the bribes extracted by public 
oﬃcials “informally.”
 5. State legitimacy. In countries where those involved in the informal economy 
are more than half of the population, state legitimacy is at stake. Expanding 
the tax base and developing a “culture of compliance” is important not only for 
increasing revenues, but also for a means of re-engaging citizens with the state.
 6. Links between taxation and accountability. It is argued that governments that 
are dependent on “earned” revenues such as taxes—as opposed to “unearned” 
revenues such as aid or mineral wealth—tend to be more responsive to their 
citizens. Equally typical, citizens who pay taxes are more likely to demand 
responsive governments. Therefore, integrating the informal economy into the 
tax net can stimulate constructive engagement with the state, particularly in 
terms of making claims and realizing rights.
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2.4 Local Governments and Revenues in Jakarta and Bandung
In order to ﬁnance services and activities for which local governments are responsible, 
they need resources and revenues; and under their control, local governments have the 
authority to collect local taxes and charges (Devas 2008). Borne by residents of the 
jurisdiction, these revenues are to fund at least part of the cost of services that beneﬁt 
those residents (Devas 2008: 23). However, the reality is often far from the expectations. 
In most countries, local revenues sources meet only part, and even sometimes quite a 
small part, of local expenditure needs (Ibid.).
In Indonesia, as indicated earlier, local governments own source revenue is quantita-
tively small. As shown in Table 2.1, local government own source revenue by category for 
2003 consisted of local taxes, user charges and fees, and various other types of revenue. 
The table reveals that each of the three main types of local revenue contributes roughly 
the same amount to total own source revenue. 
Table 2.1
Actual Local Government Revenue, Indonesia 2002–2005 (in IDR billion)
Revenue items 2003 2004 2005*
Local government revenues 111,300 118,594 124,875 
Original revenues 8,603 100.0% 9,464 100.0% 10,023 100.0% 
Local taxes 3,128 36.3% 3,727 39.4% 3,908 39.0% 
User charges and fees 2,768 32.2% 3,308 34.9% 3,736 37.3% 
Other local government own revenues 2,706 31.5% 2,430 25.7% 2,379 23.7% 
Transfers 93,755 100.0% 104,581 100.0% 110,525 100.0% 
Tax shares 9,927 10.6% 11,333 10.8% 10,061 9.1% 
Nontax shares/Natural resources 10,403 11.1% 11,091 10.6% 11,779 10.6% 
General allocation funds 70,230 74.9% 73,329 70.1% 78,627 71.2% 
Special allocation funds 3,193 3.4% 3,022 2.9% 4,225 3.8% 
Tax share from province 0 0.0% 5,806 5.6% 5,832 5.3% 
Other Revenues 3,942 100.0% 3,493 100.0% 4,171 100.0% 
Local government financing 12,728 12,301 12,475 
Total 124,029 130,894 137,350 
Note: *  Based on Anggaran Pembangunan Daerah Bruto (APDB). 
Source: CBS (2009).
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Table 2.1 shows that whilst local government own revenues from 2003 to 2005 are 
dominated by local taxes revenues (around 36.3 and 39.4 percent), there is no signiﬁcant 
diﬀerence in the contribution between user charges and fees, and other local govern-
ment revenue components. However, the above table illustrates that the contribution 
of the informal sector is quite small compared to the formal sector. As we know, local 
taxes are derived from the formal sector, whilst remunerations are received from both 
the informal and formal sectors. The total contribution of user charges and fees to local 
revenues increases, ranges from 32.2 to 37.3 percent during 2003 to 2005. During the 
period, the contribution of user charges and fees increased about 0.8 percent.
In the past decades, local government in Indonesia depended heavily on central gov-
ernment in terms of revenues and ﬁnancing. Central government provided transfers and 
subsidies of up to 90 percent to support districts. The decentralization process introduced 
in 1999 has motivated district and municipal governments to increase their capacity and 
self-reliance. Local governments now have more opportunities to manage their own re-
sources, making them less reliant on the central government and potentially more eﬃcient. 
Since 1999, the implementation of regional autonomy laws—Laws No. 22/1999 
and No. 25/1999—has changed the structures of relations between central and local 
government, particularly in the area of administration and ﬁnance. Law No. 34/2000, fur-
thermore, which was launched to regulate the types, tariﬀs, and administration regulations 
of local taxes and other local revenues (user charges, local state own revenue, and others), 
and provides greater possibility for local governments to generate their local revenues. 
The Law No. 34/2000 separates local taxes and user charges into two category—the 
ﬁrst is taxes and user charges that can be collected by provincial government, whilst 
the second by cities or municipalities. Four categories of taxes that can be collected by 
provincial governments are motor vehicle taxes, the transfer of registration fee for mo-
tor vehicles, taxes of motor vehicle fuel, and taxes for using ground water. Whilst seven 
categories of taxes belong to the city or municipality governments, namely, taxes on 
hotels, restaurants, public entertainments, advertising, street lighting, mineral extraction 
type C, and parking (Sidik 2002).
Table 2.2 shows local government revenues in Jakarta and Bandung for the period of 
2005 to 2007. It was found that the main sources of revenue in Jakarta and Bandung are 
diﬀerent. Jakarta, having the status of both a province and a city, has access to a much 
larger pool of local own revenues, notably on motor vehicles. As a result, own source 
revenue account for 56.8 percent, 54.5 percent, and 57 percent of the city’s budget in 
2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively. By contrast, the city of Bandung’s budget is domi-
nated by transfers from central government, which account for 84.9 percent and 87.4 
percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
The table also highlights the relative importance of local taxes in own source revenues 
in Jakarta as well as in Bandung. Although this data is too aggregated to be useful, it 
would be fair to say that the contribution of the informal sector is mainly through fees 
and charges rather than local taxes, since local taxes are mainly paid by the formal sector. 
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According to Law No. 34/2000 and its supporting regulations, provincial governments 
are prohibited from collecting other taxes apart from what have been regulated. However, 
district and municipality governments are allowed to collect other taxes, as long as these 
do not violate the criteria of tax collection described as follows:
  It is a tax in nature, which is diﬀerent from user charges; 
  The tax object should be residing in the area of the region, with low mobility, 
and a residential-based population;
  The base and object of the tax should conﬁrm the social justiﬁcation;
  The local tax object should not overlap with those owned by the central and 
provincial governments;
  The tax potential should be signiﬁcant;
  The tax should not distort the economy;
  Equity and the ability to pay tax should be the concern of the tax policy; and
  Environmental considerations should be a priority.
Table 2.2
Local Government Revenue in Jakarta and Bandung, 2005–2007
Source of revenue 2005 2006 2007
IDR 
(billion)
Percent IDR 
(billion)
Percent IDR 
(billion)
Percent
Jakarta
Transfers from central government 5,770 43.2 6,520 45.5 7,572 42.9
Own-source revenue of which: 7,599 56.8 7,817 54.5 10,084 57.1
Tax-based 6,514 48.7 6,483 45.2 8,334 47.2
Non tax-based 138 1.0 213 1.5 250 1.4
Others 947 7.1 1,121 7.8 1,500 8.5
Total revenue 13,369 100.0 14,337 100.0 17,656 100.0
Bandung
Transfers from central government na na 1,879 84.9 2,970 87.4
Own-source revenue of which: na na 334 15.1 427 12.6
Tax-based na na 189 8.5 245 7.2
Non tax-based na na 18 0.8 20 0.6
Others na na 127 5.7 162 4.8
Total revenue 2,213 100.0 3,397 100.0
Source: Extracted from Provincial Government of Jakarta, Financial Statistics (2005–2007) and the 
Municipality and District Government of Bandung, Financial Statistics (2005–2007).
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2.5 Working Population of the Informal Economy
It is clear that in Indonesia the informal economy is the main source of employment 
for a large majority of the total working population, and therefore could potentially 
contribute a large amount to local revenues. According to newspaper reports and discus-
sions with resource persons during seminars and interviews with municipal government 
oﬃcials in Jakarta and Bandung, it is estimated that in the ﬁve municipalities of Jakarta 
the number of street enterprises in 2008 is between 80,000 and 100,000, whilst in the 
Greater Bandung district and municipality the number is between 30,000 and 50,000 
vendors. This estimation is close to other calculations. For example, Jakarkta’s Statistics 
Oﬃce reported that in 2006 there were about 13,941 street vendors located in temporary 
appointed-legal sites and 3,408 establishments located in “lokasi binaan” or permanent 
appointed-legal sites, and about 75,402 street traders operated in unregistered locations 
(DPRD Jakarta 2007). 
As has been indicated earlier and will be explored further in the next sections, al-
though the “special” characteristics of the informal sector locate the sector outside the 
accountable and transparent coverage of local levies, there are local levies that are collected 
by the municipal governments, so they are not entirely outside the tax system. Moreover, 
in addition to local levies, the nature of the informal sector makes them vulnerable to 
other forms of levy by unoﬃcial collectors and rent-seeking by oﬃcial collectors.
3. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF TAXING 
 THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
So far, this project has outlined evidence-based research on opportunities and challenges 
faced by local urban governments of Jakarta and Bandung in collecting revenues (taxes 
and fees) in a predominantly informal economy. Except for the potential contributions 
of street trading to local revenues, in general, the trajectory of ﬁndings in two cities 
under study shows similar trends as well as pointing to possible solutions for eﬀective 
taxing of informal economic activities that can be applied by other local governments 
in Indonesia and elsewhere.
As elsewhere, street vendors in Jakarta and Bandung agglomerate around potential 
business locations. They surround the markets (pasar), shopping areas (pertokoan), and 
commercial complexes, trading food, commodities, and services to city dwellers. In 
addition to these locations, the street traders, mainly food sellers, also converge at the 
entrances to schools, universities, and hospitals, providing food to students, patients, 
staﬀ, and visitors. Street enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung are widespread in many dif-
ferent places. Yet their locations always reﬂect their reliance on economic activities that 
were either located on, or aﬀected by, the street. Thus, while many street enterprises may 
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clearly be drawn from the main roads or intersections, some of them clogthe sidewalks 
and pathways, reﬂecting their physical proximity and access to the streets. 
In selling a variety of items and services, the vendors are found in various places 
and structures. Table 2.3 shows that the majority of vendors use kiosks/stalls for their 
wares and operate their business during the day and night and in ﬁxed locations. It was 
found, however, that a few street traders are mobile. They sometimes shift and roll their 
locations from, for instance, the pavement near a school in the morning to the roadside 
at the entrance to a square, park, or movie theatre, where crowds congregate at night. 
Table 2.3
Proﬁles of Street Vendors in Jakarta and Bandung
Variables Jakarta (Percent) Bandung (Percent)
1. Types of structure
  Mat
  Kiosk/stall
  Pushcart
  Pushcart with tent/cover
4
58
18
20
16
31
28
25
2. Time of operation
  Daily (6 a.m.–6 p.m.)
  Evening (6 p.m.–midnight)
  Day and night
34
8
58
41
24
35
3. Mobility
  Fixed in one location
  Mobile
92
8
89
11
4. Types of trading
  Street food enterprises
  Street goods enterprises
  Street services enterprises
39
54
7
30
58
12
5. Working capital (value of stock)
  Less than IDR 100,000
  IDR 100,100–IDR 500,000
  IDR 500,100–IDR 1,000,000
  More than IDR 1,000,000
15
49
32
4
16
52
25
7
6. Daily incomes*
  Less than IDR 100,000
  IDR 100,100–IDR 200,000
  IDR 200,100–IDR 300,000
  More than IDR 300,100
33
35
22
10
36
30
26
8
n1 (Jakarta): 135; n2 (Bandung): 105
Note: * The average daily income of street traders in Jakarta is IDR 149,100; in Bandung is IDR 
111,289.
Source: Data collection in 2009.
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In Jakarta and Bandung, some street enterprises, especially good traders, are quite 
large operations. As Table 2.4 shows, most street vendors in Jakarta (49 percent) and 
Bandung (52 percent) have working capital or value of stock between IDR 100,000 
(about USD 10) and IDR 500,000 (about USD 50), and even 32 percent and 25 percent 
of street traders have working capital between IDR 500,000 and IDR 1 million. Although 
many street traders obtain a daily income of less than IDR 100,000, their daily average 
net incomes are still relatively high: about IDR 150,000 in Jakarta and IDR 111,000 in 
Bandung. This makes street traders’ monthly “wages” higher than the monthly salary of 
high-ranking government oﬃcials as well as commerical factory workers. It was found 
that some traders, especially those with a working capital of more than IDR 500,000, 
are involved in supermarket chains, money exchange, software distribution, auto-part 
supply, electronic trading, and other manufacturing products.
Table 2.4 indicates that street traders in Jakarta and Bandung are willing to pay taxes, 
especially user charges, when these are in exchange for some public services, such as public 
cleaning, electricity and water facilities, security and protection from harassment from 
state agents and illegal “police” as well as some legitimacy and predictability regarding 
their business operations. In view of their business operations, which are on a small-scale 
with daily cash transactions, most street traders prefer to pay user charges on a daily basis. 
Table 2.4
Willingness of Street Vendors to Pay Tax in Jakarta and Bandung
Variables Jakarta (percent) Bandung (percent)
1. Willingness to pay tax
  Strongly agree
  Agree
  Neutral
  Disagree
  Strongly disagree
2
18
45
28
7
7
15
37
36
5
2. Willingness to pay user charges
  Strongly agree
  Agree
  Neutral
  Disagree
  Strongly disagree
59
16
14
8
3
49
33
10
6
2
3. Government services demanded as returns for user charges
  Security (especially from illegal “police”)
  Cleanliness
  Electricity 
  Water
  Protection from eviction
  Legal business location
21
20
10
7
30
12
21
9
14
9
31
16
81
I n d o n e s i a
Variables Jakarta (percent) Bandung (percent)
4. Preference to system of payment
  Daily
  Weekly
  Monthly
  Yearly
79
11
4
6
65
17
13
5
n1 (Jakarta): 135; n2 (Bandung): 105
Source: Data collection in 2009.
Data in Table 2.5 reveal the connection between the informal economy and the 
reality of informal taxation in Jakarta and Bandung. In both cities, government oﬃcials 
argued that no formal taxes are being taken from street traders. They mentioned, however, 
that user charges are indeed applied to some street traders in some appointed areas of 
the cities. Nevertheless, in practice, they are equivalent to taxes, since no services are 
being provided directly and exclusively to the payers. 
Table 2.5
Practice of Tax Payment and Perceptions 
Variables Jakarta (percent) Bandung (percent)
1. Amount of daily user charges paid*
  Less than IDR 2,500
  IDR 2,600–5,000
  IDR 5,100–IDR 7,500
  IDR 7,600–IDR 10,000
  More than IDR 10,000
12
15
30
36
7
17
23
20
32
8
2. Payment collectors
  Government officer
  Illegal “police”
  Do not know
  Others
36
14
29
21
48
10
20
22
3. Time of payment
  Pay earlier
  Pay on time
  Pay later
8
82
10
6
78
16
4. Perception towards amount of payment
  Higher than my earnings
  Just right
  Lower than my earnings
28
66
6
26
69
5
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Variables Jakarta (percent) Bandung (percent)
5. Perception towards benefit of user charges
  It can promote my business
  It has no benefit for my business
  It can decrease my business
46
38
16
43
40
17
6. Government services received
  Security (especially from illegal “police”)
  Cleanliness
  Electricity 
  Water
  Protection from eviction
  Legal business location
60
20
12
0
0
8
51
38
7
0
4
0
7. Perception towards accountability
  All money goes to local government
  Largest amount of money goes to local government
  Fifty percent of money goes to local government
  Only smallest portion of money goes to local government
  No money goes to local government
12
16
20
22
30
13
16
14
21
35
n1 (Jakarta): 135 n2 (Bandung): 105
Note: * Average daily user charge paid in Jakarta is IDR 7,818; in Bandung is IDR 5,244. 
Source: Data collection in 2009.
In fact, all street traders in the two cities mentioned that they pay user charges 
every day. The average daily user charges paid in Jakarta is IDR 7,818; and in Bandung 
is IDR 5,244. The amount varies according to their business scale and the place they 
operate. In Jakarta, for example, 12 percent of street traders pay less than IDR 2,500; 
81 percent pay between IDR 2,600 and IDR 10,000; and seven percent pay more than 
IDR 10,000 per day. 
It was reported that some street traders in Simpang Market in Bandung that oper-
ated at night even pay IDR 17,000 per day. Based on interview with Sugiman—head of 
neighborhood administration/authority in Simpang—who manages and directs the levies 
collection in that area, the amount of money is established on the agreement of three 
parties: the municipal government, the street traders themselves, and the neighorhood 
administration/authority. Of the total amount of IDR 17,000, IDR 15,300 is paid to 
neighborhood authority for security, a tent, and a booth (including the assembling), 
and electricity services, and IDR 1,700 goes to the local government, in which IDR 
700 is for public cleaning and IDR 1,000 for market retribution (based on Perda/Local 
Legislation No. 11/2005). 
Table 2.5 (Continued)
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However, it appears that the total amount of the charge that is paid to local 
government varies from one place to another. For example, according to Deni Syarif, 
a tax collector in the Kosambi area of Bandung, every street trader has to pay IDR 
3,000 on a daily basis. According to him, IDR 1,000 is the charge that goes to local 
government, whilst the fee for electricity and cleaning is IDR 1,000 each. He sends 
the collected money to the local government every week, whilst the public cleaning 
money is sent directly to the public cleanliness oﬃcer every day. Since the electricity 
comes from the market, Deni pays the money to the market management oﬃcer on 
a daily basis. 
Whereas Sugiman pays IDR 700 to local government, Deni claims that he pays IDR 
1,000 to the local government. However, he does not provide any ticket—neither to 
street traders nor to the local government—for every transaction made. Since the Local 
Planning Board claims that the local government produces tickets for every transaction, 
it appears that Deni receives the tickets from the local government but he keeps them. 
He “manages” the ticket in such a way that he determines the amount of money that 
will be paid to the local government. 
In Jakarta, Bang Boim, the tax collector in Pasar Minggu claims that he performs as 
the “assistant” of the local government in collecting market charges from street traders. 
He collects IDR 2,000 for the market charges, IDR 2,000 for the cleanliness services, 
IDR 2.000 for electricity services, and IDR 2.500 for “jasa preman—japrem” (security 
service) which will prevent the street traders from eviction. Paying the money to local 
government on weekly basis, he never uses the ticket for the charge, meaning that there 
is no proof that the money paid by street vendors goes directly to local government. 
This condition is similar to the Kosambi area in Bandung.
This form of multiple levies is evidence in all areas surveyed. In addition to regular 
charges, street vendors in the Kosambi area in Bandung and the Sunday Market in Ja-
karta who sell pirate CDs and DVDs are even required to pay “extra” fees to the “public 
security” oﬃcer (Petugas Tibum) and police personnel. In return, the authorities provide 
them with information regarding the eviction schedule. This quasi “protection” makes 
street traders safe from “cleanliness” operation suddenly done by Petugas Tibum.
Levy collectors play an important role in collecting charges from the street enterprises 
in both Jakarta and Bandung. The procedure of collection process is usually something 
like this. The charge coupons that originally come from municipal government are 
then distributed to the subdistrict (kecamatan) government. The collectors come to the 
street enterprises, collect the fees, and give the coupons as the receipt. Once a week, 
member of municipal government takes the collected money from the collectors. The 
total money taken is based on the amount of returned coupons. 
However, this procedure is not as simple as it seems. In practice, the management 
control of retribution collection from local governments is very limited. In South Jakarta, 
for instance, the retribution coupons distributed from the municipal government to 
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the kecamatan cannot eﬀectively be collected according to an actual target. The total 
returned coupons—and therefore the total amount of money received from retributions 
fee—is always very little compared to the actual number of street enterprises. According 
to Trityatmo Bowolaksono, a staﬀ member of the Board of City Development Planning, 
contribution of retribution fees to the local revenues in South Jakarta is only about one 
to two percent of the potential. 
In-depth interviews with street traders indicated that the low contribution of street 
traders to local revenues is mainly caused by “deals” between taxpayers and tax collectors. 
In most cases, the oﬃcial collectors perform as the main actor. They often illicitly take 
the money from the street enterprises without giving coupons as receipts. Consequently, 
instead of going to the government, the money goes into their own pockets. In order 
to hide this wrongdoing, tax collectors collaborate with “unoﬃcial” levy collectors who 
act on behalf of them in collecting retributions. Most of them are informal watchmen. 
This practice is done to establish transactions without any receipt as well as to minimize 
the time in collecting the money. 
In Jakarta and Bandung, formal taxes are likely less costly than the bribes extracted 
by public oﬃcials on an “informal” basis. Secondary data supports this fact. For example, 
in 2005 it was estimated that if 60 percent of the existing street enterprises in Jakarta pay 
user charges between IDR 3,000 and IDR 10,000 per day, in a year government would 
receive a total revenue about 30 billion. User charges applied to the street vendors are 
based on a zoning system in which areas with high traﬃc mobility and business oppor-
tunities are charged the highest tariﬀ of IDR 10,000 per day (Tempo Magazine 2005). 
According to a member of Parliament of Jakarta, H.M. Nakoem, user charges obtained 
from 92,751 street traders in Jakarta that should come to the ﬁnancial accounts of the 
local governments should not be less than IDR 34 billion. But in reality, in 2006 the real 
amount was reported only IDR 24 billion (DPRD Jakarta 2007). Although it is only a 
general calculation, this argument indicates that if the taxes are well-managed then the 
contribution of the informal sector to local government revenues will be signiﬁcant. 
Table 2.4 also provides information about the capacity and legitimacy of local 
governments in Jakarta and Bandung in collecting user charges. It was found that 
street traders in Jakarta Bandung perceived that governments can provide certain ser-
vices (i.e., security and cleanliness) that are in line with their expectations. However, 
government services in providing water facilities, protection from eviction and legal 
business operation are lower than expected. The level of state legitimacy is perceived 
as low in the eyes of street traders. This is partly caused by the fact that the level 
of services provided by the government is determined by the contribution of user 
chargers. As mentioned earlier, collusion between taxpayers and oﬃcials occurred in 
many level of retribution collection. As a result, the revenue received from charges 
is much less than the potential. This condition, therefore, determines the level of 
services provided by governments.
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Most respondents in Jakarta (52 percent) and Bandung (56 percent) believe that 
only the smallest portion of, and even no money at all, derived from user charges goes to 
local government. This evidence is similar with the ﬁndings based on the interview with 
tax collectors in Jakarta and Bandung. In addition, interviews with some street traders 
in Kosambi, for example, revealed that the actual levies they should pay based on the 
coupon is IDR 700–IDR 3,000. However, Table 2.5 shows that most of street traders 
pay more than the amount stated in the coupon or ticket. This indicates the low level of 
accountability of the government since the conﬁdence of the taxpayers that revenues are 
actually used fairly is low. Most respondents claimed that they pay on time to collectors 
since most of the transactions are made on a daily basis (see Table 2.4). They also said 
that the amount of payment is fairly ﬁtting with their earnings. Street traders in Jakarta 
(38 percent) and Bandung (40 percent) perceived that user charges have no beneﬁt for 
their business. However, although 16 percent and 17 percent of street traders in Jakarta 
and Bandung, respectively, said that user charges can negatively eﬀect their businesses, 
most street traders in both cities, 46 percent and 43 percent, respectively, believe that 
user charges are important for promoting their ventures. Street traders will do anything 
to keep their customers. Moving to other places due to eviction is a catastrophe that 
could ruin their businesses. Since the user charges are able to prevent eviction, most 
street traders believe that paying their user charges on time means keeping their regular 
as well as irregular customers.
On the basis of the estimated number of street enterprises in Jakarta (between 
80,000 and 100,000 establishments) and in Bandung (between 30.000 and 50.000 
vendors), the potential contribution of revenues can be drawn (Table 2.6). For example, 
if all street traders in Jakarta (100,000 people) and Bandung (50,000 people) pay IDR 
7,500 per day, yearly revenues of the Jakarta and Bandung governments from street 
enterprises would be IDR 270 billion and 135 billion, respectively. In Jakarta, such 
an amount of money would account for 2.7 percent of its 2007 own source revenue; 
whilst in Bandung it would account for 31.6 percent of the city’s own source revenue.
In comparison with the actual local government revenues in 2003–2005 as men-
tioned in Table 2.2, the general calculation above indicates that the contribution of user 
charges and fees from the informal sector would provide a signiﬁcant payment to the 
local government revenues. This is particularly the case for Bandung, where the total 
contribution reaches 31.6 percent from the actual yearly revenue in 2007. 
86
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
Table 2.6
Scenarios of Revenues from Street Enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung
Local government User charge IDR/day
Scenario 1 
IDR 700/day
Scenario 2
IDR 1,000/day
Scenario 3 
IDR 2,500/day
Scenario 4 
IDR 5,000/day
Scenario 5
IDR 7,500/day
Jakarta
 Yearly revenue (billion) 25.2 36 90 180 270
 As percent of 2007 
own source revenue 
(IDR 10,084 billion)
0.25 0.36 0.9 1.8 2.7
Bandung
 Yearly revenue (billion) 12.6 18 45 90 135
 As percent of 2007 
own source revenue 
(IDR 427 billion)
2.95 4.21 10.5 21.1 31.6
This table indicates that a certain proportion of street traders contribute at a lower 
rate of tax, whilst the other segment contributes a much higher tax to the local govern-
ment revenues. Through this calculation, it can be estimated, based on Table 2.6, that all 
of the street traders in both Jakarta and Bandung would possibly be able to contribute 
26 billion and 18 billion in Jakarta and Bandung, respectively, through a IDR 1,000 
user charge per day. The maximum percentage of street traders who would be able to 
pay user charges as mentioned in scenario 3 is 73 percent in Jakarta and 60 percent for 
street traders in Bandung, whilst there are only about 36 percent street traders in Jakarta 
and 32 percent in Bandung who would be able to pay a IDR 7,500 user charges per 
day as stated by scenario 5. From this calculation, it can be concluded that the possible 
amount of user charges that can be subjected to every street trader based on their actual 
user charge amount in Jakarta and Bandung is IDR 1,000.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND INITIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the informal economy is claimed as multifaceted, and hence most studies 
dealing with it remain vague, this view is not supported by the evidence collected here. 
Whilst around the globe the informal economy contains a huge range of businesses 
(Farrel 2006), this research shows that street enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung have 
the potential to contribute to local revenues of the cities, albeit not equally, and that 
they have the capacity and willingness to pay tax and user charges to authorities. The 
potential contributions of a share of revenues in Bandung are relatively higher than that of 
Jakarta. This is partly determined by the capacity of local governments in gaining revenues 
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from their source. Local revenues of Jakarta are notably higher than that of Bandung, 
since Jakarta has two sources of revenues: provincial and municipal revenues. The main 
source of revenue in Jakarta is also mainly derived from its own source revenue. Local 
revenues of Bandung are mainly derived from transfers from the central government.
It is not true that the informal economy and tax evasion are identical. This study sup-
ports the ﬁndings of Joshi and Ayee (2008) that tax evasion is not the primary reason for 
being informal. Whilst their level of incomes shows their potential capacity to pay tax and 
user charges, their willingness to pay fees is high. However, noting that their incomes vary, 
with many of them having very low incomes, and involving daily and cash transactions, 
the informal sector’s activities are most likely to contribute through user charges rather than 
tax. According to the law, district and municipality governments are allowed to collect user 
charges from street vending. In Bandung and Jakarta, the collection of fees from street traders 
is possible since it is explicitly stated in Perda K3 (Kebersihan, Ketertiban, Keindahan) or 
the Local Regulation on Cleanliness, Orderliness, and Attractiveness of the Cities. 
This study has also explored how street traders as charge payers evaluate local 
governments in Jakarta and Bandung in providing public goods that beneﬁt them; 
and in reﬂecting the legitimacy and capacity to make all taxpayers shoulder their fair 
burden. The ﬁndings have informed about the degree of “quasi-voluntary compliance” 
of street traders as taxpayers. Everest-Phillips and Sandall (2008: 3–4) argue that the 
idea of quasi-voluntary compliance extends the concept of legitimacy from both the 
intrinsic and instrumental willingness to pay tax based on taxpayers’ overall perception 
of the fairness of the tax system. At the instrumental level, taxpayers assess the govern-
ment’s capacity to deliver on the ﬁscal social contract, that is, the instrumental side of 
governance in providing essential public goods such as security and core services such 
as infrastructure, health, and education. At the intrinsic level, taxpayers’ perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the state, called tax morale, combines political acceptance of state 
authority, the perceived fairness and eﬀectiveness of state institutions, and trust in 
public institutions and oﬃcials. Everest-Phillips and Sandall (2008: 3) noted that “tax 
compliance is low in developing countries where citizens neither believe governments 
act in their interest, nor trust the state to use revenues wisely.”
This research shows that the implementation of the local taxation system in Indo-
nesia is still weak and there is a gap between the actual and potential revenues. This is 
partially inﬂuenced by the low level of tax morale due to the lack of local governments’ 
capacity and legitimacy as perceived by street traders. Informal trading operators as 
citizens tend to avoid paying tax to a state they do not believe in. The more legitimate 
a state is in the eyes of its citizens, the higher the citizens’ tax morale. This leakage of 
revenue is likely to occur not only due to the lack of administrative capacity of local tax 
levied and the vulnerable mechanism of ﬁnancial monitoring and planning at local level, 
but also due to the scope of abuse in administering the tax collection, especially due to 
fraud by tax collectors as stated elsewhere. Lewis (2006) indicates corruption related to 
local taxation has become more than “public secret” under Indonesian decentralization. 
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The question then is: what strategies can be used to deal with such opportunities 
and challenges? In terms of increasing local taxation from street enterprises, the issue of 
regulation and formalization is central here, whereby formalization or regulation depends 
on the nature and characteristics of the informal economy in that particular region. It 
is clear that informal enterprises, even large ones, choose to stay that way if there is no 
change in the factors that generally drive them into informality, such as high corporate 
taxes and the bureaucratic burden of operating formally. 
Therefore, the strategies that can be developed should take into account the ques-
tion of why those involved in street trading are informal? First, is the factor related to 
the margins of proﬁtability of the informal sector, which are so small that regulation 
means the destruction of the activity itself? In this is the case, then regulation in the 
way that it applies to formal establishments may not be suitably applied to those in 
the informal businesses. Regulation and tax will lead to economic distortions caused 
through undesirable disincentives. Second, if the factor has something to do with the 
procedures and practices of formalization of the trading that are often overly diﬃcult, 
then formalization can be selected as a strategy to deal with the informal economy.
In the case of street traders in Jakarta and Bandung, the second scenario is closer 
to the ﬁndings. The capacity and willingness of street traders in Jakarta and Bandung 
are relatively high and viable for local taxation. Therefore one policy option that can be 
applied is the formalization of street traders through a review of the regulatory processes. 
It is argued that once the regulations and procedures are relaxed and improved, street 
traders will almost automatically follow the formalization of their business activities, 
including formal taxation. Discussions with resource persons and seminar participants as 
well as interviews with government oﬃcials in Jakarta and Bandung lead to a number of 
recommendations to support such policy options. In order to eﬀectively and eﬃciently 
apply local taxation into the street trading, four options merit attention:
 1. Taxation of the informal economy is possible and viable in terms of economic 
and legal concerns, especially to those operating their business in ﬁxed and 
appointed locations. It needs to take into account the characteristics, typology, 
and economic scale of the trading. For example, user charges may be higher to 
those businesses operating in attractive locations and obtaining high revenues. 
 2. Jakarta and Bandung have already Perda (local regulations) related to the 
collection of user charges. However, the regulation is only a part of the Perda 
on cleanliness, orderliness, and attractiveness based on paradigm of a “security” 
rather than an “equality” approach. Therefore, regulating local taxation of the 
street traders needs speciﬁc Perda using a new approach under the paradigm 
of good governance. In terms of user charges, it also needs to be clearly stated 
that the fees collected will be associated with speciﬁc government services.
 3. It is clearly noted that the main issue is that the charges are not being collected 
and accounted for properly, so that the informal sector is being burdened 
89
I n d o n e s i a
without the municipality beneﬁting. In addition, the capacity and legitimacy 
of local governments in managing the tax are low. The improvement of good 
governance, including the enhancement of government oﬃcials’ commitment 
and administrative capacity are highly needed. 
 4. The collection of tax or user charges could involve street traders’ associations, 
especially in collecting fees on a daily basis. Capacity building of such associations 
is required to improve their skills and commitments in doing such tasks. This 
idea was proposed by a few participants of the workshop so as to maintain the 
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of tax collection. It is argued that instead of taking 
money one by one from street vendors, tax collectors can collect money faster 
through the association. 
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ANNEX
1. Research Methodology
1.1 The Design
This research-for-policy project employed the triangulation method. This mixed-research 
approach refers to a combination of strategies to study the same phenomenon employ-
ing quantitative and qualitative techniques of data collection. As identiﬁed by Greene, 
Caracelli, and Graham (1989), the purpose of the triangulation method is particularly 
to seek convergence, corroboration, and correspondence of results from the diﬀerent 
research strategies. This method leads to more conﬁdence in the results and generates 
an innovative approach to the study of social issues. Whilst this project is ﬂexible and 
cyclical, the method of data collection is operationalized under four main activities as 
summarized in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7
Matrix of Data Collection
Methods 
and steps
Purposes and main information collected Timeline
1. Desk review
 Achieving research objective No. 1
 Significance of local tax from street enterprises 
November–December 2008
2. Seminar and 
focus group 
discussions
 Achieving research objective Nos. 1 and 3
 Significance of local tax from street enterprises 
 The impacts of taxation and equity effects on 
the informal economy 
First week of 
December 2008
3. Fieldwork
 Achieving research objective Nos. 2, 3, and 4
 Explore the characteristics of street enterprises 
 Perceptions towards the practice of tax/user 
charge collections 
 Practical difficulties and the scope of abuse in 
administering the tax collection
January and March 2009
4. Workshop
 Informing and refining research findings 
 Generating policy alternatives and advocacy plan
Fourth week 
of June 2009
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1.1.1 Desk Review
This activity is aimed at collecting secondary data through desk review of literature and 
related documents (e.g., previous research reports, newspapers). The information col-
lected was focused on macro/national level data on local government revenue sources by 
type, disaggregated by tax/revenue instrument, and disaggregated by type of local govern-
ment. This activity is on-going, yet the main ﬁndings were collected in December 2008.
1.1.2 Seminar and Focused Group Discussions (FGDs)
To complement and support the desk review, a one-day seminar and focus group dis-
cussions were held at the Bandung College of Social Welfare. Two experts (Mr. Teguh 
Kurniawan, Senior Lecturer from the Department of Public Administration, University 
of Indonesia, Jakarta, and Ms. Resmi Setia, Senior Researcher, AKATIGA Research 
Foundation, Bandung) who have expertise in local taxation and the informal economy 
served as the resource persons. This seminar was attended by 24 participants consisting 
of lecturers and postgraduate students from the Bandung College of Social Welfare; 
Pasundan University, Bandung; and the Bogor Institute of Agriculture as well as repre-
sentatives from street vendors’ associations, the municipal governments of Jakarta and 
Bandung (i.e., Board of City Development Planning and Oﬃce of Social Aﬀairs), NGOs, 
and the mass media (Pikiran Rakyat Daily, Bandung; Gala Media Daily, Bandung; and 
Media Indonesia Daily, Jakarta). This activity was held on January 21, 2009. 
Following the seminar and panel discussions, focus group discussions were held 
with the participants to delineate the possible impact of local taxation and equity eﬀects 
on the informal economy. Whilst information about macro/national level data on lo-
cal government revenue sources was explored further, the signiﬁcance of the informal 
economy to local economic development was also discussed through the focus group 
discussions. In addition, information about the opportunities and challenges of taxing 
the street vendors in Bandung and Jakarta was also delineated in this event. With three 
facilitators (the author of this report and two lecturers of the Bandung College of Social 
Welfare), focus group discussions were organized into three small groups. Each group 
has one spokesperson and rapporteur. 
1.1.3 Fieldwork
Fieldwork was employed to obtain primary data and information about characteristics of 
street enterprises in Jakarta and Bandung. This activity was directed to identify the en-
terprise structures, and the economic and demographic proﬁles of the informal economy 
so as to understand its capacity and willingness to pay tax. Primary data were obtained 
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from questionnaires and in-depth interviews applied to selected participants of street 
traders, tax collectors, and related public policymakers from the Bandung Municipality 
and South Jakarta jurisdictions. Fieldwork was completed between January and February 
2009. A preliminary report was completed on March and was presented in the second 
workshop of LGI (interim team workshop) on April 24–30, 2009 in Istanbul.
Jakarta and Bandung cover a large area in terms of the total area and number of street 
enterprises. As the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta is administratively a province consist-
ing of ﬁve territories or municipalities, namely, Jakarta Pusat (Central Jakarta), Jakarta 
Utara (North Jakarta), Jakarta Barat (West Jakarta), Jakarta Selatan (South Jakarta), and 
Jakarta Timur (East Jakarta). Bandung is the capital of West Java province situated 180 
kilometers southeast of Jakarta. Administratively, Bandung encompasses two regions, 
known as Greater Bandung or Bandung Raya: the district (kabupaten) and the munici-
pality (kotamadya). The municipality covers the metropolitan core of Bandung City, 
whilst the district covers the area surrounding the municipality area. In 2007, the total 
population in Jakarta (ﬁve municipalities) and Bandung (district and municipality) was 
estimated at 8.5 million and 5.4 million people, respectively (CBS 2008).
The selection of particular locations in each city was based on the agglomeration 
(concentration) of the street enterprises within the subdistrict area of Bandung Mu-
nicipality and South Jakarta areas. Because the number of street traders is very large 
and concentrated in various locations of the city, a certain number of participants was 
selected as samples of the population in a certain site within the given subdistrict area. 
Preliminary observations were initiated in each city to examine those research locations 
characterized by the most agglomerated and highest number of street enterprises (i.e., 
market areas with malls, supermarkets, business complexes, and crossroads that are full 
of pedestrians), and determine the locations for data collection. 
In Bandung, 105 participants were selected from two sites at the Simpang Market 
and Kosambi Market areas, where about 97 and 133 street traders are located, respec-
tively. In Jakarta, data collection was concentrated in South Jakarta and involved 135 
participants selected from about 350 street vendors in Pasar Minggu or Sunday Market. 
The selection of research participants mainly used a purposive sampling technique 
in order to get reliable information from diﬀerent groups of respondents. The socio-
economic backgrounds, such as types of informal activities, revenues, level of authority 
in public policymaking, and gender characteristics were taken into account to achieve 
as much as possible a representative sample of respondents. In order to approach such 
a number of participants eﬀectively and eﬃciently, this data collection was assisted by 
six junior data collectors.
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1.1.4 Workshop
In addition to the desk review, seminar, and ﬁeldwork, this project also included a 
one-day workshop involving a wide range of policymakers and policy stakeholders. The 
workshop was conducted on the fourth week of June 2009. This activity was aimed 
particularly at informing and improving initial ﬁndings and generating initial policy 
alternatives. The workshop was conducted with a participatory approach and a frame-
work involving a number of policy stakeholders, such as street traders’ associations, 
NGO workers, members of professional associations, and selected leaders and members 
of community organizations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pakistan’s informal sector has grown at an unprecedented pace over the years, and today 
72.9 percent of the non-agriculture workforce is employed by this sector. There has been a 
signiﬁcant growth in the informal sector over many years and the issue has become a matter 
of great concern, with government considering proposals to bring the informal sector into 
the mainstream economy through a number of initiatives. According to conservative esti-
mates, out of a USD 140 billion economy, well over USD 32 billion is in the informal sector, 
providing huge opportunities for its businesspeople to evade and avoid taxation every year. 
This study, one of the very few on the subject in Pakistan, analyzes local taxation in 
economies that are predominantly informal by looking at four tehsils in two provinces of 
Pakistan. Reviewing own source revenues, key levies, and the associated socio-cultural, politi-
cal, and administrative issues, the study provides recommendations for local and provincial 
governments to improve revenue generation in an inclusive and efﬁcient manner. 
The speciﬁc objectives of the study are to assess local government revenues in selected 
areas of Pakistan to:
  understand their status in general and vis-à-vis the informal economy in particular
  ﬁnd the constraints to and potential for improvement 
  discuss and recommend policy options for improving local government revenues.
The ﬁrst section of the report provides a brief discussion of the nature of the informal 
economy in Pakistan. This is followed by sections that provide a brief overview of the local 
government system and its ﬁnances. Section 4 looks at the sources of revenue in detail 
along with the collection trends in the focus municipalities in the Faisalabad and Sukkur 
districts of Pakistan. The ﬁnal section looks at options for reforms and their feasibility and 
concludes with some recommendations. 
The report identiﬁes the signiﬁcant dependence of the local governments on federal and 
provincial transfers. The local governments work under expenditure restrictions especially 
in terms of those relating to personnel. Their independence is further compromised as the 
hiring and ﬁring authority rests mostly with the provincial governments. The report also 
identiﬁes the duplication of tax authority resulting in an increase in compliance costs for 
taxpayers and leads to spatial variation in effective tax rates, with associated distortions. It 
also has been observed that the taxes allowed by various levels of the district government 
are not buoyant enough to yield good returns. Local governments represent elite classes 
rather than the population as a whole, and ultimately emerge as custodians of class-speciﬁc 
interests. Taxes are resented and generally considered as encroachment by the state on the 
ﬁnances of the people, pointing to a deﬁcit in real, sustainable trust. The report also analyzes 
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speciﬁc levies like the transfer of immoveable property tax, property tax, and advertisement 
tax to identify the detailed problems and their potential. 
The report concludes with a discussion of three sets of policy options namely the status 
quo; the tweaking; and the upheaval options, with supporting detailed recommendations 
on improving analysis/collection functions, undertaking tax rate revisions, and consolidation 
of tax code in an incremental manner.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A study conducted by the Lahore University of Management Sciences in 2003 showed 
that out of PKR 100 due in tax revenue, the government receives only PKR 38 and 
PKR 62 is pocketed by the taxpayer, tax collector, and tax lawyer. It means that of the 
total of PKR 720 billion collected in tax in 2005–06, only 38 percent of about PKR 2 
trillion was actually collected by the Federal Board of Revenue.2 According to the draft 
of Pakistan’s National Employment Policy,3 the informal sector has grown at an unprec-
edented pace over the years, and today 72.9 percent of the non-agriculture workforce 
is employed by this sector. There has been a signiﬁcant growth in the informal sector 
over many years and the issue has become a matter of great concern, with government 
considering proposals to bring the informal sector into the mainstream through a 
number of initiatives. According to conservative estimates, out of a USD 140 billion 
economy, over USD 32 billion is in the informal sector, providing a huge opportunity 
for Pakistan’s businessmen to evade taxes every year.
While these estimates look at federal revenues, there has been no overall assessment 
of tax evasion or revenue potential at the local government levels in Pakistan where 
revenue generation also takes place. Local governments, already operating in a hostile 
policy environment, with high constraints on access to adequate human resources and 
limited macro-political support for decentralization, are further weakened by almost total 
ﬁnancial dependence on provincial and national governments. This low autonomy can 
somewhat be oﬀset by higher “own source” revenues. A fair policy debate in Pakistan 
on decentralization requires as assessment of local governments, not simply as ﬁscal 
sinks that drain provincial and national governments of power and prestige—but rather 
as units of government with some degree of autonomy that enable and assist federal 
and provincial governments in delivering a minimum standard and coverage of public 
services and assure appropriate accountability. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the revenue realities and the potential for 
improvement among four of Pakistan’s local governments, including both rural and 
urban areas in two of the four provinces. A key contextual consideration is that the 
revenue and expenditure assignments operate within economies that are predominantly 
informal. The analysis here is restricted to local governments, with a focus on Tehsil 
Municipal Administration (TMAs). TMAs are responsible for providing major mu-
nicipal functions and also have the authority to generate a major chunk of resources, 
as compared to the other two tiers of local government in Pakistan, namely district 
and union. Union is the lowest tier in the local government structure in Pakistan. The 
analysis takes into account the revenue sources and their nature, their respective yield 
over the past years, and makes an eﬀort to identify the challenges and opportunities to 
enhance local revenues in economies that are predominantly informal. 
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The speciﬁc objectives of the study are to assess local government revenues in selected 
areas of Pakistan to:
  Understand their status in general and vis-à-vis the informal economy in 
particular;
  Find the constraints to and potential for improvement;
  Discuss and recommend policy options for improving local government 
revenues.
The ﬁrst section of the report provides a brief discussion of the nature of informal 
economy in Pakistan. This is followed by sections that provide a brief overview of the 
local government system and its ﬁnances. Section 4 looks at the sources of revenue in 
detail along with the collection trends in the focus municipalities in the Faisalabad and 
Sukkur districts of Pakistan. The ﬁnal section looks at options for reforms and their 
feasibility and concludes with some recommendations. 
2. METHODOLOGY
The following instruments and methods have been used in ﬁnalizing this study:
  Desk review of literature and past reports;
  Field data collection from the local governments under focus and subsequent 
analysis;
  Focus group discussions, interviews, and consultations with stakeholders 
including local government oﬃcials, tax authorities, and the business community.
3. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN PAKISTAN
The informal sector or informal economy is deﬁned in a variety of ways. Some of the 
terms applied to the informal sector include the unobserved economy, the unregulated 
sector, and the underground economy, which also refers to illegal activities as well. For 
example, Braun and Loayza (World Bank 1994) describe the informal economy as a set 
of economic units that do not comply with government-imposed taxes and regulations 
but whose product is considered as legal. Others have stressed the exclusion from the 
taxation net as a deﬁning characteristic of informality (Joshi and Ayee 2008). Various 
reasons cited for the inclusion of the informal sector consist of the need for increasing 
revenues, while also providing opportunities for businesses to expand. The informal 
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sector cannot borrow or rely on the legal system to execute and ensure contracts and 
resolve disputes.
The informal sector in Pakistan is formulated in terms of household enterprises 
(Labor Force Survey 2006–07) and the size of employment. For statistical purposes, 
the provenance of employment in the informal sector is given as follows:
  All household enterprises owned and operated by self-employed workers irre-
spective of the size of the enterprise (informal self-employed enterprises); 
  Enterprises owned and operated by employers with less than 10 persons engaged. 
It includes the owner(s) of the enterprise, the contributing family workers, the 
employees, whether employed on an occasional or a continuous basis, or as 
apprentices,
  All enterprises engaged in agricultural activities or wholly engaged in non-market 
production are excluded.
The informal sector consists of small units producing goods or services with the 
primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the families engaged in these 
activities. Informal activities have often been characterized by low levels of capital and 
skills, poor access to organized markets and technologies, low and unstable incomes, and 
poor and unpredictable working conditions. Such activities are often outside the scope 
and purview of the oﬃcial statistics and government regulations as well as beyond the 
formal system of social protection. The units operating in the informal sector are highly 
labor intensive but employment is mostly casual and based on kinship and personal 
relations rather than contractual arrangements ensuring protection. The informal sector 
activities depend, to a large extent, on the local and regional demand. Despite its growing 
size, the informal sector continues to be largely “invisible” and “neglected.” Suﬃcient 
information is lacking concerning employment patterns, the nature and extent of its 
activities, and the characteristics of its participants. This leads to an absence of informa-
tion on regional trade and any activity-speciﬁc employment potential. 
Various methods have been used to estimate the extent of informal economy in 
Pakistan. The Labor Force Survey of 2006–07 estimates that the informal sector accounts 
for 72 percent of the employment in the forms of employment outside the agriculture 
sector, more in rural (73 percent) than urban areas (71 percent). Kemal (2007), using 
diﬀerent methods, estimates the size of underground economy at 31–64 percent of 
GDP. He also estimates that tax evasion as a percentage of GDP ranging between 3.8 
to eight percent of GDP. The fact that Pakistan’s budget deﬁcit is between three to seven 
percent of GDP signiﬁes the importance of this tax evasion. He, however, includes 
illegal activities like smuggling, black marketeering, etc., as part of the underground 
economy. Gennari (2004) estimates the contribution of the informal sector to the GDP 
using the Labor Force Survey deﬁnition and data. He criticizes the non-inclusion of 
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criterion of registration of the enterprise by the Survey and some aspects related to data 
accuracy. But the work provides interesting insights into the nature of informal sector 
in Pakistan. For example, the study shows that the contribution of the informal sector 
to total value added is substantial in wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and restau-
rants, accounting for over half of the total value added to the industry, and that is also 
substantial in transport and communications as well as in the social, community, and 
personal services sectors.
There have also been recent eﬀorts in estimating the “tax gap” for Pakistan (Ahmed 
and Rider 2008 and World Bank 2009). The federal tax gap in Pakistan for 2007–08 
is estimated to be about 79 percent of actual tax receipts. Other studies have focused 
on the revenue potential of provincial governments (Government of North Western 
Frontier Province and Malik 2004; Bahl, Wallace, and Cyan 2008) to employ various 
methods to come up with estimates of the potential for the urban immovable property 
tax, motor vehicle tax, agricultural income tax, and taxes on professions, trades, and 
callings. The missing link, however, in these studies is that of the informal sector. 
There have been very few eﬀorts in estimating the potential of local government 
revenues in Pakistan (Decentralization Support Program, Government of Pakistan 2005 
and CIDA 2007). These studies have mostly focused on federal and provincial revenues. 
All these eﬀorts have not taken into account the informal sector as such and mostly relied 
on estimating the higher potential for taxation by proposing higher tax rates, improved 
administration, and documentation. All these elements, however, can be successful in 
formal settings and where economies are well documented. Still, it has been found that 
many of the businesses operating at the local level invariably pay various local fees even 
if they are not paying, or are evading, some of federal and provincial taxes.
The discussion on local taxes and levies in this study does not depend on any scientiﬁc 
or agreed upon deﬁnition of what constitutes “formal” or “informal.” Nevertheless, while 
avoiding turning the focus of this study to characteristics of the informal sector in Pakistan, 
we have primarily looked at two explanations about the informal sector. According to 
the World Bank, the informal sector covers a wide range of labor market activities4 that 
combine two groups of a very diﬀerent nature. On the one hand, the informal sector is 
formed by the coping behavior of individuals and families in an economic environment 
where earning opportunities are scarce (casual jobs, temporary jobs, unpaid jobs, subsistence 
agriculture, moonlighting). On the other hand, the informal sector is a product of rational 
behavior of entrepreneurs that desire to escape state regulations. The latter includes unof-
ﬁcial business activities, tax evasion, avoidance of labor regulations and other government 
or institutional regulations, and is characterized by the non-registration of companies. 
This category also includes underground activities like crime and corruption—activities 
not registered by statistical oﬃces. 
The Aspen Institute’s Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Eﬀectiveness, Learning 
and Dissemination (FIELD) has worked for many years to educate policymakers about 
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microenterprise as anti-poverty strategy. The Microenterprise in US project,6 provides 
the following four characteristics that are associated with an informal economy. We ﬁnd 
these characteristics to be in play in the districts in the focus of this study on Pakistan: 
  They involve licit but unregulated work: enterprises, employers, and self-
employed individuals do not comply with standard business practices, taxation 
regulations, and/or other business reporting requirements, but they are otherwise 
not engaged in overtly criminal activity. 
  They include both employed and self-employed workers, with some engaged 
in both kinds of work. 
  Cash is the most common medium of exchange, although bartering also occurs. 
  Work conditions for those who labor are inferior to those found in the formal 
economy. 
The entities that operate in the informal economy, as per this categorization, display 
the following characteristics: 
  They are largely invisible or operate at low levels of visibility. They may or may 
not have licenses, are often engaged in casual hiring, non-reporting of income, 
and other informal labor practices. They can be easily moved, opened, or closed 
at will, and thus, can hide from regulation. 
  They pursue businesses similar in type to those commonly found among all 
microentrepreneurs, and most focus on very local markets. 
  Like other microentrepreneurs, many are income patchers; that is, they engage 
in multiple economic activities to generate a living. 
  They generate low revenues and have very few assets. 
4. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN6
Pakistan has a federal administrative structure guided by the Constitution of Pakistan 
of 1973, with amendments. The Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the 
Senate. The allocation of functions of the federal government and the provincial govern-
ments is speciﬁed by the Constitution, the former having the authority to make laws 
with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List and the latter in the Concurrent 
Legislative List. However, in case of a dispute between the two, the writ of federal gov-
ernment shall prevail, hence providing for the root of centralization in Pakistan. While 
local governments have always been a part of the conceived structure of the federation, 
their status, shape, and form falls entirely under the domain of the provinces. Local 
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government reforms in 2001 were accompanied by a special constitutional provision 
allowing a time-limited protection7 for local government law enacted by the provinces. 
Prior to 2001, the Constitution of Pakistan did not fully recognize local governments as 
a separate tier of government with their own powers and functions. They were essentially 
viewed as extensions of the provincial governments, having been created by provincial 
legislation, through which some functions were delegated to them. 
Pakistan has a poor track record of democracy, since for more than half of its years 
of existence after independence it has been ruled by the military. While the military 
governments always have found faults with the politicians, it was always they who cre-
ated the local government systems. Pakistan has experimented with two systems of local 
government before the introduction of the current system in 2001. The history of local 
governments in Pakistan is characterized by two factors: ﬁrst, the local governments 
have never been autonomously functional in the presence of democratic governments. 
Second, every time a new system of local government is created, it is at the expense of 
the previous system.
In 2001, Pakistan simultaneously promulgated four provincial Local Government 
Ordinances establishing a new structure and system of governance at the local level. It 
is imperative to point out that these laws, although a product of some consultations, 
came about when no elected government existed at the provincial level. This, in our 
view, was a critical missing link in ensuring ownership for the new system. The new 
law has established a uniform three-tier structure comprising of a district, tehsil and 
union throughout the country irrespective of the size or other features of the various 
locations. This major change was also introduced in one stroke without piloting the 
system anywhere. The district remains the largest unit of the system and geographi-
cally comprises of tehsils and unions. Tehsils are called towns in large city districts and 
talukas in Sindh Province. Direct elections are held only at the union level, whereby 
these directly elected councilors form the Electoral College for other tiers of the local 
government. Each tier comprises of a respective council led by a nazim (mayor) and 
naib nazim (deputy mayor), and administration headed by district coordination oﬃcer 
(DCO), tehsil municipal oﬃcer (TMO), and union secretaries. Two elections have been 
held since the new law of 2001. 
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Figure 3.1
Local Government in Pakistan
Source: National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan.
5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES8
Public ﬁnances in Pakistan have been characterized by high ﬁscal deﬁcits, poor revenue 
mobilization, a persistent trend of centralization, massive vertical imbalances between 
federal and provincial governments (i.e., very large gaps between provincial govern-
ments’ expenditures and own revenues, which have to be made up by the means of ﬁscal 
transfers from the federal government), weak ﬁnancial management, and a lack of ac-
countability by the public sector (World Bank 2000). Local governments have not been 
recognized by the Constitution as a separate tier of government and have existed only 
as extensions of the provinces, with some functions delegated to them by the provinces. 
This has seriously aﬀected the ﬁscal structure and related distribution of authority for 
revenue mobilization and expenditure obligations among diﬀerent levels of government. 
Each of the local government tiers has been assigned speciﬁc responsibilities and 
revenue raising authority in accordance with the Local Government Ordinance of 2001. 
While each district diﬀers in size and resources, the responsibilities and revenue raising 
authorities remain uniform as per the law. Respective councils are authorized to approve 
budgets and can also approve changes in the rates of respective authorities. 
Expenditure assignments are speciﬁed in the First Schedule of the Local Govern-
ment Ordinance of 2001. There are certain legal and operational overlaps between the 
provincial and local governments in this regard. This is mainly due to the dependence 
of the local governments on provincial transfers and the fact that there are vertical de-
velopment programs funded by federal and provincial governments. Most social services 
1st tier:
2nd tier:
3rd tier:
District
Tehsil Tehsil
Village Village Village Village Village Village Village Village
Union
Council
Union
Council
Union
Council
Union
Council
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fall under the domain of the local governments. At the national level, the separation of 
responsibilities and jurisdictions are speciﬁed in the Constitution of Pakistan through 
a Federal Legislative and Concurrent List. The Concurrent List identiﬁes areas where 
provinces have jurisdiction. The actual expenditure assignments at the local government 
level, therefore, also vary with each provincial government and their desire to exercise 
control or delegate responsibilities to the local governments. 
Revenue assignments are speciﬁed in the Second Schedule of the Local Government 
Ordinance of 2001. In general, most of the high-yielding tax authorities rest with the 
federal and then provincial governments. The revenue generating opportunities for vari-
ous tiers of local governments remain minimal and cumbersome. The following table 
summarizes these assignments.
Local Revenue Administration. The district governments, in accordance with the Lo-
cal Government Ordinance of 2001, can levy, assess, and collect taxes with the approval 
of the respective elected councils. In reality, however, the extent to which this authority 
is exercised varies with the location and resources of the districts and also within the 
three tiers of the local government. As mentioned above, each tier has a separate set of 
revenues to generate. Each tier has a diﬀerent set of administration to deal with these 
matters. At the district level, the executive district oﬃcer (EDO) of ﬁnance and plan-
ning heads the ﬁnance department and is assisted by district oﬃcers (DOs) and other 
support staﬀ. At the tehsil level the functions are performed by the tehsil municipal 
oﬃcer (ﬁnance and revenue) supported by lower cadre staﬀ.
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Table 3.1 
Sources of Local Revenue9
District councils Tehsil and town councils Union councils
 Education tax 
 Health tax 
 Tax on vehicles other than 
motor vehicles 
 Local rate on lands assessable 
to land revenue 
 Fees in respect of schools, 
colleges, and health facilities 
established or maintained by 
the district government 
 Fees for licenses granted by 
the district government 
 Fees for specific services 
rendered by a district 
government 
 Collection charges for 
recovery of tax on behalf of 
the government as prescribed 
 Tolls on new roads, bridges, 
within the limits of a district, 
other than national and 
provincial highways and roads
 Local tax on services 
 Tax on the transfer of 
immovable property 
 Property tax on annual rental 
value of buildings and lands 
 Fees on advertisements, other 
than on radio and television, 
and billboards 
 Fees for fairs, agricultural 
shows, cattle fairs, industrial 
exhibitions, tournaments and 
other public events. 
 Fees for approval of building 
plans and construction and 
reconstruction of buildings. 
 Fees for licenses or permits 
and penalties or fines for 
violation of the licensing rules 
 Charges for execution and 
maintenance of works of 
public utility like lighting 
of public places, drainage, 
conservancy, and water supply 
 Fee on cinemas, theatrical 
shows, and tickets thereof, 
and other entertainment 
 Collection charges for 
recovery of any tax on 
behalf of the government, 
district government, 
union administration or 
any statutory authority as 
prescribed.
 Fees for licensing of 
professions and vocations 
 Fee on sale of animals in 
cattle markets 
 Market fees 
 Fees for certification of births, 
marriages, and deaths 
 Charges for specific services 
rendered by the union council 
 Rate for the remuneration 
of village and neighborhood 
guards 
 Rate for the execution or 
maintenance of any work of 
public utility like lighting 
of public places, drainage, 
conservancy, and water supply
 
The tax or revenue administration also diﬀers between districts and tehsils. The 
district tier mostly relies on the local oﬃces of the provincial Excise and Taxation 
Department (provincial taxes including property tax) and the Board of Revenue (pro-
vincial land revenue, mutation (Mutation of property is the recording in the revenue 
records the transfer of title of a property from one person to another) and registration 
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fee, agricultural income tax). Their own capacity to administer local taxes is generally 
weak, with few staﬀ, and those they have are not trained to manage the levies available 
under the new law. 
Tehsil governments have generally better own source revenues than the district, 
even though they too are dependent on transfers from higher levels of the government 
(provincial and federal). Tehsils collect the urban immovable property tax and many 
other kinds of fees and levies. Many of these collections are through contractors, and 
therefore there is a huge scope for improving the capacity of tehsils to manage revenues 
including taxes. For the taxes and levies under their jurisdiction, they have a fair degree 
of independence to set the tax rates, their assessment and collection. Various procedures 
and processes for the key levies are discussed below. 
Key Taxes/Fees/Levies and their Business Processes.10 The following table describes the 
general processes associated with some of the key levies at the tehsil, town, and taluka level. 
Table 3.2
Tehsil, Town, and Taluka Levies
No. Name of tax/fee/levy Business processes Basis
1. Transfer of Immovable 
Property Tax
This tax is collected at the time of 
execution of a sale deed or at the time 
of verification of mutation. The TMA 
staff assesses levies and collects the tax 
from buyers of immovable property. The 
process is supervised and controlled by a 
contractor in some cases. Salaries of TMA 
staff responsible for collection are also 
paid by the contractor, who pays the bid 
amount to a designated TMA account. 
The contract is given on a yearly basis. 
EDO (revenue) registers firms that wish 
to participate in the bidding. The bids are 
presented in the council and contract is 
awarded after an open competition. If no 
contract is awarded, TMA staff performs 
the assessment, levy, and collection func-
tion under supervision of the TMA.
One percent of the value 
of property as recorded in 
the sale deed/registry.
2. Advertisements/
Billboards fee
Collection is either auctioned or under-
taken directly by the local governments 
themselves (different in various tehsils).
Based on various rates 
prescribed for different 
sizes of billboards levied 
on an annual basis. 
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No. Name of tax/fee/levy Business processes Basis
3. House Tax/
Property Tax
The tax is assessed and collected by the 
Excise and Taxation staff from the owner 
of the house. There are certain exemptions, 
e.g., for widows and for retired armed 
forces personnel. Moreover, there is no 
house tax on houses measuring 5 marla or 
less (25 feet by 50 feet). Demand notices 
are created on a yearly basis and issued 
to the owner of the house, who pays the 
amount into a designated bank account.
Based on rates notified 
for different sizes of land/
property levied on an 
annual basis.
4. The bazari 
(encroachment) fee
The bazari clerk issues receipts for 
encroachments and deposits the received 
sums in accounts branch. 
Levied on encroachers on 
land (a certain amount 
per square foot and hand 
cart owners). 
5. Slaughter fee Auction/direct recovery by TMA staff Rate prescribed per 
animal type. 
6. Copying fee Those needing an official certified copy 
of any document apply to the competent 
authority, who may decide to grant such 
certified copy on payment of the fee deter-
mined by the TMA. The clerk concerned 
recovers the copying fee. The copying fee 
is nominal, but three to four times the 
prescribed fee is charged from the applicant. 
Not all of this extra fee is deposited in TMA 
accounts.
Rate prescribed per copy.
7. Bakar Mandi 
(cattle market) fee
Auction/self-recovery. The contractor orga-
nizes the sale/purchase of animals at desig-
nated places. For this service, he charges a 
fee as determined by the TMA.
Fee prescribed per animal. 
8. License fee The TMA staff issues licenses to persons 
providing professional services, e.g., 
butchers, milk sellers, and other trades. 
A fee is charged for the issuance of such 
licenses. This is the fee charged from 
professionals providing services within 
the jurisdiction of a TMA. The license 
fee is determined by the TMA and levied 
through a notification in the official 
gazette. The renewal is on an annual basis 
against payment of a fee. 
Rate notified for each 
profession or trade. 
Table 3.2 (Continued)
112
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
No. Name of tax/fee/levy Business processes Basis
9. Building fee Departmental recovery. Anyone who 
wishes to construct a house must get the 
building plan and architectural design 
approved by the TMA. The building fee is 
charged for such approval. 
Fees prescribed for 
residential, commercial, 
industrial buildings as per 
their size. 
10. Shop Rent Recovery by TMA staff from tenants. Rent as agreed with 
tenants. 
General Issues
  Dependency on Federal/Provincial Transfers: Given the nature of public ﬁnances 
in Pakistan, the local governments are still dependent on the provincial and 
federal governments for many reasons. So long as provincial governments keep 
on posting their employees to the local levels, this dependency is unlikely to 
change. In addition, provinces still exercise substantial control over the budget 
preparation process of the district governments. The TMAs do not play any 
active role in legislation (e.g., bylaws) and exist as extensions of federal and 
provincial governments (master-client relationship).
  Expenditure Restrictions on Districts and Tehsils: The districts have many restric-
tions, especially in terms of personnel-related expenditures. They are not autho-
rized to hire the required human resources. However, a positive departure from 
the past is that they do not have to go back to the provincial governments for 
those projects where they have their own resources for funding. But the districts, 
at present, do not have much maneuverability with the development budget 
as a very large percentage of the total budget still goes to non-development 
expenditures like salaries. 
  Revenues: There are many cases where there is a duplication of tax authority 
between the provinces and districts. Property tax is one such example. 
Overlapping tax bases or tax base sharing between diﬀerent levels of government 
increases compliance costs for taxpayers and leads to spatial variation in eﬀec-
tive tax rates, with associated distortions. It is further observed that the taxes 
allowed by various levels of the district government are not buoyant enough to 
yield good returns. A major problem with regard to revenues is that many urban 
areas generate more revenues than rural or undeveloped areas. While part of 
this problem is addressed by the equalization grants from the provinces, it still 
leads to dependency of these areas further out in the provinces. The generation 
of resources at the level of TMA clashes with vested interests which explains 
under-taxation, nontaxation, and evasion.
Table 3.2 (Continued)
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  Audit and Accounting Issues: After the 2008 elections, the newly elected provin-
cial governments severely criticized the delays in the holding of annual audits 
by the local governments. The law stipulates establishment of internal audit 
functions but these have not been institutionalized after a lapse of so many 
years. 
  Representation: District and TMA members represent elite classes rather than 
the population as a whole, and ultimately emerge as custodians of class-speciﬁc 
interests. Ownership of executive functions does not exist at a grass-roots level. 
Taxes are resented and generally considered as encroachment by the state on 
the ﬁnances of the people, pointing to a trust deﬁcit.
6. LOCAL REVENUES IN FAISALABAD AND SUKKUR DISTRICTS11
Faisalabad
The Faisalabad District, originally called Lyallpur, is the third largest city in Pakistan, 
and is a key district of the Punjab Province of Pakistan. The name Lyallpur was derived 
from one of the foremost colonists of the British Raj, Sir James Lyall, who served as 
lieutenant governor of the Punjab. The lower Chenab Canal is the main source of ir-
rigation water, and helps meet the requirements of 80 percent of the land cultivated in 
the district. The district represents among the more cultivable agricultural regions in 
the province, with fertile soil and easy access to water. The key attraction of Faisalabad 
as a location for rural migrants has been the city’s world-renowned textiles industry 
(cotton-based fabrics). Faisalabad’s exports (to mainly North American and European 
markets) alone account for nearly 40 percent of Pakistani exports. There are over ﬁve 
hundred large industrial units, the vast majority of which produces textiles. Engineer-
ing, chemical, and food processing industries have also beneﬁted from the advantages 
Faisalabad oﬀers to large-scale industrial enterprises. Much smaller industries also have a 
history of thriving in the district, and there are also some 12,000 household industries, 
which include some 60,000 power loom factories. 
The City District Government of Faisalabad, established in 2005, concurrently 
with the introduction of amendments to the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 
of 2001, consists of the towns (municipalities) of Lyallpur, Madina, Jinnah, Iqbal, Sa-
mundri, Tandianwala, Jaranwala, and Chak Jhumra. Faisalabad district covers an area 
of nearly six thousand square kilometers. Estimates for the population of the district 
vary between six and seven million, and for the city area of Faisalabad, between three 
and four million. The literacy rates in Faisalabad have tended to be lower than in other 
large cities of the country. 
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For the purpose of this study, Lyallpur (population: 1,545,190; 57 unions) and 
Jaranwala (population 861,482; 38 unions) were selected for their urban and peri-urban 
nature. Both the towns have thriving commercial, industrial, and informal activities. 
The industrial sector in these towns has indirect, rather than direct ramiﬁcations. The 
local economies rely on the jobs and opportunities for business created by the industrial 
activity in the district—but both towns represent the typical feeder localities from which 
management and lower management staﬀ local industries, as well as being the source of 
some demand for the industry’s products. The implications of these characteristics are 
that the informal economy in these towns beneﬁts from, but is not directly dependent 
on, the industrial complexes that characterize Faisalabad, at a macro-level. 
Sukkur12
Sukkur District is located in Sindh Province, on the banks of the Indus River. While it is 
the third major urban center in the province, after Karachi and Hyderbabad, it is primar-
ily rural in character, and therefore is comprised of what are called talukas—representing 
the trraditional municipality model in the province of Sindh. Talukas date back to the 
earliest settlements in Sindh Province, and enabled conquering armies and colonists to 
administer the extraction of natural and human resources from the region. With four 
talukas (municipalities), Sukkur district covers an area of 5,165 square kilometers and 
has a population of about one million. The district’s economy relies primarily on the 
agricultural activity of its surrounding districts, and that primary agricultural activity 
supports a range of industrial activity in Sukkur, including cotton ginning, silk and food 
processing, rice and ﬂour milling, textile dyeing, metal works, boatbuilding, tanning, 
tobacco processing, shad ﬁshing, and the manufacture of chemicals, cement, candy, 
tiles, hosiery, and playing cards. The scale of industry in Sukkur is modest, particularly 
in comparison to Faisalabad, and the consumption of Sukkur-produced goods is almost 
exclusively domestic, and particularly local. Land fertility and productivity have tradi-
tionally been quite good in Sukkur; however, recent years have seen a degradation in 
the quality of water available to the land, via the Indus River, and productivity has been 
reduced considerably as a result. Sukkur’s main crops include rice, cotton, tomatoes, 
peas, wheat, barley, chickpeas, melons, and dates, and the district is host to a number 
of riverine forests.
For the purpose of this study, the Sukkur City (population 560,000) and Rohri 
(population 310,851) municipalities were selected for their urban and peri-urban nature. 
Both the towns have a robust local economy with a vibrant commercial sector.
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7. NATURE OF TAXES, THEIR YIELD, AND ADMINISTRATION
This section makes an attempt to provide the basic data for local revenues in Pakistani 
local governments. Table 3.3 provides a brief description of each of the taxes, fees, and 
charges levied at the town, tehsil, and/or taluka level. The basis, rates, and administra-
tion of the key levies are provided in following table. The actual yield of the key levies 
for each tehsil is also provided. The approach adopted by our study to review various 
sources of revenues in the informal sector takes into account the peculiar characteristics 
of the informal sector in Pakistan. Our observations on the ground, interaction with 
the stakeholders, and review of the revenue sources and data indicate that a signiﬁcant 
portion of revenues is generated by informal economic activity and that the informal 
sector plays an important role in both income generation and job creation for the local 
economies we examined. 
The situation observed in the focus areas is in line with the earlier discussion 
about the informal sector. Most of the observed business activities cannot be clas-
siﬁed as illegal or criminal. The issue of registration is rather tricky as well. On one 
hand, much of the business activity is not registered under federal taxation system, 
but they cannot avoid paying many of the local government fees and taxes. A much 
more detailed analysis would be required to quantify and classify various enterprises 
in accordance with the above-mentioned characteristics of informal economies. For 
the purpose of our analysis, we ﬁnd it extremely diﬃcult to identify businesses that 
are informal in general, but not paying at least some of the local government lev-
ies. There may be cases of underpayment (immovable property tax), but in general 
the local government levies are hard for the informal businesses to avoid as we have 
observed. This provides an excellent opportunity to develop the local government 
ﬁnancial administration to lure informal activities into the taxation net. Much of this 
activity remains out of the ambit of the federal taxation regime, especially direct taxes. 
In fact, the study leads us to conclude that local revenue generation is probably the 
most eﬀective way to bring the informal activities under some sort of taxation net. If 
applied eﬃciently, local revenue generation can also pay for improving many of the 
services that fall under the ambit of local governments in Pakistan. 
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Table 3.3 
Taxes and Their Description
No. Tax, fee, or charge Description Basis and administration
1. Tax on transfer 
of immovable 
property
Municipality receives 90 percent of 
this tax. Remaining 10 percent is 
received by district revenue office as 
they collect the property tax. 
One percent of transfer value, 
imposed on buyer.
2. Advertisement fee Fee on billboards and other adver-
tisement means developed inside the 
area of a municipality.
Various rates for different sizes of 
boards, imposed on advertisers on 
an annual basis.
3. The bazari fee Fee charged to people who run 
their businesses outside the existing 
shops, for example, a shoeshine 
service, photocopying, etc., outside 
a shop.
Various rates per square foot of 
encroached land/area imposed on 
the encroacher.
4. Slaughter fee Fee charged by slaughterhouses 
managed by the municipalities.
Certain fee per animal (e.g., PKR 
50/cow) paid by slaughterer.
5. Copying fee Very small fee charged on copying, 
typing, and issuing documents in 
municipal administration offices.
PKR 10/page paid by the person 
requesting copy.
6. Trade licensing fee Around 60 different types of licenses 
listed under this category. 
Various rates have been specified 
for different types of businesses. 
7. Building fee Fee charged when construction plan 
for construction of a new building is 
approved.
Rates of approval of building plans 
are specified according to size and 
imposed on the owner. 
8. Shop rents Applied on buildings constructed by 
the municipality. 
Monthly rent as determined by the 
TMA and imposed on tenant.
9. Ground rents When kachi abadi (shelters, 
informal settlements) convert 
to paki abadi (formal, planned 
settlements), a certain amount is 
collected per month as ground rent.
PKR 1/yard (varies in different 
TMAs) imposed on land used.
10. Sandal piri fee Fee on cabins/shops developed 
by people to run small business 
(Khokha dukan).
Specified rate per square foot of 
shop/cabin imposed on the busi-
ness.
11. Cattle piri 
(grazing) fee
For cattle grazing, municipality 
provides separate ground; this fee is 
collected from those people who use 
this land for grazing. 
Specified rate per animal imposed 
on the owner.
12. Hand cart fee Fee collected from those people who 
run their business using hand carts 
(Rehri wala).
Specified rate per cart imposed on 
the owner using TMA land.
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No. Tax, fee, or charge Description Basis and administration
13. Latrine fee Fee collected on those latrines 
constructed by municipality, fee 
collected either by municipality or by 
theka (contractor) system.
Various rates per person using the 
latrine.
14. Parking fee Fee charged on raksha, cycle, 
motorcycle, or any other vehicle 
on entrance into the municipality’s 
parking area.
Specified rate per vehicle type 
(truck, trailer, taxi, car).
15. Misc. income Others not included.
 
Evaluation of Own Source Revenues in the Focus TMAs
Table 3.4 
Total Local Own Revenues (PKR Million) 
2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–09 (Estimate)
Rohri 8.1 15.0 21.3 26.0
Sukkur City 24.0 26.0 31.0 31.2
Lyallpur 131.0 137.2 106.0 133.0
Jaranwala 57.2 58.3 55.0 83.2
Rohri
Figure 3.2 
Rohri Revenue Trends
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Taxes and Their Description
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Main Observations
  In terms of yield, the most prominent levy appears to be the one collected from 
cattle grazing, given the peri-urban to rural and agricultural setting of the TMA.
  Various kinds of rents collected from markets are the other key levies in terms 
of yield.
Sukkur
Figure 3.3
Revenue Trends in Sukkur City
Main Observations
  In terms of yield, the most prominent levy is the one collected from property-
related transactions given the urban setting of the TMA.
  Various kinds of rents collected from markets are the other key levies in terms 
of yield.
  The other signiﬁcant levy is collected from approval of building plans pointing 
to signiﬁcant construction activity in the TMA.
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Lyallpur
Figure 3.4 
Revenue Trends in Lyallpur
Main Observations
  In terms of yield, the most prominent levy is the one collected from property-
related transactions given the urban setting of the TMA.
  The other signiﬁcant levy is collected from approval of building plans pointing 
to signiﬁcant construction activity in the TMA.
  Other key levies are trade licenses and advertisements 
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Jaranwala
Figure 3.5 
Revenue Trends in Jaranwala
Main Observations
  In terms of yield, the most prominent levy is the one collected from property-
related transactions. 
  Various kinds of rents collected from markets, building plan approvals, and 
parking fees are the other key levies in terms of yield.
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 The sources of revenue display an interesting consistency across the TMAs under 
review. Property-related levies including sales, transfers, and construction remain the 
predominant levy. The only exception is Rohri where, surprisingly, the maximum 
yield comes from cattle grazing. A deeper look into the quality of grazing services 
being provided could provide leads to maximize the yield from this levy. 
Cost of Collection
In order to get a rough idea about the cost of collection, a detailed review of staﬃng 
and associated costs was undertaken for the taluka in Sukkur City as part of the study. 
Out of many oﬃces at the taluka level, the following oﬃces were found to be directly 
or closely associated with administering own source revenues. Given the culture and 
human resource practices at this level, multitasking is common and the following, 
even at best, presents just a rough estimate based on interviews and available records. 
The oﬃces dealing with water and drainage-related charges have been deliberately 
excluded from the focus of the study. It is interesting to point out that while the local 
governments were denied the collection of octroi tax (tax imposed on goods brought 
for consumption into a administrative unit/district) since 1999 and provided a lump 
sum share from the sales tax in lieu thereof, Sukkur City continues to maintain an oﬃce 
for the purpose. According to their budget documents, the octroi department has 103 
sanctioned staﬀ positions, out of which 89 are vacant. However, the staﬀ are indicated 
in the budget. This anomaly was not clearly explained by the staﬀ. Our study excludes 
the octroi department for its visible absence from the revenue collection and the fact 
that the sanctioned staﬀ is not available/recruited. 
Table 3.9
Octroi Staﬀ in Sukkur City
Department Sanctioned staff Vacant 
positions
Budget allocation
(PKR million)
Finance department 15 3 12.0
Regulation department 4 4 0.4
Tax branch 57 22 7.0
Cattle corral 3 1 0.4
Land grant branch 16 7 1.7
Infrastructure department 
(excluding women’s hostel)
56 36 7.3
Total 151 73 28.1
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Sukkur City’s actual collection for the 2007–08 is PKR 30.5 million, hence putting 
the cost of collection at about 90 percent of the revenue generated. This obviously appears 
to be very high as very little is left over for revenues for development expenditures in 
the taluka. This, however, tallies with the general situation of revenues and expenditure 
at local government levels in Pakistan where established costs (salaries, etc.) account for 
more than 80 percent of the local budgets. Another striking feature is the high percent-
age (almost 50 percent) of vacant positions at the local level. The reason, in most cases 
including Sukkur, is a ban on the recruitment of staﬀ. The local governments continue 
to budget for them for the fear of losing sanctioned posts, making the whole budget-
making exercise unrealistic. In fact, this points to problems in budget management and 
capacity issues at local levels. The budgeted expenditure lapses at the end of the ﬁscal 
year and the positions for which the amounts were allocated remain unﬁlled. Discount-
ing the unﬁlled positions from the cost of collection brings down the collection cost 
to 45–50 percent, which is still very substantial (and would be higher still if the octroi 
department were included). There is a serious need to review the budget-making process 
and revenue collection practices at the local and provincial levels. 
Box 3.1
Revenue Potential in the Khanewal TMA
Revenue Potential in TMA Khanewal*
A Revenue Potential Survey of TMA Khanewal was conducted in 2005 involving a door-to-
door census for water rates, license fees on professions/vocations, and billboard taxes. The 
exercise indicated a revenue increase potential of 71 percent and 94 percent for profes-
sional fees and billboard taxes, respectively. The study could not identify any potential to 
increase revenues from water rates due to outdated records and poor service quality. The 
potential was calculated by identifying new payees and a new rationalization of the rates. 
Poor market information, poor record maintenance, and a lack of monitoring capabilities 
were identiﬁed as the main weaknesses. 
 * (AHNR Consulting for Decentralization Support Program, Government of Pakistan 2005)
Potential for Corruption and Evasion
The anthropology behind informal taxes is important to consider. The system is open to 
quite widespread and signiﬁcant opportunities for rent-seeking, largely due to limited 
record-keeping, manual ledger record-keeping, and the very low levels of literacy and 
legal awareness among entrepreneurs. This is made worse by the disincentive for local 
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governments to raise their own revenues given the signiﬁcant injections of vertical funds 
from the provincial and federal governments. These transfers are both a systemic part 
of the local government revenue structure and performance, and need-based grants 
are made under speciﬁc, often politically motivated, direct interventions of a vertical 
nature by individual, group, and state entities located at the federal level. Speciﬁcally 
in the context of the focus areas of this study, one major area of underreporting/fraud, 
with some evidence of collusion, was observed in the case of the transfer of immovable 
property tax. This is because people underreport the actual market value of the property 
at the time of registration, and hence the tax that should be paid is avoided. This results 
in a number of revenue losses in the form of stamp duties and revenue coming to the 
local governments. The losses are signiﬁcant, as per the views of local government of-
ﬁcials, especially in urban areas. 
Another key levy with signiﬁcant actual collusion is advertisements (e.g., billboards). 
Instead of auctioning proﬁtable sites, local governments rent out sites to applicants. 
Signiﬁcant discretion is available to the local governments since areas are not surveyed 
and clearly categorized in terms of value. Due to limited monitoring ability, additional 
losses are incurred from illegal billboards as well. Whether they are really “illegal” or 
just exist with the connivance of local oﬃcials is debatable. Some of the other levies 
on encroachers are clearly open to exploitation, and hence the loss of revenue and the 
creation of an unfriendly business environment. 
8. STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE
A series of consultations were held with the oﬃcials of the local governments and local 
business community. The most critical one was held in Faisalabad with the Anjuman-
i-Tajiran (Traders Association) of the city of Faisalabad. It was heavily attended, with 
participation from a number of other business associations like the electronics dealers 
association and the cloth merchants association, to name a few. Lively participation and 
debate was observed with both sides making their cases in a forceful manner.
The perspective of the local governments is summarized as follows:
  Abolishing many low-yielding taxes;
  Identifying the most promising targets for the property tax, provided some 
improvements can be made like regular updating of valuation tables as per 
market trends, and amending the Law of Preemption to apply to urban areas, 
etc.; 
  Creating more realistic budget/revenue targets in the tehsils;
  Identifying collusion and evasion in the collection of key taxes (transfer of 
immovable property tax and advertisement/billboards fees); 
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  Reconsidering the transfer of most highly yielding taxes to the city district 
government, advertisements in the case of Faisalabad;
  Loosening strong provincial controls, and eliminating delays in transfers of 
funds due to the tehsils as their share of the taxes collected on their behalf by 
higher tiers of the government (mostly provincial taxes);
  Improving weak management capacity and poor enforcement.
Unlike the common perception, the study found a large variety of businesses, voca-
tions, and professions at the local levels, almost all of which were paying one or another 
form of levy. The other interesting observation was that many of the businesses did not 
appear to be under the ambit of direct federal taxes. The nature of provincial taxes (e.g., 
motor vehicle registration) is such that all businesses, irrespective of their type, could 
not evade it. Each TMA had an elaborate list of professions/vocations and fees assigned 
for those practicing these vocations. The business community complained about the 
high-handedness of contractors, the unequal rates applied to the same professions in 
adjoining TMAs, and the disproportionate and discretionary increase in diﬀerent rates. 
One obvious problem was the disconnect, and resulting lack of trust, between the local 
government and business community. 
The perspective of the local business communities is summarized as follows:
  No visible beneﬁt for paying taxes;
  Poor services by the local governments and their selected contractors, and weak 
monitoring by the tehsil governments;
  No accountability of elected oﬃcials, staﬀ, and contractors;
  Varying tax rates causing confusion, especially in the case of professions tax;
  Unclear jurisdictions and incidences of multiple tehsils claiming the same tax 
or fee (e.g., goldsmiths in adjoining towns of Faisalabad complained about the 
diﬀerent rates charged); 
  Willingness to pay taxes, and even higher rates of tax, if the number of taxes is 
reduced, and if eﬀective management and results can be demonstrated;
  Willingness to pay more in return for simpliﬁed procedures and improved 
services.
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9. PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS
Some of our overall ﬁndings resonate with those identiﬁed by a similar study focusing 
on the districts of Kasur and Lodhran (CIDA and COWATER 2005). These include:
  Legal confusion/lacuna cause loss of revenue; 
  Local governments have limited autonomy to set their own tax rates; 
  There is limited possibility of introducing new taxes/rates/fees; 
  There is vast potential to improve collection eﬃciency as the present system of 
assessments is not professional and is not based on any surveys or data; 
  Reﬁning business processes can increase own source revenue; 
  Improvement in service delivery is a prerequisite for increasing user charges; 
  Comprehensive mapping and development of databases can broaden the tax 
base; 
  Certain taxes/fees can be abolished with negligible Own Source Revenue (OSR) 
loss; 
  Weak tax administrative (assessment, collection etc) points to signiﬁcant capacity 
gaps at the local level;
  Tax collection targets are arbitrarily ﬁxed and frequently missed but without 
ﬁxation of responsibility;
  Non-professional oﬃcials tasked with the collection responsibilities; 
  No transparency in assessment and collection;
  Inability to expand the tax base has resulted in taxing the already taxed sources 
of revenue with all the three tiers sharing the pie (e.g., each property transaction 
involves stamp duty, registration fee (provincial tax), TMA tax, and capital value 
tax (federal tax); 
  Loopholes in laws relating to conversion of agricultural land into residential/
commercial land allow people to mint money at the expense of the state. 
10. OBSERVATIONS ON SPECIFIC LEVIES13
Transfer of Immovable Property Tax
This is one of the most important sources of revenue for a TMA. The rate of this tax 
was until recently ﬁve percent, later reduced to two percent and now ﬁxed at only one 
percent of the value of property (Punjab). It was hoped that lower tax rates would 
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persuade people to correctly report property values and pay due tax. This is generally not 
the case. Since the property value is generally underreported in the sale deed/registry, 
TMAs cannot realize the tax even at this reduced rate of one percent. Recovery should 
be based on valuation tables and not on the basis of the recorded sale price. The valua-
tion tables, where available, should be revised regularly, preferably every three years; the 
last time the valuation table was revised was some ﬁve years ago. The District Oﬃcer 
(DO) (revenue at the district level) revises the valuation table after a survey of property 
prices. This power (i.e., the determination of valuation table) should be given to TMAs 
as the tax is assessed, levied, and collected by the TMAs. DO (revenue) has little to do 
with the tax, except settling the property value in the valuation table. For revision of the 
valuation tables, services of professional private sector ﬁrms should be engaged. If the 
valuation table is revised upwards regularly, the provincial government will also beneﬁt 
in terms of enhanced recovery of stamp duty. Generally, there is intense competition 
among contractors for the collection rights of this tax. Through a recent amendment, 
it has been made possible for a contractor registered anywhere to bid for the contract. 
This allows for greater competition in the awarding of contracts. This is essentially a 
gamble. Property prices are highly variable. Sometimes there are very few actual sales, 
on account of, for example, an anticipated property price hike. In such cases, the con-
tractor might even abandon the contract midway. This tax has the maximum potential 
for yielding higher yields. 
Advertising and Billboards Fees
This fee is for various kinds of boards and banners, most signiﬁcant of which are the 
billboards. Fees levied on billboards falls under the purview of the provincial govern-
ment. This forms a major source of revenue for tehsils and especially those with an urban 
population. In cases where districts have been converted to city districts, the same has 
been transferred from the tehsils to districts, hence causing a major loss of revenue for 
tehsils (Faisalabad is a case in point). The fee has the potential to be an important revenue 
source for the TMAs. Proper surveys should be conducted to collect data about number 
of boards in the territorial limits of the TMAs as, at present, the record is incomplete. 
It is proposed that surveys should be outsourced to the private sector due to the lack 
of trained staﬀ within the TMAs. The survey can also identify critical/high visibility 
areas that could then be auctioned to generate the maximum revenue for the TMAs. 
At present some areas have been rented out at very low prices. Rates also need to be 
rationalized at regular intervals.
House Tax/Property Tax
Section 117 of the Punjab and Sindh Local Government Ordinances both declare a tehsil 
or town as a rating area and the TMA is authorized to determine the rate of property tax 
(commonly called house tax) within its territorial limits. There is considerable confusion 
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in the assessment and collection of this tax, however (the local government versus the 
provincial excise and taxation department). The legal confusion notwithstanding, in 
practice, the tax is collected by excise and taxation staﬀ at the district level and deposited 
in Account 1, which goes to the provincial government. The local governments/tehsils 
are then authorized to keep a certain portion of the collected amounts. This either does 
not happen or in some cases the transfers are substantially delayed. The confusion needs 
to be clariﬁed and clear processes need to be established so that the TMAs can get their 
share of this important levy. 
Slaughter Fee
Presently this is being collected by TMA staﬀ. Considerable leakage exists in the collec-
tion of this fee. According to rough estimates, around 70 percent of animal slaughter 
takes place outside the designated slaughterhouses. This not only leads to the erosion 
of the TMA’s legitimate income, but also eﬀectively undermines any eﬀorts at quality 
control and food safety. At the same time, the facilities provided by the TMA at the 
slaughter houses are inadequate and the clients do not feel obliged to pay these fees on 
these grounds.
Copying Fee 
The amount received as a copying fee is too little. The citizens pay far more than what 
actually reaches the TMA coﬀers. With the promulgation of Freedom of Information 
Ordinance, more people should have access to public documents, and to facilitate this 
the charges should be clearly displayed and accounted for. Otherwise, the charges could 
be abolished without much loss to the TMAs. 
Bakar Mandi (Cattle Market) 
The contractor organizes the sale/purchase of animals at designated places. For this 
service, he charges a fee as determined by the TMA. There is a need to establish more 
markets for the sale and purchase of animals. Also, the contractors should provide better 
facilities at such places. The monitoring of mandis (markets) by the TMA staﬀ is poor 
and the traders complain about poor facilities.
License Fee 
Considerable confusion prevails on the jurisdiction issue. The Licensing of Professions 
and Vocation Rules of 2002 does not clearly demarcate if the district government, TMA, 
or union council has the jurisdiction for the levy and collection of the fee. Hence, there 
are instances of multiple taxation. Practically, whosoever arrives ﬁrst would collect the 
fee. There is no proper survey of persons providing professional services. In the absence 
of such a database, it is very diﬃcult for the TMA to collect license renewal fees from 
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every person liable to pay such a fee. The TMAs reviewed under this study have elabo-
rate lists of trades and professions with taxes. If properly applied, this could generate 
suﬃcient revenue from the informal sector. 
Building Fee 
This is an important source of revenue, given the large size of construction activity 
in the TMAs’ limits, especially those that are urban. The fee also plays a control role, 
allowing the TMA to ensure that building bylaws are followed. There are, however, a 
number of issues involved in this. First, the building fee is levied on and charged against 
buildings in the city. The rural areas, where a lot of construction activity goes on, are 
so far exempt from payment of such fee. They should be brought in the ambit through 
a decision by the TMA. Second, enforcement is poor and any ﬁnancial deterrent is 
seldom administered to those violating the building code. In fact, the encroachment 
fee provision in the TMAs provides a convenient window for regularization of any 
violation of the building codes. 
Shop Rentals 
If the shops’ rents are ﬁxed at the current market rates and recovery is unaﬀected, this 
can be a very important source of revenue for the TMA. Unfortunately, however, the 
shop rental fees remains at abysmally low levels. The archaic legal system, rent legisla-
tion, and rampant corruption in the lower judiciary eﬀectively thwart any eﬀort at rate 
enhancement. As per law, the rent can be increased up to a maximum of 10 percent 
every year or 25 percent after every three years. This is done, but the market far surpasses 
any such increase. Consequently, property worth millions is rented out at nominal 
rates. Under an informal transfer system (the pugri system), shops are transferred from 
one owner/tenant to the other at a pugri of millions of PKR. The TMA, however, gets 
nothing out of such transfers.
11. POLICY OPTIONS
The following options make an attempt to address the issues and problems discussed in 
the sections above, while reviewing speciﬁc levies and other circumstances in the tehsils 
in focus. To avoid duplication, not all speciﬁc recommendations have been repeated. 
Since the study focused on four tehsils in two provinces and the rules and procedures 
remain more or less similar, it was deemed appropriate to come up with somewhat 
generic policy options. This will allow these recommendations to be applicable to tehsils 
in both the provinces and helpful in improving own source revenues in economies that 
are predominantly informal. 
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The Status Quo Option
Maintaining the status quo in terms of the local government taxation regime is a viable 
option for Pakistan’s provinces—the subnational entities under whom local govern-
ments operate. To appreciate why doing nothing represents a viable option, one needs 
to trace the positioning of the issue of subsidiarity within Pakistan’s historical and 
political context.
Provincial governments, according to the Constitution, are representative and largely 
autonomous bodies whose participation in the Pakistani federation is a voluntary and 
mutually beneﬁcial arrangement. The real politik of Pakistan’s history, the diﬃcult ter-
ritorial issues it faces on all its borders (India, Afghanistan, and Iran), and the tradition 
of military intervention in political life has created a counter-subsidiarity strain within 
Pakistani governance. The centralizing impact of the insecurity of Pakistan’s military and 
defense establishment is one of the primary drivers of the debate on decentralization. 
Ironically, military governments tend to be keen to decentralize provincial powers 
to local bodies, while centralizing other provincial powers to the federal government. 
The impact of this dual pressure on provinces has created a counter-decentralization 
narrative among Pakistan’s provincial politicians, the civil service at large, and among 
some members of Pakistani policy community. 
Within this context, the option of maintaining the status quo and doing nothing 
with regards to the revenue generation potential and capacity of local governments, 
particularly as it relates to the informal sector, is an attractive option. The reason for 
this is rather simple: changes to the local government revenue system, particularly if 
they are deliberately fashioned to capture the informal economy, would involve alter-
ing the minutia and details of local government in Pakistan. That represents a highly 
risky, politically unstable choice, given that the overarching context and framework of 
devolution and decentralization is undecided. In the absence of a minimum level of 
consensus or collectively bargained agreement about the future of local governance in 
Pakistan, changes to the local government revenue system would be akin to changing 
the wheels on a car that has no engine. 
Even if we were to suspend disbelief about the overarching context of decentralization 
in Pakistan, and examine the issue of local government taxation as it relates to the informal 
sector, some would continue to argue for a do-nothing approach. The reasons for this 
can be found in the analysis of who constitutes the informal sector’s taxpayer, and who 
such constituents represent politically. Informal activity in almost all of Pakistan’s cities 
and villages (save perhaps the metropolitan areas of Lahore and Karachi) is conducted 
by landless, asset-less, and uneducated citizens. While these citizens have almost no real 
voice in Pakistan’s decision-making, they do carry one signiﬁcant asset. Their ability to 
vote is a very signiﬁcant factor in Pakistani electoral politics. One of the small mercies 
that the political elite confers to this class of informal sector actors is to protect them from 
the taxation net. Taxes in Pakistan have almost always fallen to either large corporations 
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or to the urban middle class (which is exclusively engaged in formal activity). Doing 
anything to alter and improve local revenue from the informal sector therefore represents 
a politically infeasible option for decision-makers that have political interests in the local 
constituencies they represent. 
On the whole therefore, doing nothing and maintaining the status quo is a viable 
and attractive option for overarching structural reasons, for macro-political economic 
reasons, and for local and grass-roots political reasons. 
The Incremental Change or Tweaking Option
Despite serious political threats to the overarching structure of local governments at 
any given time in Pakistan, local bodies have almost always been part of the structure. 
The debate and ﬂuctuation in Pakistan has always been about the relative levels of po-
litical, administrative, and ﬁscal powers of provinces and local bodies in the country. 
This means that regardless of the eventual outcome—or even in the likely case that a 
stable outcome continues to be elusive in terms of the status of local governments—lo-
cal government ﬁnances, and particularly the magnitude and quality of their revenue 
generation, represent compelling policy issues. 
If this premise is used to view the spectrum of policy options for local government 
taxation, particularly as it relates to the informal sector, there are essentially two choices. 
One is to begin to approach local government taxation issues in an iterative, sustained, 
and incremental manner, and the other is to engage in wholesale change that encom-
passes, structures, processes, and drives the outcomes of everything concurrently. The 
former represents the incremental change, or tweaking option, while the latter represents 
the transformational change option. 
The argument for an incremental approach rests on three principal factors. First, 
incremental change allows reformers and agents of change to create small spaces and 
constituencies for change, without explicitly and boldly threatening the interests that tend 
to beneﬁt from the status quo. In the case of the taxation system for local government, 
local oﬃcials’ capacity for rent-seeking is enabled by the status quo. To change the system 
incrementally would mean exploring tactics that enable beneﬁciaries of the status quo to 
buy into a regime change, without directly threatening the employment of such oﬃcials. 
Second, incremental change allows reformers to learn by doing, without toppling 
the entire ediﬁce of existing systems and procedures. Incremental change, because it 
stretches out over longer periods of time, enables agents of change to learn on the go 
and adjust their solutions to problems in accordance with existing circumstances, be 
they political, social, or economic. 
Finally, incremental change represents a lower level of political risk for reformers. 
When agents of change adopt incremental change as their mantra, there are few, if any, 
dramatic risks to their reputations. Failure or success while attempting incremental change 
has limited bearing on the direct or indirect political interests of reformers. 
135
P a k i s t a n
If decision-makers in Pakistan chose to adopt an incremental change approach to 
the local taxation of the informal sector, they would be best served by undertaking three 
speciﬁc measures to instigate reform. 
First, they would need to invest in a dramatically improved data collection, storage, 
and analysis in relation to the informal actors in the economy, and their taxability. Sec-
ond, they would need to make changes to the tax rates, many of which have not been 
changed in decades, and therefore reﬂect none of the changes that have taken place in 
the economy, class structures, and modes of production. Finally, they would need to 
invest time and eﬀort in the consolidation of the tax code. 
  Database: Analysis/Collection Functions
  The data available to local government oﬃcials on the informal sector activity 
is limited to those taxpayers that either voluntarily pay their taxes, or those 
that are surveyed by tax oﬃcials and choose to pay into the system, rather than 
bribing the oﬃcials. This means that the full potential for local taxation is an 
“X” factor in the debate on local revenue generation from the informal sector. 
To mobilize this “X” factor, local governments require a database that is updated 
regularly on the informal sector as a whole. (The data need for all local sources 
of revenue is high). Once collected through a survey that identiﬁes baseline 
markers of the size, magnitude, and characteristics of the informal sector, a fully 
functional and updated database of informal economic activity will enable the 
policy community (decision-makers and citizens alike) to identify and locate the 
revenue potential of a given locality and to assess the skill and adroitness with 
which local oﬃcials collect may revenue. This database could also represent an 
accountability instrument—as long as there is a ﬁrm commitment to ensure a 
very high level of accessibility to citizens, e.g., through free Internet access to 
the database. 
  Tax Rate Revision
  A particularly diﬃcult element of the local taxation regime in Pakistan is the rates 
of tax that are imposed on ﬁrms and individuals. Local tax rates were originally 
set during the second half of the twentieth century by the pre-independence 
British Colonial Raj in what now constitutes Pakistan. In all cases, those tax 
rates have been revised very infrequently, with some tax rates not having seen 
any changes for decades. This static nature of tax rates has often meant that the 
currency and price inﬂation—especially in the case of ﬂat-rate taxes—are in no 
way reﬂected in the local tax rates. Tax rates are not just out of date. They are, in 
many ways, out of synch and out of context. Changes in the economic, social, 
and political realities of Pakistan have translated into transformed economies, 
and indeed, local economies that vary signiﬁcantly from each other, often, even 
within the same districts. To cater to these changes, Pakistani decision-makers 
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would be well served by altering the stasis on tax rates at the local level. A detailed 
analysis of each tax as it exists today and the kinds of considerations needed to 
be made in revising those taxes is available in sections 8.1 through 8.9 for nine 
of the major taxes levied by the local government. 
  Tax Code Consolidation
  Finally, tax code consolidation—in synch with improved data collection and 
analysis, and better, sharper, more incisive tax rates that reﬂect the social 
and economic realities of present day local economies—will serve to buttress 
revenue generation, and modernize the ediﬁce of local taxation of the informal 
economy in Pakistan. Consolidating the tax code will need to be undertaken 
with a view to both administrative considerations, and equity considerations. A 
high percentage of the levies, fees, rates, and charges at the local level are low-
yield taxes. Additionally, these low-yield taxes only generate liabilities for small 
businesses that invariably tend to be members of the informal or marginally 
formal economy. Eliminating ineﬃcient taxes, and lowering or reducing the 
tax burden on the poor, would be high-level policy outcomes from a serious 
eﬀort to renegotiate and reconstitute the tax code. Formulating a roster of 
taxes that ensures greater revenues, without compromising on political and 
equity considerations, would therefore be an essential part of the incremental 
change option. 
The Local Taxation System Transformation (or Upheaval) Option
From a purely analytical perspective of an academic or conceptual framework, the 
most attractive solution to the challenges faced by local taxation eﬀorts and aspirations, 
speciﬁcally with regards to the informal economies of Pakistan, is a total transforma-
tion of a system that is outdated, inequitable, ineﬃcient, and corrupt as well as being 
ﬁscally and politically irrelevant. The reform of the taxation system at the local level 
in Pakistan, of course, would be a very large undertaking requiring interest, eﬀort, and 
commitment from a range of actors, beginning with political leadership in all three 
tiers of government (federal, provincial, and local). Chief among other key actors that 
will inﬂuence Pakistan’s ability to aﬀect transformational change in the local taxation 
regime will be bureaucrats, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and informal 
sector businesses. More incisive and more dramatic than incremental change, the up-
heaval or transformation option will require major changes in at least ﬁve speciﬁc and 
cross-tier areas, including the local government tax codes, the administrative structure 
of government at the provincial and local levels, economic and tax data at the provincial 
and local levels, and the service delivery paradigm, or more broadly the social contract 
that enables tax collection. 
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  Transformation of the Local Government Tax Code 
  The local government tax code needs to be redeﬁned for the 21st century. This 
redeﬁnition would enable administrators to target high-yield sectors, including 
potential areas of opportunity in the informal arena, without being inequitable. 
A progressive local government tax code would attempt to ensure that both 
formal and informal economic actors that comprise low-income groups would 
pay no taxes, or very little taxes. Industrial production, for example could be 
taxed from an inputs perspective, making both formal and informal raw mate-
rials that contribute to manufacturing processes subject to taxes. The challenge 
would be to ensure that the burden of taxation is on the high capital, high 
income party—rather than low capital, low income actors. 
  Transformation of Administrative Structure
  The civil service and administrative structures of local government – comprised 
of towns/tehsils/talukas as well as union councils and districts makes for an 
obfuscation of roles and confusion for taxpayers and citizens, in terms of 
identifying the locus of responsibility for the payment of taxes. Reforming the 
administrative structures to better reﬂect the balance between elected oﬃces 
(at the union council level) and their responsibility to deliver services against 
income generated by tax and revenue sources (at the tehsil level) is therefore 
vital to improved tax regimes in local governments in Pakistan. 
  Transformation of Province and Local Government Relationship
  As discussed elsewhere in this paper, provincial ownership of local governments 
and their ﬁscal issues is limited. Provincial governments, at least in last two years, 
have shown little commitment to see local governments become more independent 
in terms of resources. Improved commitment from the provinces would enable 
local governments to become more proactive and innovative in order to become 
less ﬁnancially dependent on the provinces by enhancing their own revenues.
  Transformation of the Data Regime
  This would include, as stated in the incremental option, the entire range of 
data activities including collection, storage, archiving, analysis, and evaluation. 
  Transformation of Service Delivery Paradigm
  Ultimately, an altered relationship between the state (at the local government 
level) and the citizen (and taxpayers) is central to the distinction that needs to 
be struck between tax collection for the sake of enriching the abstract, underper-
forming state—which is how many view local governments, and tax collection 
for the purpose of delivering services to the general public. 
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12. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend Pakistani decision-makers to adopt the Tweaking Option as the pre-
ferred choice of policy intervention to address the current challenges in local taxation 
of the informal economy. 
Pakistan has a political landscape that is diﬃcult for reformers to navigate in the 
best of times. Since 2007, Pakistan has been under a constant state of scrutiny by the 
international community, a sustained economic and ﬁscal crisis, and a political process, 
that has delivered a set of major and urgent constitutional amendments, without ad-
dressing the more immediate security and economic needs of the populace. 
One of the key ingredients of better governance in Pakistan is a revenue system 
that produces locally autonomous resource allocation decisions. Such decisions are not 
possible without expanding the tax net. 
This poses a clear dilemma for policy makers. Good public policy must deliver 
higher revenues to improve democratized and localized resource allocation decisions. 
Yet it must also do so without further deepening the set of political or economic chal-
lenges to the Pakistani state and incumbent government. 
The tweaking option allows for a negotiated and phased approach to local taxation 
reform. Documentation of the economic activities at the local level is a long-standing 
challenge—which is often resisted by vested interests. By presenting the documentation 
exercise as an eﬀort to ease the burden of taxes (through tax rate revision) and rationalize 
the targeting of taxes (through tax code consolidation), government could easily create 
a narrative of tax code reform that favors progressive taxation and distributive justice—
both key populist considerations in a fragile democratic equilibrium. 
One of the enduring complications in generating a national narrative, for what is 
a provincial (or sub-national issue), is the degree to which this process could be made 
subject to political manipulation. To prevent this, incentives could be oﬀered by the 
federal government to the provinces to come to a cohesive and coherent outcome for 
the entire country. 
 
Table 3.10
The Tweaking Option
Dimension Ease of execution
Political Easier than transformation 
Fiscal Easier than both transformation (high cost of reform) and do nothing 
(high cost of status quo) 
Administrative Easier than transformation
Replicability Easier than both other options
Sustainability Easier than transformation
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the years in Sierra Leone, formal direct taxation by local councils to ﬁnance the provi-
sion of local public goods has been quite limited, comprising less than 30 percent of the 
own source revenue proﬁle of the councils. The low level of formal taxation would sug-
gest that local public services are primarily ﬁnanced outside the local community, either 
through direct provision, intergovernmental grants and contribution from other national 
and international NGOs.
To justify this claim, it is important to critically determine how local taxes are admin-
istered in the local economy, much of which is informal, the perception of stakeholders in 
the administration of the local taxes in terms of efﬁciency, effectiveness, and equity, and 
the burden placed on low-income informal traders from unofﬁcial as well as ofﬁcial levies.
This study utilizes both primary and secondary data sources. Secondary data analysis 
looked at the extent and level of local taxation of the informal economy whilst the primary 
data analysis focused on stakeholders’ (Mayors/Chairpersons, local council staff, business 
community, etc.) perception in local tax administration, the extent of service delivery, and 
the burden placed on low-income informal actors from ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial levies.
The key ﬁndings of this study derived from both primary and secondary data analysis 
revealed that the assessments of some of the tax systems are invariably complex; there are 
the increased cost of collecting the local revenues, an excessive burden on taxpayers, and 
double taxation that resulted in resistance to pay, or taxpayers overburdened with all kind 
of taxes. The study has also revealed that tax collectors are often dishonest when account-
ing for local revenues from local residents or taxpayers who are underinformed and have 
mixed feelings of the kind of services provided.
This study recommends that Sierra Leone harmonize and rationalize the legal provi-
sions and improve the administration of the already existing local own revenue sources. 
This could be achieved through:
 Investing in determining the revenue bases of the local taxes to have realistic esti-
mates of their potential or more speciﬁcally, adapting the existing property tax and 
reforming business licensing; 
 Contracting out the collection of some of the local revenue sources (market dues); 
 Embarking on a national campaign to inform residents of the need to pay taxes, and 
the services that are to be provided in return; 
 Strengthening the enforcement mechanisms on tax collection through establishing 
bylaws addressing penalties for tax defaulters and incentives for tax compliance;
 Reviewing and repealing the provisions in other legislation to be consistent with 
provisions in the Local Government Act of 2004; 
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 Ensuring that councils budget use at least 60 to 70 percent of local own revenues 
for direct service delivery before approval by the Local Government Finance Com-
mittee (LGFC);1  
 Providing both demand- and supply-driven capacity-building programs for all local 
stakeholders including local government staff as an ongoing devolution process.
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1. OVERVIEW  
1.1 Research Focus
This study focuses on how far the administration of the local tax system captures the 
whole local economy (both formal and informal) and proposes suggestions for improving 
the administration and collection of these local taxes in terms of eﬃciency, eﬀective-
ness, and equity. The focus was on the major own source revenues administered by local 
councils as articulated in Section 45, Subsection 1 of the Local Government Act of April 
2004 (LGA 2004). These local own revenue sources comprise: local tax, property rates, 
business licenses, fees and charges, and mining revenues.
1.2 Background Information on Sierra Leone and its Local 
 Government Structure
Sierra Leone, located along the Atlantic coast of West Africa, shares borders with the 
Republic of Guinea, to the north and east, and the Republic of Liberia, to the south (see 
Figure 4.1). The country has an area of about 71,740 square kilometers and a popula-
tion of about 6.1 million people.2 The country is rich in mineral resources (diamonds, 
rutile, bauxite, etc.), yet 70 percent of the population lives below the income poverty 
line of less than one dollar per day (15 percent in Freetown and at least 79 percent in 
the rest of country).
Figure 4.1
Map of West Africa 
Source: http://www.google.com/Map of Africa.
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After independence in 1961, Sierra Leone’s government began to deteriorate, which 
led to the abolition of local government in 1972. The centralization of power that re-
sulted meant that the rural population was deprived of basic economic opportunities, 
education, and political participation. All these, coupled with widespread corruption, 
nepotism, and the marginalization of youths from decision-making, resulted in a bloody 
eleven-year (1991–2002) civil war that displaced half of the population, caused 20,000 
deaths, and destroyed infrastructure and social capital.3 
The government, after restoring peace and stability in 2002, undertook a series of 
institutional and structural reforms with the support of the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), the Department for International 
Development (DfID), the African Development Bank (AfDB), etc. Key among the 
reforms supported by these donors was the rebirth of government decentralization, 
which led to the enactment of the LGA in April 2004 that established 19 functional 
local councils. The LGA 2004 was supplemented by the Assumption of Regulations 
Act No.13 of November 2004 (the Statutory Instrument) that clearly mapped out the 
devolution4 of functions to the local councils for the transition period 2004–2008.
The 19 local councils comprise ﬁve city councils, one municipality, and 13 district 
local councils including the Western Area Rural District Council (WARDC). Each 
district local council consists of, on average, 10 chiefdom councils. A chiefdom council 
is a tier of government below the local council that is legally obliged to collect certain 
revenues and share these with the local councils. Chiefdoms are further divided into 
sections and villages. The chiefs are hereditary rulers whose local powers have been as-
sumed to largely supersede those of oﬃcials of the central and local government. They 
are constitutionally recognized and their inﬂuence remains important, particularly in 
matters of traditional culture and justice.
1.3 Sierra Leone’s Informal Sector 
Because of its very nature, the informal economy poses tremendous challenges to 
researchers attempting to estimate its size, and while they have attempted a variety of 
approaches, the measurement process remains an inexact science. For example, Feige 
(1979) declares all forms of measurement ﬂawed in some way. Despite diﬀerences in 
the techniques and results, what clearly emerges from the data is the understanding 
that the informal economy is surprisingly large in most developing countries and Sierra 
Leone is no exception.
According to C. Magbailay Fyle,5 the informal sector does not only serve the 
poor and low-income groups of the population but is patronized by all sectors of 
society. The International Labour Organization and Jobs and Skills Programme for 
Africa/JASPA (ILO) advisory employment mission report on Sierra Leone from 
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1990 described the activities in the informal sector as ranging from petty trading to 
carpentry, blacksmithing, tailoring, gara tie-dyeing, soap making, market women, 
palm wine tapping, small-scale construction, manufacture of basic tools and capital 
goods such as axes and hoes, local cement brick making, machinery, and other skill-
intensive activities such as watch repair, motor, radio, and television repair, and diverse 
traditional ﬁnancial intermediaries such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), locally known as Osusu, and much more. This array of activities suggests 
that informal activities involve all sectors of the economy. 
The actual size of Sierra Leone’s informal sector could not be determined. However, 
the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) report on the Development 
of a Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector in Sierra Leone (2004–2009) estimated that 
the informal sector accounts for at least two-thirds of the 935,800 estimated number of 
households in Sierra Leone. A survey done by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
(FIAS) on Informal Economic Activity in 2005 estimated that at least 80 percent of 
all businesses operated in the informal sector. For the purpose of the survey, informal-
ity was deﬁned as the lack of compliance with legal and procedural requirements for 
business operation.
Interviews with oﬃcials from government, including staﬀ of the National Revenue 
Authority (NRA), also suggests that formal sector activities account for less than 30 
percent of the local economy. 
1.4 Problem Statements
A key function of local governments is the ﬁnance and provision of local public services. 
Over the years, the formal direct taxation of households in Sierra Leone has been limited, 
comprising less than 30 percent of local own revenues, for service provision. The low 
levels of formal taxation would suggest that local public goods are primarily ﬁnanced 
outside the local community, either through direct provision, intergovernmental grants 
and contributions from other national and international NGOs. The reasons for this 
are partly attributed to ignorance or unwillingness of key stakeholders/institutions to 
meet their obligations and/or to adhere to the principles of decentralization and good 
governance. This is coupled with unclear provisions in the LGA of 2004 between local 
and chiefdom councils in revenue collection and sharing, inability of the central govern-
ment through the ministry responsible for local government to fully meet its ﬁnancial 
obligations in the form of subventions to chiefdoms, and conﬂicting regulations in 
the administration of central and local government revenues. More importantly, local 
councils lack the suitable local tax revenue instruments and do not properly collect the 
local revenue sources at their disposal as mandated by law and when they do, they ﬁnd 
it hard to collect because much of the local economy is informal.
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1.5 Objectives of the Study
The objective of the study is to answer the following questions:
  How are local taxes administered by local councils in the local economy, much 
of which is informal?
  What is the perception of stakeholders (oﬃcials from the NRA, local council 
oﬃcials, street traders’ associations, ordinary citizens that pay local taxes and 
other levies, etc.) about the administration of local taxes, in terms of eﬀective-
ness, eﬃciency, and equity?
  What are the burdens placed on lo w-income informal traders from unoﬃcial 
as well as oﬃcial levies? 
  What are the implications for policy? Are there speciﬁc government polices and/
or regulations that might be adopted or changed that would make the chiefdoms 
more accountable, thereby ensuring a smooth revenue collection and sharing 
relationship between the local and chiefdom councils? 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study
Inasmuch as the research tried to address the eﬃcient and eﬀective administration of 
local taxes in the economy that is presumed to be largely informal, it did not focus on 
providing data on the size of informal economy in Sierra Leone. Descriptions of the 
characteristics and size of the informal sector in the context of Sierra Leone was presented 
through related research on the informal sector and discussions with stakeholders in 
government, the private sector, and enlightened ordinary citizens. 
2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT STUDIES AND THE CURRENT 
 STRUCTURE AND REFORMS IN LOCAL REVENUES 
 ADMINISTRATION 
2.1 Review of Relevant Studies
Various labels have been use by scholars to refer to the “informal economy.” It has been 
called the irregular economy (Ferman and Ferman 1973), the subterranean economy 
(Gutmann 1977), the underground economy (Simon and Witte, 1982; Houston 1987), 
the black economy (Dilnot and Moris 1981), the shadow economy (Frey, Weck, and 
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Pommerehne 1982; Cassel and Cichy 1986), and the informal economy (McCrohan 
and Smith 1986). The popular media uses terms such as invisible, hidden, submerged, 
shadow, irregular, non-oﬃcial, unrecorded, or clandestine (U.S. Department of Labor 
1992). The common thread is that these activities are unrecorded or imperfectly reﬂected 
in oﬃcial national accounting systems.
The informal sector is growing, absolutely and relatively. While the exact ﬁgures are 
debated, there is no doubt that the informalization of the economy is occurring in poorer 
countries. Recent calculations for developing countries suggest that the informal sector 
varies from between about 20 percent of GDP in Indonesia to around 67 percent in 
Bolivia; and that it accounts for over 40 percent of GDP in 24 out of the 55 countries 
for which estimates have been made (Alm and Martinez-Vasquez 2003).
Ironically, evidence suggests that the informal sector itself is not as averse to taxation 
as one might expect. Some research shows that tax evasion is not the leading reason 
for explaining the informal economy (Friedman et al. 2000). Avoiding costly regula-
tion may be a more powerful motivation (Ngoi 1997; De Soto 1990). On the basis of 
survey data, Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas (2003) suggest that non-compliance in the 
informal sector often results from ignorance of tax legislation or the complexity of the 
tax system rather than from deliberate evasion.
2.2 Description and Administration of Local Revenues 
Section 45, Subsection 4 of the LGA states that local councils shall make adequate 
eﬀorts to collect revenues from their own sources that comprise: precepts from local 
tax; property taxes; licenses; fees and charges; shares of mining revenues; interests and 
dividends; and any other revenue due to the government but assigned to local councils 
by the minister responsible for ﬁnance by statutory instrument. Another very impor-
tant revenue grant for the local councils that is not mentioned in the Act is the Local 
Government Development Grant (LGDG).
The LGDG program is a participatory, demand- and performance-driven program 
that commenced in 2004 and has been mainstreamed within the normal operational 
requirements of local councils under the LGA of 2004. The primary objective of the 
program is to make sure that all councils improve the provision of facilities and services 
for their people. The projects selected for funding under this program should be at the 
discretion of the local council, but must take the needs of local communities into ac-
count, preferably with consultations taking place at the Ward Committee level.6 
The description and administration of each of the local own revenues are as follows:
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2.2.1 Local Tax
Otherwise known as the poll tax, the local tax is a tax per head on selected individuals (at 
least 21 years of age and above). The taxpayers are not fully identiﬁed by either the local 
or chiefdom councils, so that a large proportion of the full tax potential is not actually 
collected. This is simply because of inadequate capacity (human and logistical) on the 
part of the collection agency (chiefdoms) to fully cover all areas within their respective 
jurisdictions. In instances where the chiefdoms report local tax collection, the monies 
are not properly accounted for by the tax collectors, either to the chiefdoms or local 
councils in question. The local councils also have made little eﬀort to ensure that they 
receive their actual and fair share of the tax collected. Over the years the practice has 
been that the district local councils always accepted, as their own share, without ques-
tions, any amount the chiefdoms reported as local tax collection.  In the case of the city 
councils (with the exception of Freetown City and WARDC), the local tax precepts are 
nil despite the fact that chiefdoms are located within city council jurisdictions.
The cost of printing the local tax receipt books over the years was borne by the cen-
tral government through the ministry responsible for local government and the World 
Bank. Ideally the chiefdoms are expected to bear the cost of collection, but it is clear 
that shared revenues reported as collection would not even pay three months salary of 
chiefdom functionaries after deducting rebates to section and village chiefs in instances 
where they fully participate in the collection.  
2.2.2 Property Tax
The deﬁnition of property as articulated in Section 70 of the LGA of 2004 is all build-
ings (including buildings owned or occupied by the government and the local council). 
The current problem of many councils is that they have no database on which to levy 
property rates.  In the city councils, some databases do exist but the lists of properties are 
incomplete and out-of-date, the ownership/occupancy of many properties is unknown, 
and the valuations are very old.  This is coupled with the paucity of qualiﬁed staﬀ in 
the valuation departments, where it exists (city councils); a lack of computer skills by 
the staﬀ of these departments; a history of signiﬁcant tax defaults; and the nonexistence 
of real estate markets, to the extent that the relevant provision in the Act on Property 
Valuation (Section 72.1) could not be easily adopted. The so-called tax appraisers have 
used these developments as an opportunity, over the years, to arbitrarily determine how 
much owners/occupiers should pay as rates.
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2.2.3 Fees and Charges/Market Fees
Section 57 (a) of the LGA of 2004 states that local councils shall charge fees for the 
use of markets. The fee is payable by all stallholders and vendors in the vicinity of the 
market on a daily basis, including weekends. It is not limited to those operating from 
council property, unless it also included roads and footpaths.   
In the 13 district council areas, many markets are currently owned or managed by 
the chiefdom councils. For this reason, and to enable them to cover maintenance costs 
and payments for the renting of land from the landowners, the ministry responsible for 
local government established a transitional arrangement, whereby the chiefdoms should 
pay the 13 district councils “up to 20 percent” of the total collection of market fees. 
However, in local council areas where chiefdoms do not exist (the ﬁve cities, Bonthe 
municipality, and WARDC), market dues are not shared and accounted for more than 
50 percent of the revenues collected by these councils.
By the nature of its collection, it is evident that the collectors hardly account for 
the actual revenues collected per day, and the councils are not making any extra eﬀort 
to ensure that revenues from markets are properly accounted for, even with the realiza-
tion that collection costs are higher and despite knowing what options are available for 
reducing these costs. There are speciﬁc instances in some city councils where collectors 
have been subject to demands of the mayors in terms of what is expected to be accounted 
for as market fee collections per day.  
2.2.4 Business Licenses
All businesses or business people are legally obliged to pay something loosely called 
the right to trade tax to their council. For very small businesses, it is called market fees 
and is paid daily.  For all others, it is called a business license fee and is paid annually. 
The current arrangement is confusing and has resulted in huge inequities. It is unclear 
whether the tax is being levied on individuals or businesses (is it an accountant or an 
accounting business)? Like the case with property rates, the councils have no baseline 
information on the number of businesses that should attract licenses. In the city councils, 
some databases do exist but the lists of businesses are incomplete and out-of-date; the 
ownership/occupancy of many of the businesses is unknown.   
2.2.5 Mining Royalties
Section 60 of the LGA 2004 states that the councils shall be entitled to a share of revenues 
from mining as may be determined by the ministry responsible for local government 
after consulting the ministries responsible for ﬁnance and mineral resources.  The mining 
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share comprises surface rents from small- and large-scale mining and the mining area 
community development fund. 
Eighty percent of surface rents from small-scale mining are shared with the chiefdoms 
whilst surface rent from large-scale mining are shared among the chiefdoms, landown-
ers, paramount chief, and the local council in the ratio 2:4:2:2, respectively. However, 
beneﬁting councils are those in which the mining has taken place. Here, a few councils 
will become very wealthy if diamond, rutile, or bauxite mining become large industries. 
For the revenue distributed through the Community Development Fund7 (80 percent 
shared with chiefdoms), which is collected by the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the 
Statutory Instrument on Devolution lists this as a function to be devolved. If this is to 
happen, there may still be opportunities to change the operational aspects of this fund. 
2.3 Reforms in Revenue Administration
In Sierra Leone, recent reforms have been undertaken in the administration of prop-
erty tax and business licenses. Given the key constraints faced by the local councils, 
especially the city councils over the years in the administration of property rates and 
business licenses, a new program to raise local revenues was created with the support of 
Mr. Paul Fish, a Canadian Chartered Surveyor, assigned to Sierra Leone as Voluntary 
Service Overseas (VSO). The objective of the system is to introduce an assessment of 
all properties and businesses so that a fair system of taxation can be implemented. The 
success of the program depends on the cumulative performance of ﬁve critical steps: 
discovery, assessment, billing, sensitization in a form of public awareness campaign, 
and collection.
This method of determining the assessment of properties and businesses is based 
on value-derived points awarded to physical properties in order to indicate the annual 
ratable value. This simpliﬁes the valuation and makes it adaptable to a formula and to 
automation. Since the professional valuation capabilities of staﬀ have been limited so 
far, a simpliﬁed “points-based” system is preferred. The new system uses a basic or initial 
tariﬀ for each type of use and is applied to the area of the building, measured in square 
feet, to arrive at an initial annual ratable value.
The basis of the tariﬀ is the relative cost of construction. However, data on the cost 
of construction are not available locally in Sierra Leone with any consistency or accu-
racy. Thus, the system in the cities of Bo, Makeni, and Kenema relies on data about the 
relative cost of constructing buildings in North America, since such a database is reli-
able and is widely used. Sierra Leone taxpayers have expressed their concern about the 
nature of the cost data and the high cost of construction in North America. However, it 
is not the actual cost that is used but the relative cost. The intention is to assess a high-
cost building such as a bank at a higher tax rate compared to a simple retail shop. The 
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relative cost in North America will suﬃce in the absence of local information in Sierra 
Leone. Updating the relative cost is not required on a frequent basis since the relative 
costs are unlikely to change over time.
This system allows for the adjustment of the tariﬀ to handle the grading of poorer 
or better property features. The success of the property assessment system hinges on 
fairness and progression. A progressive point-based system aims to tax a greater amount 
to those more able to bear the cost and vice versa. In local council areas where the 
system is currently operational (Bo, Makeni, and part of Kenema), a sharply progres-
sive system was required since poverty is widespread, along with a small class of those 
who are better oﬀ.
3. THE APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Design and Focus
This study relies upon case studies that largely suited a qualitative research approach, 
but with some elements of quantitative data application. This choice was based on the 
nature of the research that intended to provide an in-depth and systematic analysis of 
how local taxes are administered by local councils in the Sierra Leone economy, much 
of which is informal. The research concerned six local government institutions in the 
cities of Freetown, Bo, Makeni, and Kenema, along with the Kenema District and the 
Dama Chiefdom, each operating in a case-speciﬁc environment (local government 
sphere). Fieldwork was conducted to investigate the operations of the local government 
agencies in question.
Given that the study was about local taxation in a highly-informal economy, the 
research utilized both qualitative and quantitative data to analyze the institutional opera-
tions of the six local government institutions in order to understand the notion of the 
administration of the various local taxes, in relation to the following aspects: 
  How and by whom are these local taxes levied? 
  What is the scope of and abuse of local taxes? 
  What is the performance of the local tax administration in terms of eﬃciency 
and eﬀectiveness?
  What are the indications of the impact of the tax on equity?  
Quantitative data generated from secondary sources in the form of statistics enabled 
a comparative assessment on the quantiﬁable elements related to performance.
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The rationale for selecting these councils is as follows:
  The four city councils constitute the largest in terms of local own revenue collec-
tion among all 19 local councils and have settlements that are highly populated, 
implying a substantial number of actors in the informal sector.
  Located within the Kenema District, Kenema District Council and Dama 
Chiefdom were selected to critically analyze the relationship between the two 
institutions in terms of revenues collected and shared (local tax, market fees, 
and mining royalties. 
  The selected councils represent all regions within Sierra Leone (see Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2
Map of Sierra Leone Indicating the Case Study Councils
 
Source: GIS Mapping Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED).
3.2 Study Population
The study generally enlisted four diﬀerent types of people. First was senior administra-
tive staﬀ including elected representatives (mayors/chairpersons) and staﬀ of revenue 
departments of local councils. They are the people’s representatives at the local level and 
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are supposed to understand and deal with revenue policy implementation issues on a 
daily basis, and from whom accountability is sought, by virtue of the devolved functions 
and public resources they hold.  
The second group was oﬃcials from the National Revenue Authority (NRA) and 
the Registrar General’s Department (RGD)—the central government department re-
sponsible for registering all businesses in the country. As the national revenue collection 
agency, the NRA was chosen to represent the relationship between taxes administrated 
at the local and national levels. 
The third group was the business community, which is part of the taxpayer popula-
tion but with speciﬁc reference to the payment of licenses and fees for the businesses 
(small medium, and large) they operate in the respective jurisdictions. This category of 
taxpayers is very useful as they form the bulk of the informal sector actors.
The fourth group was the residents of the respective local council jurisdictions who 
are legally obliged to pay their local taxes in return for services provided by the local 
councils. 
Focus group discussions were conducted with the last two groups to yield a free-
ﬂowing discussion around topics relevant to the study. The focus group discussions 
aimed to garner opinions and ideas from local residents, businesses, and stakeholder 
groups to ensure that any development-oriented issues are sustainable and represent a 
broader public interest. 
The essence was to ascertain the extent of service delivery and what were their percep-
tions of unoﬃcial levies and monies that are collected but unaccounted for by revenue 
collectors. Participants were asked to explore an issue, sometimes loosely, sometimes 
thoroughly, by responding to more focused questions.  
Structured questionnaires were administered to the following four categories of 
people mentioned above. The issues addressed across all four categories of groups in 
broad thematic areas are summarized in Annex 1.
The respondents for all the questionnaires were selected purposefully, since there 
was the desire to include speciﬁc sections of the study population that have in-depth 
information and understanding of the themes of the study.  In total, eight focus groups 
and 219 respondents were interviewed (Table 4.1).
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3.3 Data Collection Methods
Data for this study was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The study 
utilized three methods, namely: interviews, documents/records review, and direct ob-
servation. The use of these diﬀerent methods was intended to enable the triangulation 
of data and make an assessment of the balance of evidence given.
  Face-to-face interviews were conducted to elicit primary data from key personnel 
in the case study institutions. Interview guidelines were used for diﬀerent 
respondents. These guides consisted of themes and open-ended questions to be 
covered. The interview method was chosen as it suited the nature of the research. 
  A document review involved the collection, study, and analysis of existing written 
(published and unpublished) materials. Documents reviewed include oﬃcial 
institutional publications (reports, statistics, and ﬁgures); legal and regulatory 
instruments; published articles on ﬁscal decentralization and the informal sector. 
3.4 Data Analysis
The data obtained from secondary sources was evaluated and compared with the data 
gathered from primary sources in order to support the balance of evidence and inter-
pretations made in the study. The analysis of secondary sources began before and during 
the interview process. The preliminary review and analysis of documents enabled the 
research to identify the key thematic issues, and later during the interviews it helped in 
redesigning the questions in order to capture the analytical constructs. The secondary 
sources provided some elements of quantitative data in the form of statistical tables 
and ﬁgures, which enriched the analysis and helped to describe, translate, and provide 
meaning to issues captured from the interviews. The information generated from the 
in-depth interviews was transcribed and summarized according to the themes and the 
four speciﬁc objectives of the study.  
4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS 
This section of the report presents the responses of elected representatives (mayors/chair-
persons), the staﬀ of revenue departments of local councils, oﬃcials from the NRA and 
RGDs, and the business community to the question of local tax collection. 
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4.1 Data Analysis from Secondary Sources
The total own revenues generated by all 19 local councils (tax and nontax revenues) 
reported an increasing trend for the period under review (2005–2008), except for ﬁscal 
year 2007 when own revenues dropped over half from their 2006 levels. One reason for 
this drop is was the negative signal sent by political parties regarding the non-payment 
of taxes during the national election period in August 2007. However, ﬁscal year 2008 
marked a signiﬁcant increase in own revenues from the previous years (Figure 4.3), partly 
due to an increased eﬀorts by the city councils, and certainly the Freetown City Council 
(FCC), to collect these revenues. Most importantly, the radical approach used by FCC 
administration to change the locks on all businesses that fail to pay licenses and proper 
enforcement of the payment of rates largely account for this increase. 
Furthermore, the development fund (formally the annuity fund) to the tune of SLL 
7.55 billion transferred to the FCC from the Crown Agent Account in London8  in ﬁscal 
year 2008, which represents over 45 percent of the total local own revenues reported by 
all local councils, also contributed to the signiﬁcant increase in other revenues hence 
total revenues. This fund was partly used by FCC to pay staﬀ bonuses and other fringe 
beneﬁts accumulated over the years. 
Figure 4.3
Local Own Revenues for Fiscal Years 2005–2008
Like the trends in local own sources observed during the period, central government 
transfers maintained a similar level and accounted for more than 70 percent of the total 
revenues available to the council to deliver services on average.  Whilst transfers for ﬁs-
cal year 2007 dropped signiﬁcantly from its 2006 level because of uncertainties in the 
national election process, transfers for ﬁscal year 2008 more than doubled from 2006. 
This arose because ﬁscal year 2008 marked the end of the transition period wherein 
about 75 percent of the ﬁscal devolution to local councils was achieved (Figure 4.4).   
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Local own revenues accounted for on average less than two percent of central gov-
ernment domestic revenues, on average, and less than 0.5 percent of nominal GDP on 
average (Annex 1). 
Figure 4.4
Local Own Revenues vs. Transfers for Fiscal Years 2005–2008
While local own revenues are increasing in nominal terms (averaging 25.5 percent 
annually), despite the shortfall realized in ﬁscal year 2007, inﬂation is averaging 12.4 
percent. In real terms (constant 2004 prices), local own revenues continued to increase 
(9.5 percent) at a decreasing rate (25.5 percent) and at a rate less than inﬂation rate 
(12.4 percent). Similarly, central government transfers also increased (43.3 percent) but 
faster than both the inﬂation rate and local own revenues (Annex 1). 
However, despite the increase in local revenues over the period, key revenue targets, 
though grossly underestimated, were not met. The local councils still collect an average 
of less than 16 percent of their revenue potentials. Annex 2 and Figure 4.5 show the 
actual revenues collected against the estimated full potential whilst Annex 3 gives an 
estimation of the full revenue potentials.
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Figure 4.5
Average Actual Revenue vs. Estimated Potential for Fiscal Years 2005–2008
Local own revenues per capita, adjusted for a population growth of nearly 2.5 percent 
per year, showed an increasing trend in real terms, from SLL 906 to SLL 1,084, a 6.5 
percent increase per year between 2005 and 2008. Total revenues per capita, including 
transfers, increased by 31.5 percent per year over this period (Annex 1).  
Analysis of Revenues Collected from the Informal Sector
The next phase of the secondary data analysis focused on the components of local own 
revenues that are largely collected from informal sector, and its impact on the poor and 
middle income groups. These revenue sources are market fees, licenses, sales from lo-
cal tax, property tax, and fees and charges. Trends in the performance of these revenue 
sources are depicted in Figure 4.6, which shows mix trends in market dues collected 
both in nominal and real terms. Licenses issued from businesses and local tax collected 
decreased sharply in 2006 and throughout 2007, except in 2008 when collections in-
creased rapidly, back to their 2005 levels. These changes are attributed to the diﬀerent 
signals sent by political parties before and during the election period in 2007 about the 
payment of local taxes. However, after the elections, changes in the political administra-
tion heads, coupled with enforcement mechanisms implemented by the city councils, 
improved the collection of the revenue sources in question. 
Furthermore, other fees and charges (hire of city hall and recreation grounds, hire 
of other council property, rent of council property, jetty/landing fees, cemetery/burial 
fees, lorry park fees, slaughter house fees, market store rent, public toilets, parking fees, 
etc.) and property rates maintained an increasing trend over the period. Despite the 
average growth rate of property tax over the years exceeded 100 percent (Annex 2), 
performance was not encouraging compared to their estimated potential to raise local 
revenues (refer to Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.6
Trends in Revenue Sources Largely Collected from the Informal Sector, 2005–2008
4.2 Data Analysis from Primary Sources
Outlined below are the ﬁndings/observations of issues common across all sub-themes in 
the focus groups in the case studies of local and chiefdom councils and in the interviews 
with other stakeholders. Detailed responses from questionnaires administered in the 
focus group discussions are ampliﬁed in Annex 2.
4.2.1 Summary Feedback from Focus Group Discussions
Taxpayer Education and Knowledge of Taxpayers on Local Revenue Streams
  Focus groups in the city councils have some knowledge of the revenue administra-
tion provision by local councils in the LGA of 2004 and have some knowledge of 
the reasons for paying taxes (e.g., to undertake development programs and pay 
salaries). The opposite is true for residents in the district council jurisdictions.
  Receipts, whether valid or not, are issued for all taxes paid by residents. 
  For daily market fee collection, sellers are indiﬀerent about demanding receipts 
from fee collectors—and always deal with the same fee collectors.
  Fiscal year 2006 receipt books were issued for 2007 local tax collection.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
Local tax Property tax Market dues
Other fees and charges Licences
2005 2006 2007 2008
In
 S
LL
 b
ill
io
n
Years
166
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
Service Delivery
  Focus groups in the districts are less informed and have mixed feelings of the 
kind of services provided by either local councils and/or NGOs.
  Local councils do provide services that range from the construction of court 
barries, earth closet latrines, culverts, small bridges, public toilets, markets, 
schools, and solid waste management including cleaning the city, etc., as 
admitted by focus groups in the city councils. 
  The willingness to pay local taxes should be matched with improved public 
services in the form of safe drinking water, electricity, good health facilities, etc. 
Compliance
  The assessments of some of the tax systems are complex, subjective, and ineq-
uitable (property tax and business licenses). Average daily market fees at SLL 
300 accumulated for the year (SLL 86,400) may exceed licenses paid annually 
for some businesses. 
  There is excessive burden on taxpayers (NRA, local, and chiefdom councils) and 
double taxation resulted in resistance to pay or taxpayers overburdened with all 
kind of taxes. 
Trust, Ethics, and Standards of Tax Collectors
  Tax collectors are dishonest in accounting for local revenues collected.
  Complaints to local/chiefdom councils about dishonest tax collectors are 
normally treated with levity.
  The commitment of tax collectors to work is associated with the expected 
personal gains. 
4.2.2 Summary Feedback from Discussions with the Business 
  Community
Socio-Economic Characteristics of Business/Taxpayers
  Owners/suppliers of businesses are either Sierra Leoneans or foreign-based 
nationals like Lebanese or Indians. 
  Businesses are classiﬁed by both NRA and local councils into small, medium, 
and large-size but has no measurable guide to determine what constitutes a 
small, medium, and/or large business.
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  Businesses pay licenses to both the NRA and local councils.
  Some businesses in Bo and Kenema cities admitted having knowledge of plans by 
these city council to design a system to equitably administer licenses and rates.
Taxpayer Education and Knowledge of Business Taxpayers
  License ﬁeld oﬃcers receive both cash and checks and issue receipts on the spot 
for businesses. Small businesses in the district councils are indiﬀerent about 
asking or receipts—and always deal with the same set of collectors. 
  Licenses are either paid in cash at the revenue department section of the councils 
and/or the banks. The latter is applicable for Bo and Freetown city councils. 
  The amounts businesses pay varies depending on the size, type of product, and 
category of the business. Large, medium, and/or small businesses pay licenses 
to both the NRA and local councils ranging from SLL 50,000 to SLL 500,000 
per annum.
  Local councils hardly reach out in the chiefdoms to collect licenses and chief-
doms having been doing this for their own use. 
Service Delivery
  Business taxpayers have not been informed of services provided by either local 
councils and/or the NRA.
  The quality of services provided by each council is questionable and has had no 
direct impact on business owners.
  There is excessive burden on business taxpayers. Both the NRA and local coun-
cils collect licenses. There is need to harmonize license rates so that one entity 
handles the collections.preferably the entity that will be easily held accountable 
—i.e., the local councils. 
Compliance
  There is willingness to pay licenses and other fees and charges if the proceeds 
are development related and directly linked to service delivery. 
  There is excessive burden on business taxpayers and small businesses admitted that 
they should not be taxed as most of what they earn is for the most basic survival.
Trust, Ethics, and Standards
  Revenue collectors are impartial but do not conform to the attributes of sincerity, 
professionalism, and honesty.
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  Collectors often visit all categories of businesses and in the process have become 
permanent friends. Collectors do accept gifts from businesses. 
  There are no instances where collectors use business information for personal 
or private gains, or disclose information about clients to third parties. 
4.2.3 Summary Feedback from Discussions with Local and Chiefdom
  Council Oﬃcials
Personnel Size 
Table 4.2 depicts the total average personnel of the local and chiefdom councils visited 
in the course of this study. 
Table 4.2
Personnel of Local Councils
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Freetown city 367 130 75 1,164.69 55.99 3,288.00
Bo city 167 64 31 118.80 57.54 310.00
Kenema city 135 42 41 93.33 91.11 300.00
Makeni city 56 — 29 — 23.30 45.00
Kenema district 21 — 9 — 16.71 39.00
Dama chiefdom 22 1 5 1.20 7.72 31.90
General Administration of Local Own Revenues 
  The most important and lucrative revenue sources for all the city councils are: 
market fees, property rates, licenses, and other fees and charges. 
  Market fees, property rates, and licenses are solely collected and accounted for 
by revenue collectors of the city councils. 
  Revenue collectors for the local district and chiefdom councils are mostly 
chiefdom functionaries, but many, especially treasury clerks, chiefdom police, 
etc., have gone without their salaries for over 24 months. 
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  The introduction of the decentralization policy in 2004 somehow resulted in the 
neglect of the chiefdom councils by the ministry responsible for local govern-
ment especially in regards to the central government’s payment of subventions 
and/or grants-in-aid.
  Assessment of these local own revenues was subjective, and the councils relied 
solely on collectors to collect and account for these revenues. 
  No concrete enforcement mechanisms has been put in place by the councils 
to ensure payment of the key local revenue sources. However, the process of 
developing bylaws is in progress.
  The cities of Freetown and Bo have embarked on the closure of business entities 
that refuse to pay licenses. In addition, Bo is taking defaulters to court for the 
nonpayment of property tax. 
  Bookkeeping is poor in the chiefdom in question and there are discrepancies 
between bank statements and bookkeeping records. 
  Poor cash management was an outstanding feature in the chiefdom with the 
signatories to the account from the chiefdom having no idea of the amounts 
held with the banks. 
Local Tax
  Much local tax revenue was neither collected nor accounted for by chiefdom 
functionaries (paramount chiefs, treasury clerks, and/or the central chiefdom 
ﬁnance clerks.
  Collected local taxes are either paid directly into the respective chiefdom’s account 
or held by the treasury clerk and/or the paramount chiefs for safekeeping and 
later deposited into the bank. 
  Local tax precepts for the councils are determined from the amounts deposited 
in the respectively bank accounts of the chiefdoms, of which the chief admin-
istrator of the district local council in question is a signatory. 
  In 2008, a unilateral decision was taken by the minister responsible for local 
government to withhold precepts due to the city and district local councils. The 
withheld precept was claimed to be partly used to oﬀset salary arrears of key 
chiefdom functionaries.
Market Fees
  The collection of market fees have been marked by an increase in the operating 
cost of doing so. 
  In 2005, Makeni city contracted out the collection of market fees without doing 
a thorough assessment of the markets’ potential. Over time, the contracted ﬁrm 
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was unable to meet its negotiated obligation to the council because of direct 
interference of some council personnel including councilors in the administra-
tion of the markets. The new council administration that took over in July 2008 
reversed the decision and undertook an assessment of all markets in the city 
before awarding the contract. The result has been a somewhat increased collection 
of market fees reported by the contractor compared to previous arrangement. 
Property Tax and Business Licenses
  The Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) and the UNDP 
support to the development of the property cadastre and business licensing 
registers in the cities of Makeni, Kenema, and Bo has resulted in the councils 
having updated information on properties and businesses. The councils have 
reported improved collection of rates and licenses.
  IRCBP support was further extended to the capital Freetown. Over 80,000 new 
properties and 7,000 new businesses have been discovered and documented. 
Fiscal year 2010 will see Freetown city reporting improved collection of rates 
and licenses.
  Similar support will be extended to other city and district local councils in the 
medium term.
Mining Revenues
  Assessment of mining revenues varies depending on the type of mining. 
  Small-scale mining is assessed based on the number of licenses oﬃcially issued. 
  The assessment of large-scale mining (diamond, rutile, etc.) is unpredictable 
in a sense that the amounts mining companies pay to chiefdoms, landowners, 
and local councils are not ﬁxed and vary signiﬁcantly. 
  There are no records of chiefdoms’ share of mining revenues, including landowners.
  A large share of the proceeds from the mining area community development 
fund, after being assessed by the ministry responsible for local government, 
goes directly into the chiefdom council’s development account, of which the 
principal signatory is the paramount chief. 
Service Delivery
  Services provided using local own revenues are meager. 
  About 75 percent of what is reported as local own revenues, plus the admin-
istrative grants received from central government, is spent on the day-to-day 
running of the council administration. 
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  The key services provided by the councils are mainly from grants tied to the 
implementation of speciﬁc devolved services (education, primary and secondary 
healthcare, agriculture, solid waste management, etc.), plus projects using the 
Local Government Development Grant (LGDG). Projects implemented using 
the LGDG include, among others, road rehabilitation, construction of small 
culverts and bridges, and the construction and furnishing of schools. 
  Citizens’ perception about the outcomes of service delivery programs is mixed, 
but opines that service provision across all sectors should be signiﬁcantly 
improved, especially the provision of services that are visible and whose impact 
is immediately felt. 
4.2.4 Feedback from Discussions with NRA Staﬀ and Oﬃcials of RGD
NRA
  Central government revenue sources are: customs and excise duties, income tax, 
road user charges, and nontax revenues, which include royalties from mines and 
marine resources, etc. 
  The NRA Act states all monies collected by collectors should be deposited in 
the government’s Consolidated Fund. 
  Nontax revenue sources in the districts are collected by NRA collectors. 
  NRA lacks the staﬀ and logistics to reach other areas in the districts to collect 
revenues. 
  Collectors in the districts are faced with numerous problems, ranging from 
collusion with local council collectors in collecting most nontax revenue sources, 
to resistance from taxpayers to paying these taxes (especially where there is 
perceived to be double taxation). 
  Complaints with regards duplication in collection have mounted and have 
become a concern to NRA head oﬃce. 
RGD
  The Registrar General’s oﬃce principally located in Freetown is solely responsible 
for the registration of businesses that intend to operate within the country and 
the issuing of business licenses. 
  The presence of the RGD in the local councils is limited.  
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  Businesses operating in the local council jurisdictions are supposed to ﬁrst 
register with the RGD and then later pay licenses to either the NRA or the local 
councils (or both). 
  In some local council areas it appears that certain businesses register with the local 
councils and pay licenses to both the NRA and local councils when approached. 
  RGD staﬀ have very little knowledge of the kinds of revenues administered and 
services provided by local councils. 
  The level of collaboration between the RGD staﬀ and the local councils, especially 
the Freetown City Council where the oﬃce is principally located, is minimal. 
The department is more associated with the NRA than FCC. 
5. POLICY OPTIONS, EVALUATION CRITERIA, CONCLUSIONS, 
 AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This part consider all possible options that are available to address local taxation issues 
of the informal economy—that is, what is currently been done, what others have sug-
gested, and  some objective suggestions in addressing the problems. Each option among 
all possible options selected to address the problem is evaluated and the preferred op-
tion was chosen that led to a reasonable conclusion on the impact of local taxation on 
informal economies with general and speciﬁc recommendations on the way forward.
5.1 Policy Options and Evaluation Criteria
Through brainstorming and consultations with key stakeholders in local and central 
government, the recommended option is to harmonize and rationalize the legal provi-
sions and improve the administration of the already existing local own revenue sources. 
Five evaluation criteria were adopted to compare the baseline scenario (where there 
is no change in policy) against the chosen policy option. These are: 
  eﬃciency, 
  eﬀectiveness,
  equity, 
  administrative ease, and 
  legal issues.  
173
S i e r r a  L e o n e
Ta
bl
e 4
.3
O
ut
co
m
e 
M
at
rix
 E
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
Po
lic
y 
O
pt
io
ns
 
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
 c
ri
te
ri
a
Th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
sc
en
ar
io
N
o
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
p
o
lic
y9
H
ar
m
o
n
iz
e 
an
d
 r
at
io
n
al
iz
e 
th
e 
le
g
al
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
an
d
 im
p
ro
ve
 t
h
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
al
re
ad
y 
ex
is
ti
n
g
 lo
ca
l o
w
n
 r
ev
en
u
e 
so
u
rc
es
1
0
Ef
ﬁ
ci
en
cy
1.
 R
at
io
 o
f a
ve
ra
ge
 co
sts
 o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
to
 
lo
ca
l o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 g
en
er
at
ed
  
a.
 L
oc
al
 ta
x
R
at
io
 o
f a
ve
ra
ge
 c
os
t o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
to
 
av
er
ag
e 
lo
ca
l t
ax
 g
en
er
at
ed
48
.6
%
St
re
ng
th
en
 su
pe
rv
isi
on
 o
ve
r c
hi
ef
do
m
s t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e,
 c
ol
le
ct
, a
nd
 
ac
co
un
t f
or
 th
e 
fu
ll 
po
te
nt
ia
l o
f t
hi
s r
ev
en
ue
 so
ur
ce
.
b.
 P
ro
pe
rt
y 
ta
x
R
at
io
 o
f a
ve
ra
ge
 c
os
t o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
to
 
av
er
ag
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 ta
x 
ge
ne
ra
te
d
32
.8
%
In
ve
st 
in
 d
et
er
m
in
in
g 
th
e 
ba
se
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 re
al
ist
ic
 e
sti
m
at
es
 o
f t
he
 
po
te
nt
ia
l. 
M
or
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
, a
da
pt
 th
e 
ex
ist
in
g 
pr
op
er
ty
 ta
x 
an
d 
bu
si-
ne
ss
 li
ce
ns
es
 re
fo
rm
 to
 o
th
er
 lo
ca
l c
ou
nc
ils
. A
lso
 p
ro
vi
de
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 
fo
r c
ol
le
ct
or
s, 
bu
t a
ny
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
os
t o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
le
ss
 
th
an
 p
ro
po
rt
io
na
te
 to
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 ra
te
s c
ol
le
ct
ed
.
c. 
M
ar
ke
t f
ee
s
R
at
io
 o
f a
ve
ra
ge
 c
os
t o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
to
 
av
er
ag
e 
m
ar
ke
t d
ue
s g
en
er
at
ed
82
.6
%
C
on
tr
ac
t o
ut
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
of
 m
ar
ke
t f
ee
s a
fte
r a
 c
om
pr
eh
en
siv
e 
as
se
ss
-
m
en
t o
f a
ll 
m
ar
ke
ts 
in
 th
e 
lo
ca
lit
ie
s.
d.
 L
ic
en
se
s
R
at
io
 o
f a
ve
ra
ge
 c
os
t o
f c
ol
le
ct
io
n 
to
 
av
er
ag
e 
lic
en
se
s g
en
er
at
ed
21
.2
%
In
ve
st 
in
 d
et
er
m
in
in
g 
th
e b
as
e, 
in
clu
di
ng
 re
ali
sti
c e
sti
m
at
es
 o
f t
he
 p
ot
en
-
tia
l. 
M
or
e s
pe
cif
ica
lly
 ad
ap
t t
he
 ex
ist
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 to
 o
th
er
 lo
ca
l c
ou
nc
ils
. 
Al
so
 p
ro
vi
de
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r c
ol
lec
to
rs 
bu
t a
ny
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 co
st 
of
 co
lle
c-
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e l
es
s t
ha
n 
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 li
ce
ns
es
 co
lle
ct
ed
.
174
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
Ev
al
u
at
io
n
 c
ri
te
ri
a
Th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
sc
en
ar
io
N
o
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
p
o
lic
y9
H
ar
m
o
n
iz
e 
an
d
 r
at
io
n
al
iz
e 
th
e 
le
g
al
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
an
d
 im
p
ro
ve
 t
h
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
al
re
ad
y 
ex
is
ti
n
g
 lo
ca
l o
w
n
 r
ev
en
u
e 
so
u
rc
es
1
0
2.
 A
ve
ra
ge
 re
ve
nu
e p
er
 ca
pi
ta
 
(r
at
io
 o
f l
oc
al
 o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 to
 to
ta
l 
po
pu
la
tio
n)
SL
L 
90
8.
88
 
En
su
re
 th
at
 lo
ca
l o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 g
en
er
at
ed
 in
cr
ea
se
 p
ro
po
rt
io
na
te
ly
 
m
or
e 
th
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 p
op
ul
at
io
n.
 E
.g
. i
f p
op
ul
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
X
%
, 
lo
ca
l r
ev
en
ue
 g
en
er
at
ed
 sh
ou
ld
 in
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
m
or
e 
th
an
 X
%
.
3.
 G
ro
w
th
 r
at
e i
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 fr
om
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r 
to
 th
e c
ur
re
nt
 y
ea
r 
(i
n 
re
al
 te
rm
s)
Lo
ca
l t
ax
—
6.
4%
Pr
op
er
ty
 ra
te
s—
14
9.
4%
M
ar
ke
t f
ee
s—
26
.7
%
Bu
sin
es
s l
ic
en
se
s—
3.
6%
M
ai
nt
ai
n 
a 
ste
ad
y 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 in
 re
ve
nu
es
 fr
om
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r t
o 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t y
ea
r. 
T
he
 in
cr
ea
se
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 o
ffs
et
 
an
y 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
su
m
er
 p
ric
es
.
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
1.
 R
at
io
 o
f a
ct
ua
l l
oc
al
 o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 
re
po
rt
ed
 to
 th
e a
ve
ra
ge
 y
ea
rl
y 
bu
dg
et
 es
tim
at
es
Lo
ca
l t
ax
—
31
.1
%
Pr
op
er
ty
 ra
te
s—
34
.4
%
M
ar
ke
t f
ee
s—
72
.3
%
Bu
sin
es
s l
ic
en
se
s—
55
.5
%
In
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f a
ll 
lo
ca
l o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 re
po
rt
ed
 to
 th
e 
bu
dg
et
 
es
tim
at
es
 to
 a
t l
ea
st 
85
–9
0%
 a
nd
 b
ud
ge
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 
on
 re
lia
bl
e 
an
d 
re
ad
ily
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
da
ta
.
2.
 R
at
io
 o
f a
ct
ua
l l
oc
al
 o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 
re
po
rt
ed
 to
 th
e e
sti
m
at
ed
 fu
ll 
po
te
n-
tia
l r
ev
en
ue
s
Lo
ca
l t
ax
—
15
.7
%
Pr
op
er
ty
 ra
te
s—
10
.5
%
M
ar
ke
t f
ee
s—
6.
5%
Bu
sin
es
s l
ic
en
se
s—
15
.3
%
In
ve
st 
in
 d
et
er
m
in
in
g 
th
e 
ba
se
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 re
al
ist
ic
 e
sti
m
at
es
 o
f t
he
 
po
te
nt
ia
l. 
In
cr
ea
se
 lo
gi
sti
cs
 a
nd
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 to
 ta
x 
of
fic
ia
ls 
to
 c
ol
le
ct
 a
t l
ea
st 
85
%
 
of
 th
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 fu
ll 
po
te
nt
ia
l.
3.
 L
ik
el
y 
ex
te
nt
 o
f t
ax
 ev
as
io
n 
an
d 
fr
au
d 
by
 ta
x 
of
fic
ia
ls
Su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l b
ut
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 
un
kn
ow
n.
Im
pr
ov
e 
on
 se
ns
iti
za
tio
n 
of
 re
sid
en
ts 
on
 n
ee
d 
to
 p
ay
 ta
xe
s a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 
to
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 in
 re
tu
rn
. A
lso
 st
re
ng
th
en
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
on
 ta
x 
co
lle
ct
io
n.
 A
lso
 in
cr
ea
se
 re
m
un
er
at
io
n 
to
 ta
x 
of
fic
ia
ls 
an
d 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r i
m
pr
ov
ed
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n.
Ta
bl
e 4
.3
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
175
S i e r r a  L e o n e
4.
 T
he
 e
xt
en
t o
f t
ax
 co
llu
sio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e t
ax
pa
ye
r 
an
d 
th
e o
ffi
ci
al
 
  
Po
or
 co
nd
iti
on
s o
f s
er
vi
ce
 o
f t
ax
 
of
fic
ial
s (
ch
ief
do
m
 fu
nc
tio
na
rie
s 
ha
ve
 g
on
e w
ith
ou
t s
ala
rie
s f
or
 
ov
er
 2
4 
m
on
th
s).
 A
lso
, s
ala
rie
s o
f 
lo
ca
l c
ou
nc
ils
 st
af
f a
re
 v
er
y 
lo
w.
 
  
Im
pr
op
er
/su
bj
ec
tiv
e a
sse
ssm
en
t 
of
 th
e a
m
ou
nt
 o
f l
ic
en
se
s a
nd
 
ra
te
s p
ai
d 
on
 b
us
in
es
se
s a
nd
 
pr
op
er
tie
s, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.
Fo
rm
 a
 c
hi
ef
do
m
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
po
lic
y 
w
ith
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 
ch
ie
fd
om
 fi
na
nc
ia
l r
ev
ie
w
 to
 u
nd
er
sta
nd
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f c
hi
ef
do
m
 
fin
an
ce
—
w
ha
t i
s b
ei
ng
 fi
na
nc
ed
 a
nd
 h
ow
, a
nd
 w
ha
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
fin
an
ce
d 
in
 th
e 
fu
tu
re
 a
nd
 h
ow
?
5.
 R
at
io
 o
f a
ct
ua
l t
o 
bu
dg
et
ed
 tr
an
sfe
rs
55
–6
5%
Eq
u
it
y 
an
d
 N
eu
tr
al
it
y
1.
 N
eu
tr
al
ity
 –
 n
o 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 h
ow
 th
e t
ax
 sy
ste
m
 is
 
co
nd
uc
te
d
D
iff
er
en
t r
at
es
 fo
r d
iff
er
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s a
nd
 o
r b
us
in
es
se
s. 
T
he
 
de
ci
sio
n 
is 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
an
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
of
 ta
x 
of
fic
ia
ls.
2.
 T
he
 e
xt
en
t o
f d
ou
bl
e t
ax
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 a
ct
or
s
C
on
fli
ct
in
g 
pr
ov
isi
on
s i
n 
th
e 
LG
A 
 o
f 2
00
4 
an
d 
th
e 
gu
id
el
in
es
 
iss
ue
d 
by
 th
e 
m
in
ist
ry
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 
fo
r l
oc
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
n 
re
ve
nu
e 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
an
d 
sh
ar
in
g.
H
ar
m
on
ize
 a
nd
 re
pe
al
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 in
 o
th
er
 le
gi
sla
tio
ns
 
(in
co
m
e 
ta
x,
 to
ur
ism
, f
ac
to
ry
 a
nd
 fo
re
str
y 
ac
ts,
 e
tc
.),
 to
 b
e 
co
ns
ist
en
t 
w
ith
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 in
 th
e 
LG
A 
of
 2
00
4.
 
3.
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e o
f t
ax
 th
at
 is
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
e p
ro
vi
sio
n
Be
tw
ee
n 
15
–2
0%
En
su
re
 th
at
 c
ou
nc
ils
 b
ud
ge
t u
se
 a
t l
ea
st 
60
–7
0%
 o
f l
oc
al
 o
w
n 
re
ve
nu
es
 fo
r d
ire
ct
 se
rv
ic
e 
de
liv
er
y 
be
fo
re
 b
ud
ge
t i
s a
pp
ro
ve
d.
4.
 I
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l a
nd
 te
ch
ni
ca
l c
ap
ac
ity
Lo
w
 in
sti
tu
tio
na
l a
nd
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 to
 d
el
iv
er
 o
n 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
an
d 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 se
rv
ic
es
. 
Pr
ov
  id
e 
bo
th
 d
em
an
d-
 a
nd
 su
pp
ly
-d
riv
en
 c
ap
ac
ity
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
pr
og
ra
m
s f
or
 a
ll 
lo
ca
l s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
de
vo
lv
ed
 st
af
f a
s a
n 
on
go
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s.
176
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
Because of the continued commitment from donors (World Bank, EU, and DfID) 
to support the ongoing decentralization process, a premium was not put on the associ-
ated cost as an evaluation criterion. Also, because of the government’s commitment to 
fast track the smooth implementation of the decentralizing process as articulated in 
the country’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS II)—The Agenda for Change, 
in addition to the benchmarks set by the said donors for the government to protect 
the decentralization agenda, the political acceptability as evaluation criteria is also not 
considered. Analysis of the current and chosen policy options is shown in Table 4.3. The 
analysis is limited to the key revenue sources that are largely collected from informal 
sector that impact on the poor and middle-income groups (local tax, property rates, 
market fees, and licenses).
5.2 Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study on local taxation of informal economies in Sierra 
Leone sought to examine how local taxes are administered, in terms of eﬃciency, eﬀec-
tiveness, and equity, by local councils in the local economy, much of which is informal. 
Local taxation has failed to generate suﬃcient revenues for the improvement and 
expansion of public services in Sierra Leone. Relatively straightforward legislative and 
administrative changes to address insuﬃcient revenue collection would help increase 
revenues while also bringing public services to local communities that are in desperate 
need of better schools and healthcare. International donors have been supportive of this 
through a general trend towards decentralization in Sierra Leone, while the government 
has struggled to implement these changes through parallel layers of local councils and 
chiefdoms that also hold an important function in Sierra Leonean society.
 
5.3 Recommendations
Improving the administration of local own revenues and improving public service 
delivery would imply the following tasks if improvements are to be made, allowing 
for a widespread improvement in the lives of citizens involved in both the formal and 
informal economy of Sierra Leone:
 1. Invest in determining the revenue bases of the local taxes including realistic 
estimates of the revenue potentials. More speciﬁcally adapt the existing property 
tax and business licenses reform and should be rollout to other local councils. 
The reform has worked (see Annex 4—a case study of Bo City Council).
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 2. The city councils should contract out the collection of some of the local 
revenue sources like market fees. The burden of increased collection cost will 
shift to the contractor and eventually reduce the pressure on the respective 
council’s payroll. 
 3. Embark on a massive public campaign to inform residents of the need to pay 
taxes and the public services to be provided in return. 
 4. Strengthen enforcement mechanisms on tax collection through establishing 
local bylaws.
 5. Form a chiefdom governance policy with speciﬁc reference to chiefdom ﬁnancial 
review to understand the nature of chiefdom ﬁnance—what is being ﬁnanced 
and how, and what should be ﬁnanced in the future and how. 
 6. Review and repeal the provisions in other legislation to be consistent with provi-
sions in the LGA of 2004. By educating and sensitizing the public as to the 
changes and expectations in Sierra Leonean tax law, residents will know who 
should collect what and which services should be provided by whom.
 7. Ensure that councils budget use at least 60–70 percent of local own revenues 
for direct service delivery before approval. 
 8. Provide both demand- and supply-driven capacity building programs for all 
local stakeholders, including the devolved staﬀ as an ongoing process.
Speciﬁc Recommendations Include:
 1. The assessment of shared revenue should be jointly done by the local and 
chiefdom councils using section/village chiefs based on the available data on 
eligible local taxpayers and the number of markets.
 2. After assessment, the local councils should announce the number of eligible 
local taxpayers for every chiefdom and the amount each chiefdom/local council 
shall receive if the eligible taxpayers pay.
 3. The cost of printing shared revenue receipt books should be jointly determined 
and ﬁnanced.
 4. The requisition for the printing of local tax receipts should be sent to the govern-
ment printer at least three months before the end of every ﬁnancial year so that 
distribution of local tax receipts starts in January each year.
 5. Whilst the chiefdoms are collecting the revenues using either treasury clerks 
and or section/town chiefs, the local councils should provide an adequate 
supervisory role. 
178
L O C A L  T A X A T I O N  A N D  I N F O R M A L  E C O N O M I E S
 6. Local tax precepts payments by the chiefdoms should be done on a quarterly 
basis so service provision is not derailed by the local councils. 
 7. There will, however, be a further increase in the cost of administering the tax 
by both the local and chiefdom councils. One should ensure that any increase 
in cost should be less than proportionate to the proceeds of the tax collection 
at the maximum compliance rate, hence the overall increase in the ratio of local 
tax collection to the costs of collection.
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ANNEX 1
Table 4.4
Actual Revenues of all 19 Local Councils in Sierra Leone 2005–2008
In SLL billion, unless otherwise indicated
Revenue source 2005 2006 2007 2008 Growth rate 
average 
percent 
per year 
(2005–2008)
Tax Revenues 1.49 1.17 1.19 3.02  
 Local Tax 1.20 0.31 0.30 1.43 6.4%
 Property Rates 0.29 0.86 0.89 1.59 149.4%
Nontax Revenues 3.22 4.65 2.53 5.29
 Fees and Charges 1.09 2.22 1.49 2.66 48.0%
  Market Dues 0.96 2.01 1.14 1.73 26.7%
  Other Fees and Charges 0.13 0.21 0.35 0.93 205.1%
 Business Registration 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 11.1%
 Licenses 1.48 0.34 0.20 1.64 3.6%
 Mining Royalties 0.57 1.85 0.52 0.56 –0.6%
 Others local revenues11 0.05 0.22 0.30 0.39 226.7%
Total Local Own Revenues 4.71 5.82 3.72 8.31 25.5%
Total Central Government Transfers 17.99 26.95 19.30 56.82 71.9%
Total central government budgeted 
transfers
26.50 44.70 54.20 67.80 51.9%
Total Revenues 22.70 32.77 23.02 65.13 62.3%
Administrative expenses (personnel 
(excluding councillors sitting fees and 
allowances) and non-personnel)
3.89 5.13 3.22 13.07
Local own revenues as share of total 
revenue
20.7% 17.8% 16.2% 12.8%
Actual transfers to budgeted transfers 67.9% 60.3% 35.6% 83.8%
Price Index (2000 = 100) 138.67 140.12 166.84 190.42 12.4%
Local own revenues at 2004 prices  4.6  5.6  3.0  5.9 9.5%
Total transfers  17.6  26.1  15.7  40.6 43.3%
Total revenues at 2004 prices  22.3  31.8  18.8  46.5 36.3%
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Revenue Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 Growth rate 
average 
percent 
per year 
(2005–2008)
Population (thousands)  5,095  5,217  5,343  5,474 2.5%
Local own revenue per capita at 
constant 2004 prices (Leones)
906.26 1,082.25 567.23 1,083.77 6.5%
Total revenues per capita at constant 
2004 prices (Leones)
4,367.74 6,093.68 3,510.10 8,494.08 31.5%
Central government domestic revenues 416.00 495.60 536.90 692.70
Total central government revenues 727.90 1,351.20 2,129.30 1,060.90
Nominal GDP 2,894.30 4,213.70 4,969.80 5,873.40
Total transfers as share of central 
government domestic revenues
4.3% 5.4% 3.6% 8.2%
Total transfers as share of central 
government revenues
2.5% 2.0% 0.9% 5.4%
Administrative expenses as share of 
local own revenues
82.6% 88.1% 86.6% 157.3%
Local own revenues as share of central 
government domestic revenues
1.13% 1.17% 0.69% 1.20%
Local own revenues as % of GDP 0.16% 0.14% 0.07% 0.14%
Total revenues as share of central 
government domestic revenues
5.46% 6.61% 4.29% 9.40%
Total revenues as % of GDP 0.78% 0.78% 0.46% 1.11%
Notes: Annual average growth rates calculated as the diﬀerence between year 1 and year 4 divided by 
3; strictly speaking, this is an approximation, and can be misleading if the ﬁrst or last years are 
abnormal; (the true average annual rate should be calculated using least-squares method).
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ANNEX 4 
Case Study of the Revenue Reform in Bo City Council
Property tax and business licenses reform has worked in the city of Bo 
Objective of Reform
Introduce an assessment of all properties and businesses so that a fair system of taxation 
can be implemented. 
The success of the property assessment system depends on the cumulative perfor-
mance of ﬁve critical steps: discovery, assessment, billing, sensitization, and collection; 
and hinges on fairness and progression.
Bo 
In November 2008, the following results were achieved.
  Demand notices printed and distributed in January 2009. 
  The total amount billed for property taxes was SLL 630 million against an 
estimate of SLL 180 million for the year.
  As at end June 2009, SLL 350 million was collected compared to SLL 84.9 
million reported for the whole of ﬁscal year 2008.
Freetown 
The data collection of properties and businesses has recorded over 100,000 properties 
and 30,000 businesses compared to less than 44,000 properties and 5,000 businesses 
reported in ﬁscal year 2008. The billing system for properties and businesses will be 
done by end of ﬁscal year 2009. Demand notices will be printed and issued during the 
ﬁrst quarter of ﬁscal year 2010.
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ANNEX 5
Explanatory Notes on Key Assumptions for the Estimation of the 
Full Potentials of Key Revenue Sources and the 3 Es (Efﬁciency, 
Effectiveness, and Equity)
Local Tax
 
 Estimated taxpayer population was based on 2004 statistic ﬁgures on ages 21 
and above for all local council areas.
  FCC and WARDC were treated separately from the rest of the local councils 
because local tax is not shared in these two councils.
  The full potential of this revenue source was based on a 90 percent compliance 
rate.
  Cost of collecting local tax = salaries of stakeholders involved in assessment and 
collection at chiefdom level (treasury clerks, central chiefdom ﬁnance clerks, 
and chiefdom police) + rebates to section and town chiefs) + cost of printing 
local tax receipt books.
  On average, 4–5 percent of the proceeds of local tax collected go as rebates to 
section and or village/town chiefs.
  Average salary of treasury clerk per annum is SLL 1.8 million and that of the 
central chiefdom ﬁnance clerks is SLL 2.4 million.
  The collection of local tax in Freetown City Coucil is contracted to internship 
students, ward committee members, etc., for a fee of ﬁve percent per receipt 
administered.
  The collection of local tax in WARDC is contracted to tribal heads for a fee of 
ﬁve percent per receipt administered.
  Bo city, Kenema city, and Makeni city councils are not involved in local tax 
collection because chiefdoms are located within the respective jurisdictions.
  The full potential of this revenue source was estimated at a 90-percent compli-
ance rate.
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Property Tax
  Estimated number of properties for Makeni, Bo, and Kenema cities is known. 
However, estimated number of properties for Freetown and WARD C was based 
on the average number of housing units estimated by the Statistics Oﬃce of 
Sierra Leone.
  For the district councils the focus was on structures situated in the chiefdom 
headquarter towns that are assessable (estimated), multiplied by the number of 
chiefdoms.
  Cost of collecting property tax = salaries of bailiﬀs and valuation staﬀ of the 
city councils including WARD C + salaries of estimated number of valuation 
staﬀ in the district councils, where applicable + cost of printing and distributing 
demand notices where applicable.
  The full potential of this revenue source was estimated at a 90-percent compli-
ance rate.
Market Fees
  It is assumed that dues are collected from traders in the markets from and street 
vendors. 
  Two-thirds of the projected 2008 population is assumed to be the taxpayer 
population.
  Given the complex structure in administering this revenue source, it is assumed 
that the informal sector comprise of on average one-ﬁfth of the taxpayer popula-
tion of the city councils and one-tenth of the taxpayer population of the district 
councils.
  Cost of collecting market dues = salaries of market fee collectors of the city 
councils including WARD C but excluding Makeni city + salaries of estimated 
number dues collectors in the district councils + cost of printing market fee 
receipt books, where applicable. 
  The full potential of this revenue source was estimated at a 90-percent compli-
ance rate.
Business Licenses
  The estimated number of businesses for the cities of Makeni, Bo, and Kenema 
are known. However, the estimated number of businesses for Freetown and 
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WARD C was based on an adjustment factor by the number of businesses in 
Bo, for instance (second city). Example, the size of businesses in Freetown is X 
times the number of businesses in Bo city.
  Cost of collecting business licenses = salaries of license collectors of the city 
councils including WARD C + salaries of estimated number of staﬀ collecting 
licenses for the district councils. 
  The full potential of this revenue source was estimated at 90 percent compliance 
rate.
NOTES
1 LGFC is a statutory committee responsible to recommend to the minister responsible for ﬁnance the 
amount of grant allocations to each local council and indicate the formulae used in arriving at the 
various amounts recommended.
2 2004 Statistics Sierra Leone Population Estimated Data.
3 Sierra Leone Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (SL–IPRS) Paper.
4 The ﬁnances, assets, and personnel should accompany all functions outlined in the Statutory 
Instrument that should transferred to the local councils.
5 C. Magbaily Fyle (1988) History and Socioeconomic Development in Sierra Leone. A SLADEA 
Publication. pp 149–179.
6 Ward committee is established by the LGA 2004 and comprise of the councilor of the Ward, the 
Paramount Chief in the locality where the Ward is located and 10 other members, at least ﬁve of 
which should be women resident in the Ward. The primary responsibilities of this committee are to 
mobilize residents of the ward for the implementation of self-help and development projects and 
provide a focal point for the discussion of local problems and needs.
7 Represents 0.75 percent of the three percent of the export value of any diamond oﬃcially exported 
from the territory of Sierra Leone.
8 This is a fund that was accumulated since colonial rule by the British government in return for the 
services provided by Sierra Leoneans working then for the city council. This fund is now called 
the development fund after the Freetown City Council started paying National Social Security and 
Insurant Trust (NaSSIT) beneﬁt for its workers.
9 Estimation of ﬁgures for the revenue sources are found in Annex 1.
10 Estimation of the actual cost of collecting the key revenue sources and the potential of these revenue 
sources that directly impact on informal sector is found in Annexes 2 and 3 and explanatory notes on 
the key assumptions are found in Annex 5.
11 Excludes the SLL 7.16 billion transferred to FCC from the Crown Agent Account in FY 2008.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study on the local taxation of the informal sector in Ukraine provides a number 
of eﬀective solutions to the scarcity of own revenue sources of local governments and 
their low ability to increase revenues from taxes and duties because of the high share of 
the informal sector in the Ukrainian economy. Potentially signiﬁcant revenues could 
be received from the informal sector through personal income tax (PIT) and local taxes 
and duties. Being a minor revenue source, local taxes and duties are still not under 
extensive discussion among academics and ﬁscal practitioners in Ukraine, who mainly 
concentrate on state ﬁscal assistance and shared revenues. Another problematic issue 
regarding the local taxation of the informal economy is the absence of comprehensive 
property taxation. Increasing the local taxation of the informal sector is a useful instru-
ment for raising local revenues, and thus ﬁscal autonomy, in order to make local ﬁscal 
management more eﬀective. It is especially important for the small communities in 
rural areas whose needs traditionally are skipped by “big” ﬁscal policy. 
Local governments (LGs) in Ukraine operate under little ﬁscal discretion and suﬀer 
from a scarcity of own ﬁnancial resources, which is very typical of transition economies 
(Davey 2002, Horváth 2000, and Sevic 2006). Economies in transition like Ukraine’s 
deliver a very clear example about how the revenue system characteristic of the com-
mand economy transforms into one that is consistent with the market economy and 
decentralized decision-making. Indeed, the unfavorable ﬁnancial condition of local 
governments in Ukraine is more aggravated by the signiﬁcant share of the informal 
sector in the country, which causes great losses of potential revenues for local budgets. 
According to the MEU1 in 2007, its volume was 39 percent of oﬃcial GDP. The peak 
was back in 1997, when it was 65.8 percent of GDP. The issue of bringing the unoﬃcial 
economy out of the shadows becomes extremely important in light of the changes to 
tax legislation that came into eﬀect in 2004. The expectation was that ensuing budget 
losses would largely be compensated for by business and individual incomes coming 
out of the shadows. As it turns out, lowering tax rates in this situation is a necessary 
but insuﬃcient condition. 
The base and the benchmark for this paper is a profound analysis of the current 
system of local taxes and duties in order to examine the current situation with revenues 
of local governments in Ukraine. Thus, two major goals of the study were:
  to assess the local government ﬁscal losses of the potential revenues because of 
informal sector; and
  to ﬁnd out what has been done already and what could be done in order to 
increase the potential of the most important local taxes and duties. 
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These questions were studied based on nationwide statistics of public sector ﬁnance 
as submitted by the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance and the data on local revenues of 
three selected local governments within the Vinnitsa Region for the last ﬁve years: 
Khmilnyk (town of oblast signiﬁcance), Illintsi (town of rayon signiﬁcance), and Ven-
dychany (village). 
In additions, interviews, surveys, and focus group discussions were carried out 
with key oﬃcials of both central and local governments and representatives of the lo-
cal business communities. In particular, in-depth interviews with 100 taxpayers were 
conducted through the taxpayers associations of the Vynnytsa region (50 respondents) 
and Kyiv (30 taxpayers), as well as association of small traders in Khmilnyk (20 small 
entrepreneurs). 
A signiﬁcant share of the Ukrainian population has been to some extent involved in 
informal activities: both formal and informal sectors. Besides the unfairness of Ukrainian 
tax system, there are at least four additional reasons for the strength of the informal 
economy in Ukraine (Joshi and Ayee 2002 and 2008, Kallay 2003): a low level of eco-
nomic development; non-transparent and frequently-changed legislation; administrative 
ineﬃciency (problems of tax supervision and collection); behavior problems (taxpayer 
psychology, level of tax ethics).
Among the participants of informal sector in Ukraine we can distinguish:
  subjects of illegal economy that accumulated considerable capital and do not 
have incentives to operate in the oﬃcial sector of economy;
  oﬃcially registered businessmen, who prefer to operate (at least in part) outside 
the scope of current legislation, aiming to and thus increaseing their proﬁts;
  common citizens who are forced to top up their own income because of the 
low level of oﬃcial earnings;
  public enterprise management taking advantage of the uncontrolled utilization 
of state property; 
  local administrators who have received gains from corrupt activities.
The presence of a vast informal sector causes a number of serious problems, in par-
ticular (Joshi and Ayee 2008, Kallay 2003): a deterioration of the tax base; injustices 
in taxation and unfair competition; constraints to growth of national and regional 
economy; channels for the gradual legalization of openly criminal money; and an inef-
fective allocation of resources.
At the local level the consequences of informal sector existence are: a low level of 
social security; low quality of public services; underdeveloped infrastructure; widespread 
bribery; and problems with implementing local economic policy.
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The structure of informal employment remained stable in 2001–2007 (Table 5.1). 
The majority of informal employment was in agriculture, including subsistence agri-
culture. 
Table 5.1
Employment in the Informal Sector of the Economy 
by Types of Economic Activity, Percent
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
including (% of total)
Agriculture, hunting, and fishing 71.1 73.2 74.4 73.1 70.2 72.0 71.6
Construction 4.7 4.4 4.7 5.9 6.1 6.9 7.7
Trade, repair, hotels, and restaurants 15.9 15.2 13.8 13.7 15.0 12.8 11.8
Transport and communication 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2
Other types of economic activity 6.9 5.5 5.5 5.8 7.1 6.9 7.7
Source: SCSU (2007). 
Among other sectors, trade, repair, hotels and restaurants, and construction also 
have attracted a large number of informal employees, but with a noticeable reduction 
of the informal employment in the services (trade, repair, hotels and restaurants) and 
a growth in construction. The latter could be explained by recent construction boom 
in the country, attracting a lot of temporary workers without formal registration of 
their employment in the State Employment Oﬃce (SEO). One distinctive feature of 
the country’s informal sector is a segment of people, so-called “workers on the squares” 
(Maydans), who are actually paid for their demonstrations of support for or protests 
against the government or leading political parties. 
For the purpose of this study, three settlements in the Vinnitsa Region were chosen: 
Khmilnyk (city of oblast signiﬁcance), Illintsi (town of rayon signiﬁcance), and Ven-
dychany (village). They are representative samples of the typical local governments of 
Ukraine. Besides, these three local governments reﬂect the three-level budget system of 
Ukraine. The informal sector of two towns and the village have many similar features 
with other local governments in Ukraine. 
Local administration in Ukraine is regulated by a set of national acts, comprising 
the Budget Code (2001), the Law on Local Self-government (1997), and the Law on 
Local State Administration (1999). As in many other transitional countries, some sec-
ondary legal acts provide a signiﬁcant input into the legal environment within which 
local governments act, especially annual budget laws and regulations of the Ukrainian 
Cabinet of Ministers (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 1993).
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According to the Budget Code of Ukraine, some revenue sources are assigned to local 
governments for fulﬁllment of their own responsibilities and delegated responsibilities 
separately. So-called own revenue sources are designated to cover expenditures on own 
responsibilities completely. Revenues and expenditures on delegated responsibilities 
are estimated by the Ministry of Finance. Of course, LGs are free to collect and spend 
bigger amounts; the purpose of the Ministry of Finance calculations is to deﬁne the 
amounts of transfers to cover the gap between estimated revenues assigned to delegated 
responsibilities and estimated expenditures on delegated responsibilities. 
Thus, the local governments are highly dependent from the state in all aspects: their 
accounts could be held only in the state treasury, not in commercial banks; on the regional 
and district levels, the state administration runs the budgets and public service delivery.
The total local revenues as a percentage of the consolidated budget, excluding inter-
budgetary transfers, during 1992–2007 showed a consistent trend towards reduction. 
They were virtually reduced by half, from 46.6 up to 26.5 percent. During this period, 
total local budget revenues as percentage of GDP also dropped, albeit less markedly 
(from 17.9 to 15.1 per cent).
There are only a few duties that could lend local governments some capacity in 
revenue raising activities, thus decreasing the informal sector share. To these belong 
local taxes (the list set by legislation includes 16 duties of diﬀerent types, all with quite 
limited possibility of setting tax rates and the uniﬁed small business tax (UT); these 
two in sum deliver barely 2.2 percent of total revenues for aggregate subnational sectors 
in 2007. Besides, relative proceeds from local taxes and duties (as proportion in total 
proceeds, transfers excluded) have shown a diminishing long-term trend.
The competence of the local governments in levying local taxes is formally quite 
broad: imposing local taxes and duties, granting tax credits, reduced rates and privileges 
to the payers to the local budgets. But the real discretion in this ﬁeld is very limited, 
since the list of levies granted to sub-ational governments, the tax bases, and the marginal 
tax rates are determined centrally. It must be said that subnational governments do not 
have direct authority in administering their own taxes because the most important lev-
ies are collected and administered by the local oﬃces of the State Tax Administration.
A more detailed analysis of three chosen local budgets enable some speciﬁc conclu-
sions with respect to revenue composition in cities of oblast signiﬁcance, cities of rayon 
signiﬁcance, and villages.
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Table 5.2
Structure of Local Budget Revenues in Khmilnyk (2004–2008)
Type of revenue 
source
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
 Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Tax revenues (1) 7,321 59.6 8,664 52.7 10,230 47.4 14,621 48.5 18,730 46.3
Personal income tax 4,459 37.7 5,700 35.8 6,798 32.4 10,148 34.4 13,219 33.2
Profit tax on the 
enterprises owned 
by municipalities
68 0.6 44 0.3 45 0.2 343 1.2 113 0.3
Land fee 979 8.3 883 5.5 985 4.7 1,163 3.9 2,181 5.5
Unified tax for the 
small business
566 4.8 675 4.2 762 3.6 1,095 3.7 1,217 3.1
Tax on the owners 
of vehicles
310 2.6 382 2.4 533 2.5 653 2.2 692 1.7
Fee for the licenses 
on entrepreneurial 
activity
20 0.2 34 0.2 35 0.2 34 0.1 34 0.1
Fee for the trade 
patent
181 1.5 187 1.2 295 1.4 259 0.9 326 0.8
Local own taxes 
and fees 
301 2.5 326 2.0 310 1.5 357 1.2 369 0.9
State duty 162 1.4 146 0.9 181 0.9 249 0.8 277 0.7
Nontax revenues and 
capital gains (2)
86 0.7 294 1.8 419 2.0 552 1.9 1,378 3.5
Targeted funds (3) 17 0.1 23 0.1 22 0.1 106 0.4 179 0.5
Subtotal: Local 
Revenues without 
transfers (1+2+3)
7,423 60.4 8,981 54.7 10,671 49.5 15,279 50.7 20,287 50.2
Official Transfers: 
Total
6,626 39.6 7,209 45.3 10,596 50.5 14,533 49.3 19,839 49.8
Total Revenues 4,722 100.0 16,191 100.0 21,268 100.0 29,812 100.0 40,126 100.0
Source: Financial Department of Vinnitsa state regional administration.
As shown in the Table 5.2, budget revenues in Khmilnyk (town of oblast signiﬁcance 
in Vinnitsa Region) have the following characteristics: 
  substantial decrease in the share of local revenues excluding transfers in total 
revenues (from 60.4 percent in 2004 to 50.2 percent in 2005); steep growth in 
shares of nontax revenues and capital gains;
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  major role of PIT as a source of taxation with slight reduction of its share in 
total revenues during 2004–2008; 
  reduction in ﬁscal role of local taxes, tax on the owners of vehicles, uniﬁed tax 
(UT);
  vigorous growth in 2008 (both in nominal and relative terms) of the revenues 
related to land resources, including both tax revenues (land fee) and nontax 
revenues (receipts from land sale and rent payments on municipal property) as 
a result of strengthening the monitoring procedures and the introduction of a 
penalty system on the part of local authorities during 2008. Thus, in particular, 
the land fee receipts doubled and receipts from land sales tripled as compared 
with the 2007 reduction of the real growth rate of the local taxes and fees in 
2006 and 2008. 
According to the Table 5.3, the conclusions regarding the structural changes in the 
budget revenues of Illintsi (town of rayon signiﬁcance) are the following:
  the share of local own revenues in total revenues were gradually reducing during 
2004–2007 (by 10 percentage points), but went back to the level of 2004 in 
2008 due to nontax revenues;
  in contrast to the Khmilnik and Vendychany budgets, tax revenues in Illintsi 
remained the main revenue source for its budget despite their diminishing share 
trend within the analyzed period;
  the increase in ﬁscal role of nontax revenues and capital gains (especially, in 2008) 
correlated more with the reduction of oﬃcial transfers share than with tax revenues 
share. Besides, nontax revenues were increasing faster during the observed period 
in nominal and real terms as compared to the other mentioned sources;
  PIT share grew from 32.6 to 46.6 percent (despite the tax rate cut from 15 to 
13 percent in 2007), providing the largest receipts to the budget.
As for Khmilnyk, there were reductions in the ﬁscal role of local taxes, the motor 
vehicle tax and the uniﬁed tax for small businesses, due to the lower annual growth rates 
as compared to the general revenue trend. Thus, during the analyzed period the share 
of local taxes reduced by a factor of three, and the uniﬁed tax for small businesses—by 
a factor of 1.7.  
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Table 5.3
Structure of Local Budget Revenues in Illintsi (2004–2008)
Type of revenue source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Tax revenues 1,345 81.9 1,808 54.3 2,346 65.3 3,048 60.5 4,385 73.7
Personal income tax 536 32.6 756 22.7 1,260 35.1 2,058 40.9 2,775 46.6
Profit tax on the 
enterprises owned by 
municipalities
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 35 0.7 17 0.3
Tax on the owners of 
vehicles
90 5.5 158 4.7 176 4.9 193 3.8 245 4.1
Land fee 200 12.2 205 6.1 176 4.9 104 2.1 333 5.6
Local own taxes and fees 88 5.4 108 3.2 95 2.6 97 1.9 119 2.0
Fixed agricultural tax 6 0.4 13 0.4 38 1.1 17 0.3 16 0.3
Unified tax for the small 
business
308 18.7 442 13.3 513 14.3 473 9.4 724 12.2
State duty 117 7.1 126 3.8 88 2.4 70 1.4 157 2.6
Fee for the licenses on 
entrepreneurial activity
5 0.3 4 0.1 4 0.1 4 0.1 11 0.2
Fee for the trade patent 33 2.0 39 1.2 79 2.2 94 1.9 114 1.9
Nontax revenues and 
capital gains:
70 4.2 248 7.5 431 12.0 550 10.9 616 10.4
Targeted funds 2.63 0.2 184 5.5 62 1.7 261 5.2 8 0.1
Subtotal: Local Revenues 
without transfers
1,417 86.3 2,240 67.3 2,838 79.0 3,858 76.6 5,010 84.2
Official Transfers: Total 226 13.8 1,089 32.7 756 21.0 1,178 23.4 940 15.8
Total Revenues 1,643 100.0 3,328 100.0 3,594 100.0 5,037 100.0 5,950 100.0
Source: Financial Department of Vinnitsa regional administration.
With respect to the budget revenues of Vendychany (Table 5.4) the following con-
clusions can be formulated:
  oﬃcial transfers remained the main source of the village budget (in compliance 
with Budget Code of Ukraine) during the analyzed period, while the share of 
total revenues without transfers in total revenues substantially decreased;
  the share of the main tax revenue source, namely PIT, was relatively stable;
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  considerable reduction in revenue share of local taxes and duties (by ten times 
from 2.0 to 0.2 percent), tax on the owners of vehicles (by three times from 4.0 
to 1.3 percent), land fee (by two times from 7.3 to 3.3 percent). At the same 
time, in nominal terms these types of revenues were gradually growing except 
for local taxes and duties, which receipts dropped by almost tree times during 
2004–2008 (from UAH 16,000 to 5,000);
  strengthening in the ﬁscal role of revenues from capital gains and nontax revenues 
(the same as for two previous local governments).
Table 5.4
Structure of Local Budget Revenues in Vendychany (2004–2008)
Type of revenue source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Tax revenues 241 27.1 196 12.9 200.4 10.6 277 12.7 415 12.7
Personal income tax 81 7.0 46 4.3 73.5 4.1 126 5.8 182 5.6
Profit tax on the 
enterprises owned by 
municipalities
1 0.0 1 0.0 0.5 0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0
Tax on the owners of 
vehicles
25 4.0 25 0.9 15.6 0.9 26 1.3 40 1.3
Land fee 86 7.3 48 3.3 38.1 2.0 45 2.1 106 3.3
Fee for the licenses 
on entrepreneurial 
activity
0 1.0 7 0.4 4.0 0.3 2 0.1 2 0.0
Fee for the trade 
patent
10 1.2 12 0.7 10.6 0.5 11 0.5 12 0.3
Local own taxes and 
fees 
16 2.0 12 0.6 10.1 0.5 5 0.2 5 0.2
Fixed agricultural tax 4 0.5 4 0.3 6.0 0.3 5 0.2 5 0.1
Unified tax for the 
small business
14 2.8 36 2.0 35.0 1.8 53 2.3 60 1.8
State duty 5 1.2 5 0.3 7.0 0.2 4 0.2 2 0.1
Nontax revenues 
and capital gains:
144 0.7 153 3.4 128.0 2.2 68 0.6 121 2.9
Targeted funds 1 0.5 4 0.1 2.2 0.1 5 0.2 80 2.1
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Type of revenue source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Thd 
UAH
Share 
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Thd 
UAH
Share
%
Subtotal: Local 
Revenues without 
transfers
386 28.3 352 16.4 330.7 12.9 350 13.5 616 17.6
Official Transfers: 
Total
773 71.7 1,335 83.6 1,630.6 87.1 2,156 86.5 3,021 82.4
Total Revenues 1,159 100.0 1,687 100.0 1,961.3 100.0 2,506 100.0 3,637 100.0
Source: Financial Department of Vinnitsa regional administration.
The strikingly low portion of local taxes in local government coﬀers relates to the 
fact that the local governments do not have eﬀective stimuli to exploit this source of 
revenues because of its insigniﬁcant role. 
Table 5.5
Structure of Local Taxes and Duties in 2008 in Three Local Governments
Type of local revenue source Khmilnyk Illintsi Vendychany
Thd UAH Share, % Thd UAH Share, % Thd UAH Share, %
Advertisement tax 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Communal tax 97.3 26.4 36.4 30.6 3.5 64.9
Vehicle parking fee 3.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Marketplace fee 229.2 62.1 76.5 64.4 1.7 30.8
Fees for permission to lease a 
private apartment
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Resort duty 30.3 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Local sign usage tax 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Local auction and lottery fees 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Duty for the issuance of a 
permit to locate vending and 
service facilities
6.6 1.8 5.4 4.6 0.2 4.3
Total local taxes and fees 368.9 100.0 118.8 100.0 5.4 100.0
Source: Financial Department of Vinnitsa regional administration. 
Looking at Table 5.5, the most signiﬁcant local taxes and duties in all three settle-
ments are communal tax, marketplace fees, and duty for the issuance of a permit to 
locate vending and service facilities. Besides, the distinctive feature of Khmilnyk is fairly 
signiﬁcant share of resort duty (8.2 percent of their total amount).
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The analysis of three cases mentioned above led us to a quick conclusion regarding 
the rather sudden reduction in tax revenue share (comparing with nontax revenues). 
In particular, special attention should be paid to the fact of steady reduction in revenue 
share from local taxes and duties. 
What are the reasons for the reduction in the ﬁscal role of local tax revenues? 
Interviews conducted with the local oﬃcials in these three local governments and 
Kiev resulted in the identiﬁcation of at least four main reasons: out-of-date and con-
tradictive legislation; a lack of local taxes and duties (in the list), with high elasticity 
with regard to local economic development (Zaichikova 2006 and Ivanenko 2005); a 
lack of incentives for local governments to raise revenues from local sources, as increas-
ingly higher percentage of their revenues comes from delegated (ceded) revenues and 
transfers (Goncharenko 2005); and an increase in the informal sector on the local level.
We will pay attention on the last one, which is a core issue for our research, starting 
with the analysis of the major local revenue source, namely, PIT. 
The data on the PIT receipts for three local budgets provethat they are the foun-
dation of local budgets, determining primarily the funds available for healthcare and 
education. This explains why the legalization of individual incomes and incentives to 
legitimize incomes must be a state policy priority to provide additional ﬁnancial resources 
for local budgets in Ukraine.
Most of the state policy measures being used to reduce the share of informal 
incomes in Ukraine involved decreasing tax rates and making tax administration 
more eﬀective. Much less has been done to improve the quality of public services 
and make tax legislation more understandable, clear, and predictable (Lavriv 2003 
and Pavlyuk 2006).
The system for taxing individual incomes was a subject of the most radical changes, 
with a ﬂat 13-percent tax rate replacing the progressive tax system in 2004. While 
this step led to a signiﬁcant reduction in the tax burden, especially for individuals 
with higher than average incomes, this step has proved insuﬃcient, failing to solve 
the problem of Pension Fund contributions, which constitute the lion’s share of all 
payroll deductions and are the main reason why employers prefer to pay wages “in 
white envelopes.”
In 2001, the president signed a decree on measures to bring the economy out of the 
shadows, and a simpliﬁed tax system had already been introduced for small businesses 
in 1999. A lump-sum tax replaced a variety of taxes and mandatory social contributions 
for those businesses which were eligible. In general, these measures have inﬂuenced the 
process of bringing the economy out of the shadows in a positive way. According to 
estimates by Ministry of Economy, the share of the shadow economy reached its peak 
in 1998 and has been slowly shrinking ever since. Still, a look at the continuing impact 
of the informal economy shows a host of unaddressed issues:
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  Tax rates and social contributions. High Pension Fund contribution rates make 
it almost impossible for many companies to work proﬁtably if they pay all the 
formal deductions, leading them to conceal some part of their payrolls.
  Incentives for staying in the formal economy. A system of incentives is the least 
developed tool for bringing incomes out of the shadows, while a host of features 
in the social security and pension systems provoke individuals and businesses 
alike to move into the informal sector. For an average Ukrainian, the taxes and 
contributions paid do not correlate to the availability of healthcare services, 
since they are ostensibly provided to everyone. 
  Penalties for tax evasion and oversight over commercial activities. Legislation 
provides for heavy ﬁnes for evading or delaying taxes, but the impunity of 
high-proﬁle taxpayers who evade payment has a negative impact on the public 
consciousness (Fjeldstad 2001 and Fejeldstad and Raker 2003).
Taking the current problems in each of these areas into account, it can be argued 
that positive trends leading the economy from its dependence on the informal sector 
are unstable and new measures are needed to maintain and strengthen them.
The small business tax or uniﬁed tax (UT) was introduced by a presidential decree 
in 1998 in order to make way for the legalization of small businesses that had up till 
that point, a signﬁciant motivation to escape taxation through non-registration under 
the common tax regime. Thus, the small businesses in most areas of economic activity2 
gained the right to switching to paying the small business tax in one lump sum, instead 
of paying a host of taxes like VAT, enterprise proﬁt tax, PIT, land tax, trade patent fee, 
trade permit fee, and contributions to social security and pension funds, in addition to 
some local taxes and duties.
Actually, Ukraine uses UT of two types: (a) a lump-sum rate UT as concerns natu-
ral persons and (b) a ﬁxed proportional rate UT as concerns legal persons. So natural 
persons with an annual turnover up to UAH 500,000 and up to 10 staﬀ could be taxed 
by a lump sum ranging from UAH 20 to 200 per month; legal persons with a turnover 
up to UAH 1,000,000 and up to 50 hired personal could choose to pay 6 per cent tax 
in turnover in case they decide to pay VAT, or 10 percent in the opposite case. 
As concerns UT for legal persons, there is actually no discretion for local governments 
to vary tax rates because the tax rate schedule is set by the national legislation and a rate 
can be freely chosen by the taxpayer according to his or her own beneﬁt calculus. As 
concerns UT for natural persons (UTNP), there is some room for local government’s 
tax rate discretion because the legislation sets only the tax rate margins (from 20–200 
UAH monthly) that allows the local governments to decide upon setting tax rates for 
diﬀerent economic activities within these margins. 
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Evaluating Ukrainian UTNP one must admit that it looks quite attractive for small 
businesses. The number of small businesses registered as UTNP payers in Ukraine has 
increased in the period 1999–2008 from 66,000 to nearly a million. 
As demonstrated by the statistical data of three local governments, the rates of this 
tax for individuals are far from the maximum (which is UAH 200 a month, disregard-
ing the status of the paid employees). For instance, the rate of UTNP for Khmilnyk is 
40 percent of the maximum level, and in Illintsi and Vendychany—30 and 25 percent, 
correspondingly. It demonstrates that local governments are not really interested in 
revenues from this tax as the total revenues from this tax are shared between the central 
and the local budgets and the local budgets, in fact, receive only a token part of the 
total revenues (43 percent for UTNP). 
Local tax oﬃcers and ﬁscal administrators interviewed suggest that the UTNP is 
often being used for tax evasion: the engagement of paid employees without making 
formal labor contracts with them; evasion from payment of PIT, some local taxes, and 
payroll taxes by registering employees as business entities, which are the payers of UT. 
The main possibility to evade UT is not registering as a small entrepreneur. 
Interviews were conducted with 100 taxpayers,3 mainly representatives of small- and 
medium-size businesses in the Vynnytsa region and the city of Kiev. Their answers helped 
to establish what taxpayers think when they pay taxes; to determine the main reasons for 
tax evasion; and to evaluate the potential level of the main revenue sources of their budgets.
For the ﬁrst question, “How do you feel when you pay taxes?” the following answers 
were obtained and are listed in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6
How Do You Feel When You Pay Taxes?
The money spent on taxes is returned to you and your family by local budget expenditures 3.3%
You are part of the financial power of the state 3.3%
You support those who need the money more than you 8.9%
Officials take money that you honestly earn 28.0%
Anyway, all this money is plundered by officials 36.0%
Taxpayers’ money is not plundered, but is not distributed as you wish 17.6%
Other 2.4%
Hard to say 0.5%
The majority of the respondents (64 percent) relate their negative perception of 
tax paying with dishonesty of the oﬃcials. Such mistrust is formulated as either “oﬃ-
cials take the money that we honestly earn” (28 percent of all participants) or ”all this 
money is plundered by oﬃcials” (36 percent ). Almost 18 percent of all taxpayers do 
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not consider that money out of taxes is plundered by oﬃcials, but rather think that the 
collected resources are distributed ineﬀectively.
Regarding the second issue, namely, the main reasons for tax evasion, the following 
answers were received: excessive tax burden; fuzzy tax legislation; excessive number of 
oﬃcial and non-oﬃcial levies; imperfection of tax administration; non-transparent 
mechanism of revenues distribution between diﬀerent levels of budget system.
The taxpayers’ estimates of the amount of tax potential that is actually paid is 
presented in the Table 5.7 (where 100 percent means that the tax or fee is fully paid 
without evasions). 
Table 5.7
Respondents’ Estimates of the Amount of Tax Potential That Is Actually Paid, 
According to Type of Tax or Fee, in Percent
Revenue source Percent of potential proceeds 
(estimated average level)
Personal income tax 40
Tax on the owners of vehicles 90
Unified tax for small businesses 80
Land fee 85
Rent on municipal property 40
Fee for the licenses on entrepreneurial activity 85
Fee for the trade patent 87
Own local taxes and fees 60
Fee for the use of natural resources 45
Source: Data collection, 2009.
Thus, PIT, rent on municipal property, and local taxes (fees) have the lowest potential 
level, while the estimation of the tax on the owners of motor vehicles is quite close to the 
target. The low percentage rate for PIT is primarily explained by the enormously high 
payroll tax, where as low receipts from municipal property rent are related to practices 
of unoﬃcial payments to local authorities and intentionally downgraded tax assessment 
of real property. The small tax potential of local taxes and fees resulted from lack of 
incentives for local governments to raise revenues from local sources.
The estimates of the share of unregistered retail trade4 in Ukraine constituted ap-
proximately 40 percent of the total volume of retail trade in 2006–2007, which is mostly 
concentrated in the food sector. In particular, over 58 percent of meat retail is currently 
informal, which has reduced over the past three years by seven percentage points. Besides, 
unregistered street markets remain the second most favorite place for food purchases by 
consumers after supermarkets (22 percent of all consumers buy goods on the street). 
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It correlates with the respective ﬁgures at the local level. Thus, due to the estimate 
of Khmilnyk local tax administration, the share of unregistered retail trade constituted 
nearly 43 percent in 2008. The majority of street vendors sell fresh vegetables and fruit, 
fresh meat and milk, and cigarettes (Table 5.8). Street vendors are mainly located near 
the oﬃcial municipal markets, shopping areas, other public places (educational cen-
ters, sanatoriums, and hospitals) as well as near the roads, motorways and bus stations. 
Consumers of such goods are low- and middle-income households and pensioners.
According to the data received from the interviews carried out with 80 street vend-
ers in Khmilnyk almost 82 percent of respondents are paying unregistered fees to the 
representatives of local authorities (police, tax inspectors, sanitary inspectors).5
 Table 5.8
The Results of the Survey on Unregistered Street Trade in Khmilnyk
No. Variables Received data 
1. Types of selling goods  Vegetables and fruit 45%
 Meat and milk 35% 
 Cigarettes 20%
2. Ability to change trading 
location
 Fixed 35%
 Mobile 65%
3. Recipients of unregistered 
payments from street 
vendors
 representatives of local power (police, tax inspectors, sanitary 
inspectors) 82%
 non-officials 0%
 no receiver (e.g., vendors do not pay anything to anybody) 
18%
4. Unregistered daily 
payments
 UAH 10 45%
 UAH 20 35%
 UAH 35 20%
5. Average daily incomes  UAH 50–100 26%
 UAH 100–150 46%
 UAH 150–300 17%
 More than UAH 300 11%
6. Main reasons for rejection 
to pay official taxes and 
fees
 Excessive tax burden of the official payments 67% of all 
respondents 
 Unclear tax laws 32% of all respondents 
 Large number of taxes 34% of all respondents
 Uncertainty of appropriate use  of the official payments 
96% of all respondents 
 Habituation effect 16% of all respondents 
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No. Variables Received data 
7. Perception towards the 
official tax payments
 More than 50% goes to local budget 11%
 50% goes to local budget 29%
 Less than 50% goes to local budget 47%
 Nothing goes to local budget 13%
Source: Data collection, 2009.
Most of them are quite mobile and can easily move to another location in case of 
unexpected raids (in order not to pay penalties for the trade in the prohibited zone or 
without licenses). As 46 percent of all respondents earn on the average UAH 100–150, 
their monthly gross income in the informal sector is three times higher than the average 
pension and twice as high compared to the average salary in Ukraine. 
Unregistered daily payments by street vendors to the representatives of local power 
are ﬁxed and diﬀer depending on the type of goods for sale (for vegetables, UAH 10; 
citrus, UAH 20; meat, UAH 35). Thus, vendors’ costs for unregistered fees do not exceed 
15 percent of their gross income, which is highly proﬁtable for them. Many vendors are 
also receiving information from policemen (to whom they pay) about possible raids.
The respondents were also asked about their perception towards the oﬃcial tax pay-
ments. Eighty-six percent of the vendors do not believe that more than half of oﬃcial 
taxes and duties go to the local budget. Among the main reasons for not wanting to 
pay oﬃcial levies are the uncertainty of the appropriate use of the oﬃcial payments (96 
percent of all vendors) and the excessive tax burden of the oﬃcial payments (67 percent). 
The strict administrative measures enforced by the local administration are not 
systematic and have not brought about any signiﬁcant results in reducing informal 
trade in Khmilnyk. Therefore, it might be more eﬃcient to create favorable conditions 
for their trade, for instance, the creation of additional marketplaces or social markets, 
as well as the introduction of regular trade fairs in the city. It will reduce the informal 
sector and increase the quality of the goods sold. 
Given the reasons behind the emergence of a vast informal sector, it is possible to 
name three areas where changes could reduce the ratio of informal incomes at the local 
level: the tax system, incentives for working in the formal economy, penalties for tax evasion, 
and better oversight over commercial activities.
Correspondingly, the main strategy we have chosen involves shifting the main 
emphasis to improving the quality of public services while further reducing the tax 
burden, simplifying tax legislation, and regulating commercial activity (Bahl and Bird 
2008). This strategy is based on the assumption that the main reason why previous ef-
forts to bring the economy out of the shadows have not yielded the desired results is the 
inadequate attention paid to creating a system where working in the formal economy 
oﬀers more advantages than working in the margins. The main shortcoming of this 
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strategy is that it is not a quick ﬁx and the ﬁrst stages of implementation will require 
additional resources. Any anticipated growth in local budget revenues is likely to take 
some time, but the possibility of obtaining sustainable results makes this strategy more 
attractive. In this complex, we have singled out measures that are aimed at (Pikhotska 
2003, Slukhai 2006, and Bird 2000): increasing trust in government; raising the quality 
of public services; improving tax administration; stronger penalities for tax evasion; more 
active administrative and criminal prosecution for those individuals who collect illegal pay-
ments and “protect” street vendors. 
The interviews conducted in the course of this study show that the vast majority 
of Ukrainians support a reduction in payroll deductions and see this measure as neces-
sary to bring their personal incomes out of the shadows. At the same time, raising the 
retirement age is an extremely unpopular step. This is because the risk of losing a job is 
quite high for a worker who is close to the retirement age, which outweighs the beneﬁt 
of having much higher income for a longer period of time.
We will discuss some of the measures below in more detail.
Better administration of the uniﬁed small business tax. It is obvious that a signiﬁcant 
increase of UT receipts would be achieved only in case when the local governments 
have higher interest in their own revenue growth; it requires to change a status of some 
formally local revenue sources that, in fact, are heavily regulated by the state to entirely 
own revenues. In addition, due to the surveys, entrepreneurs consider UT to be one of 
the least cumbersome taxes, which provides good prospects for growth in employment 
and income of paid employees (Chunykha 2005). So, this tax shall be fully assigned 
to the local governments. The implementation of these proposals is the only way to 
remove such an inconsistency when moving to a simpliﬁed taxation system, whereby the 
taxpayers became exempt from payment of both the taxes treated as national ones and 
the taxes treated by the Budget Code of Ukraine as own revenues. To the latter belong, 
in particular, the land registration fee, and some local taxes and duties. The uniﬁed tax 
on legal persons could remain in the ﬁrst basket since the local governments could not 
aﬀect its rate; that being said, the list of taxes/duties from which a UT payer is exempted, 
shall be limited to the earnings which belong to it. 
There could be a question, whether the local governments have suﬃcient admin-
istrative capacity to administer the UTNP. But since the structure of such a tax is very 
simple (lump sums depending on types of activity), there is little problem with its 
administration. The existing ﬁscal departments of local governments could easily take 
this function. 
A diﬀerentiation of UTNP rates by oﬃcially approved business activity would also 
very helpful for raising UT proceeds. This will make it possible, ﬁrst, to encourage local 
governments to setting tax rates at a more or less adequate level for some proﬁt-bringing 
activities, and second, to reduce its likely distorting impact on taxpayer behavior (with 
respect to selecting the place of registration, in particular). In our view, such an approach 
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should be combined with the diﬀerentiation of the tax rates according to earnings as 
suggested by some economists (Ljutyi and Romanyuk 2007), which would produce 
fewer incentives to evade tax payments. 
Better administration of land payments. Revenues from municipal land use and 
sales currently deliver about 10 percent of Ukrainian local government revenues. There 
is a trend of increasing the land sale tax’s share in this revenue type: according to data 
of the Ministry of Finance, in 2001, it brought 10 percent of revenue stemming from 
municipal land, but in 2007 it was 40 percent; in large cities like Kiev, this ﬁgure reached 
a value of 70 percent. Despite such a relatively large value, there are a lot of possibilities 
to make land revenue sources much more important. It especially concerns land sale. 
The fact is that only insigniﬁcant portion of municipal land in Ukraine has been 
alienated through competitive bidding procedures: most land plots (far more than 95 
percent) were given away on a “free” basis. The open land auctions have been organized 
mostly in the large cities, but never in small cities and villages. A bias to such a non-
transparent procedure of allotting the valuable land parcels clearly signals the prevalence 
of private interests over public ones. Receiving land for free is obviously connected 
with high-scale bribery when heads of rural councils may be oﬀered USD millions for 
extremely favorable council decisions. 
All these facts demonstrate that the mere strict limitation to the practice of allotting 
land for free in conjunction with introducing competitive land tenders would greatly 
increase local revenues. But in order to be introduced, real, eﬀective public control is 
needed and nearly impossible without greater transparency and accountability on the 
part of local governments. 
Optimization of a current local revenue list and exemptions. The trend in revenue 
composition (basing on three analyzed local governments) calls for reform because 
the current composition cannot insure suﬃcient revenue adequacy, even for funding 
delegated functions. That is why it is very important to ﬁnd how to expand the local 
revenue base while also decreasing the informal sector (Bird and Wallace 2003). The 
most viable candidates to be included in local levies are taxes on land and property, and 
the motor vehicle tax. The tax on land is still a national levy ceded to local governments; 
the motor vehicle tax is a national levy assigned to subnational budgets. By assigning 
these taxes fully to the local governments, the center could retain control by deﬁning 
the tax basis and marginal rates of taxation in legislation.
In general, the following ﬁve options have been considered in order to change the 
approach towards the local taxation (see Table 5.9) (Lavriv 2003 and Tarangul 2002):
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Table 5.9
Analysis of the Policy Options
Policy option Consequences
1. Gradual transferring of important revenue 
types from the central government to the 
local governments. 
This will provide a setting where local admin-
istrators must act responsibly when collecting 
own revenue and individuals will start 
demanding reports about spending. 
2. Shortening of the list of inefficient local taxes 
and duties (like dog tax, trotting matches 
duty, use of local symbol duty, etc., which 
in total, yield only small percentage of local 
taxation proceeds, but need great administra-
tive efforts).
This step will make tax administration more 
concentrated on important revenue sources, 
and thus improve its efficiency.
3. Improvement of the tax structure for those 
local taxes that remain on the list.
Abandoning tax rates bound to minimal 
nontaxable individual income and setting 
them as a lump sum or as a percentage of the 
tax base. It will ensure a higher elasticity of tax 
revenues, and hence, greater correspondence 
between the amount of revenues collected and 
expenditures. 
4. Granting local self-government authori-
ties the right to introduce by their decision 
some local duties that could bring sufficient 
revenue to solve some specific local problems 
(with the burden falling only onto the local 
inhabitants).
It will provide the grounds for expansion of 
self-taxation on settlements and city communi-
ties. Moreover, it will help to achieve the fiscal 
equivalence at the self-government authority 
level, i.e., higher correspondence between the 
expenditure and mobilization of revenues in a 
particular territory.
5. Reduction of tax evasions through increasing 
the punishment for truant taxpayers and 
those individuals who help them by using 
their administrative position (the officials 
who take unofficial payments). 
This step will create higher motivation for 
taxpayers to obey tax legislation and thus make 
the tax proceeds larger.
6. Introducing local tax administrations dealing 
only with local taxes and duties.
Significant increase in local taxes and duties 
proceeds due to greater motivation for the 
local governments to collect the full amount of 
payments.
Introduction of new local taxes and duties: property tax. From many countries, one of 
the most eﬀective ways to reduce the size of the informal sector and raise local budget 
revenues through the expansion of the local revenue base is the introduction of a prop-
erty tax (Brzeski 2008, Lewis 2006, and Slukhai 2008). Such a tax facilitates greater 
fairness concerning wealth distribution and can reveal the hidden share of the informal 
sector in Ukraine. 
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Unlike many other transition countries, Ukraine has no explicit property taxation 
on either the local or the national level. Instead, there are some property quasi-taxes 
like the land tax, the motor vehicle tax, and the natural resource utilization levies that 
are assigned to the local budgets. The revenue capacity and local rate-setting discretion 
concerning these levies is very limited.
First, the property taxes have speciﬁc features, which make them convenient for use 
as local taxes: real property cannot be hidden or moved to a diﬀerent territory, so the 
“natural” intent of economic entities to evade taxation is minimized. In addition, it is the 
local level where any changes, which may be made to the tax base, are easier to observe.
The second argument for use of local property taxation is reliability of such taxes. 
According to the worldwide experience, such taxes, compared to many other taxes, show 
a higher stability of revenues, as cyclical changes in the market never eﬀect them as di-
rectly as in case of corporate proﬁt tax, PIT, or VAT. That is why property tax is capable 
of assuring revenues and certain amount of ﬁnancial stability for local self-government 
authorities even in a period of economic recession.
At the same time, this tax is associated with some problems that make its ad-
ministration quite challenging. It needs well-trained staﬀ and careful administration 
and it is, therefore, connected with quite high administrative costs; its sophisticated 
structure could generate signiﬁcant space for administrative misbehavior; in the case of 
underdeveloped markets, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd an appropriate tax base; and ﬁnally, it is 
very sensitive politically. Such a tax intervenes with the economic interests of diﬀerent 
groups of the population, especially the richest, who are not interested in sharing their 
fortunes with others. 
Field research performed by SufTAR (2006) in the Ivano-Frankivsk region has 
shown that there is some optimism concerning the ﬁrst two issues. In the regions, there is 
some information collected concerning residential property. In urban areas, the Bureaus 
of Technical Inventory hold some information on the location and size of privatized 
homes and apartments that extends for 30 up to 80 percent of households, as well as 
their initial value (market price). Housing departments have complete information on 
all the immobile property in the location. In the rural areas, the local governments keep 
information on local households, their private homes, and land plots.
This data is still incomplete (especially concerning commercial property) and is stored 
mostly on paper. Nevertheless, even with such incomplete information, a hypothetic 
taxation of private homes and apartments performed at a ﬂat rate per square meter (one-
tenth of that one employed in Poland—UAH 0.1 per square meter of dwelling space 
per annum and UAH 2.9 per square meter for commercial property objects6) brought 
some promising results: in some districts this tax could yield on average up to 25 percent 
and even more (in some locations 70 percent!) of current revenues, excluding grants.
This demonstrates the potential of property taxation, even in such a simpliﬁed and 
non-onerous form (e.g., the owner of a 100 square meter ﬂat would pay UAH 10 annually 
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while a kilogram of beef costs UAH 40–50), could be quite an important source of local 
revenues and constitute some kind of local ﬁscal autonomy in the case were proceeds will 
accrue the local budget. There will be no signiﬁcant administration costs associated with 
such a tax because the property information (including its current market value at the 
moment of property acquisition) is now being collected at the cost of citizens who must 
register their possessions; the annual tax forms could be ﬁlled in by them, too. 
Even if the mode of lump-sum tax per dwelling is chosen, this will swell local 
budgets. The introduction of the property tax assigned to local governments will help 
urban and neighboring communities in the ﬁrst line. The large cities of national and 
oblast signiﬁcance will receive a generous source of revenues because valuable property 
objects are concentrated in cities and suburban localities. But the rural communities 
will also beneﬁt greatly from this ﬁscal innovation. 
Currently, several options concerning property taxation are being discussed in the 
parliamentary committees. There are quite serious discrepancies in the approaches of 
the legislators, reﬂecting their ideological biases. For example, drafts submitted by the 
left-wing politicians (representatives of the Socialist and Communist Parties) are biased, 
so as to make the tax into an instrument to achieve a more even distribution of wealth, 
while proposing a long list of exclusions from taxation for diﬀerent categories of taxpayers. 
They also tend to assign this tax to the central government. There is some logic to this 
approach, but it leaves open the question of strengthening local government ﬁnance, 
despite the fact that both parties often use decentralization rhetoric.
Summarizing the above facts, we could argue that the introduction of the property 
tax in Ukraine would actually decrease the level of the informal sector, increase the level 
of social equality, and enhance the local revenue sources, making local governments 
ﬁscally more independent. Technically, it is possible even now, within a short period of 
time, to make this tax work. On the other hand, the uneven concentration of property 
objects would widen the gaps in terms of territory-speciﬁc ﬁscal endowment, which 
would then call for the improvement of ﬁscal equalization procedures now extending 
only over ceded revenues and delegated functions.
Consequently, the relevant legislation could be adopted within a short time span, 
followed by the introduction of the tax as early as 2010 (after the fall’s presidential 
election). We opt for the simplest form of the tax (lump sum or ﬂat rate) with some 
adjusting coeﬃcients to begin. Most socially motivated exclusions must be omitted (or 
radically reduced) in order to make people accustomed to paying property taxes and 
to avoid the danger of massive fraud like registering property with a category of payers 
exempt from taxation (e.g., retirees, low-income individuals, or large families). After 
some time (three years at least), a more sophisticated approach, possibly one based on 
market evaluation, could be applied. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
For National Authorities
  Adoption of the Tax Code with changes in tax legislation concerning: (a) 
simpliﬁcation of tax collection procedures and structure; (b) elimination of inef-
ﬁcient local taxes and revision of exemptions; (c) reduction of payroll tax; (d) 
reinforcing heavier ﬁscal penalties for local tax evasion and bribes; (e) establishing 
local tax administrations subordinated to the local council and responsible for 
collection of its own revenues; (f ) introduction of property tax.
  Through changes in the Budget Code, to transfer some shared revenue sources 
in a full amount to local budgets (primarily, tax on the owners of motor vehicles, 
uniﬁed and land taxes) as well as overestimated receipts, which will make local 
governments highly motivated to collect them in full.
  As concerns the State Tax Administration, taking special measures on strength-
ening of mutual understanding and collaboration between entrepreneurs and 
taxing authorities (common seminars, round tables, dissemination of informa-
tion), between state taxing authorities and local governments (information on 
taxpayers and their contribution to the local budget).
For the Local Governments
  Reduction of the number of tax privileges along with deeper diﬀerentiation of 
local tax rates.
  Introduction of local revenue registers (so-called “territorial passport”), 
allowing local governments to plan their own revenues more precisely and to 
have an instrument to evaluate local tax administration performance.
  Ensuring of civilized conditions for local small and micro business activity. The 
best measure will be organizing appropriate places for small business activities 
(like marketplaces) under strict control of the local government.
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NOTES
1 The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.
2 The following business activities are not eligible for simpliﬁed taxation: gambling, lotteries, currency 
exchange, production of excisable goods, production and selling of jewelry. 
3 Between January 15 and February 25, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were carried 
out with 100 taxpayers. They were organized through taxpayers’ associations in the Vynnytsa Region 
(50 respondents) and Kiev (30 taxpayers), as well as the association of small traders in Khmilnyk (20 
small business entrepreneurs). It helped to eliminate the eﬀects of regional factors and to receive more 
reliable information from diﬀerent groups of respondents using purposive sampling technique. 
4 Unregistered means out of general or simpliﬁed taxation; marketplace duty is not paid. 
5 The ﬁeldwork was based on in-depth interviews with 80 street traders using quota sampling 
technique. The interviews were conducted in one area (in Khmilnik) in the four largest unregistered 
marketplaces (“spontaneous” markets). The respondents were chosen by quotas according to the 
main types of selling goods (45 percent selling vegetables and fruits, 35 percent meat and milk, 20 
percent cigarettes). 
6 We agree that such a diﬀerence in rates existing in Poland is economically not well motivated; the 
rates here are applied only to illustrate that property taxation in Ukraine does have a signiﬁcant 
revenue potential.


